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Law
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Abstract
This Article addresses the problem of leveling down as a response to discrimi-
nation. Existing case law and legal scholarship generally assume that inequality
may be remedied in one of two ways: improving the lot of the disfavored group to
match that of the most favored group, or worsening the treatment of the favored
group until they fare as badly as everyone else. The term “leveling down” refers to
the latter response. This Article contends that courts and commentators have over-
stated the flexibility of equality rights in accepting leveling down as a response to
inequality, and proposes a new framework that focuses on the expressive meaning
of leveling down and its compatibility with a norm of equal concern. It concludes
with a section demonstrating how the proposed analysis would enrich the debate
among legal scholars over the normative appeal of equality rights.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I am  deeply indebted
to Martha Chamallas for her unsurpassed generosity as a mentor, friend, and critical reader.
I am also very grateful to Richard Delgado, Karen Engle, Jules Lobel, John Parry, Tom Ross,
Reva Siegel, and Lu-In W ang for sharing valuable com ments and insights. Earlier drafts of
this Article were presented at the Law and Society conference, the Law, Culture and
Humanities conference, and a feminist law teachers’ workshop at the University of
Pennsylvania.  I thank the participants of these conferences for their thoughtful questions and
comments.  I have benefited greatly from  the research assistance of Jorge Battle, Carrie
Cummings, Deborah Elman, and Lacy Wilber, and from a Dean’s Scholarship Grant from the
University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I am particularly grateful for the opportunity to
present this paper at the 2004 Yale/Stanford Junior Faculty Forum and for the valuable
feedback I received from the Forum participants. Finally, many thanks to the editors of the
William and Mary Law Review  for their hard work bringing this Article to fruition.
513
WHEN EQUALITY LEAVES EVERYONE WORSE OFF: THE
PROBLEM OF LEVELING DOWN IN EQUALITY LAW
DEBORAH L. BRAKE*
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515
I. THE TREATMENT OF LEVELING DOWN BY THE COURTS . . . . . . 525
A. Palmer v. Thompson Revisited: Formal Equality and
Discriminatory Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 526
B. Doctrinal Discomfort with Leveling Down . . . . . . . . . . . . 537
C. Seeds of Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541
1. The Significance of the Benefit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541
2. Remedial Principles Favoring Extension of Benefits . . 544
3. External Limits Fixing the Level of Treatment 
for One Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553
4. Leveling Down as a Cover for 
Continuing Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 556
D. Room for Further Development of 
Equality-Based Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 558
II. A  MORE CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON LEVELING DOWN 
AND EQUALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559
A. Equality as Equal Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560
B. An Expressive Meaning Approach to Leveling Down . . . . 570
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
514 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:513
III. APPLYING AN EXPRESSIVE MEANING APPROACH . . . . . . . . . 585
A. Three Examples Where Leveling Down Conflicts with
Equality Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585
B. Three Examples Where It May Not . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 592
IV. ADVANCING THE DEBATE OVER 
EQUALITY’S NORMATIVE VALUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602
A. Equality’s Critics and the Leveling Down Objection . . . . 603
B. The Treatment of Leveling Down by 
Equality’s Defenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 608
C. How Attention to Social Context and 
Expressive Meaning Would Enrich the Debate . . . . . . . . . 615
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 617
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art8
2004] WHEN EQUALITY LEAVES EVERYONE WORSE OFF 515
1. In this context, the phrase “leveling down” makes the most sense when the subject of
the challenged inequality is a sought-after benefit, as opposed to a burden sought to be
lessened, but the same phenomenon may occur in equality-based challenges to the allocation
of burdens. In the latter case, the decision maker would extend the burden to those previously
free of it, rather than lifting the burden from those disadvantaged by it. For the sake of
brevity, this Article uses the term “leveling down” to refer to the general scenario where the
advantaged group is made worse off (either by withdrawing benefits or extending burdens)
in order to achieve equality with the disadvantaged group.
2. For discussion of statutes that expressly prohibit leveling down remedies, see the
discussion infra at Part I.C.3.
3. Such a utilitarian objection to leveling down assumes that the utility loss from the
withdrawal of the benefit is not outweighed by shifting the resources to other purposes with
greater public benefit. For example, if leveling down resulted in resources being put to better
use, the utilitarian objection to leveling down loses its force. This assumption may be
defensible, given that the decision to offer the benefit in the first place presumably rested
upon a determination that the value of the benefit chosen outweighed that of other possible
uses of those resources.
4. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480 (4th ed. 2001).
INTRODUCTION
In the canon of equal protection, it is seemingly well-settled that
inequality may be remedied either by leveling up and  improving the
treatment of the disadvantaged class, or by leveling down and
bringing the group that is better off down to the level of those worse
off.  The presumptive permissibility of leveling down is viewed as an1
inherent feature of equality rights and is not limited to equal
protection; it applies in the statutory context as well, so long as not
expressly prohibited.  The acceptability of leveling down in response2
to inequality is even invoked to question whether equality has any
normative appeal at all, since it may serve as the vehicle for
producing an outcome which, by utilitarian standards, may seem
inefficient and undesirable.  As one of the leading constitutional law3
texts puts it:
Even if we could give substantive content to the equality
requirement, it is not clear why it has any normative appeal.
Although the demands of the equal protection clause can be
satisfied by extending the contested benefit to a broader group,
the government need not respond in this fashion. It may also
fully satisfy the demand of equality by denying both groups the
contested benefit.4
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5. See, e.g., JUDITH A. BAER, OUR LIVES BEFORE THE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 101 (1999) (“Fem inists can hardly welcome rulings like the victories of
W illiam Orr, who reneged on court-ordered alimony payments.... After Orr, Alabama was
under no obligation to make its alimony law gender-neutral (although it did); the state was
free to abolish all alimony, as Texas has done.”).
6. See generally MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 8-10
(2d ed. 2003) (discussing the prevalence of double binds confronting subordinated groups, and
defining double binds as “situations in which options are reduced to a very few and all of them
expose one to penalty, censure or deprivation”) (quoting M ARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF
REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 2 (1983)).
7. So much critical scholarship emphasizes this theme, that it defies comprehensive
citation in one brief footnote. For a small sampling, see, for example, CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000) (compiling writings
by critical race scholars containing rich critiques of formal principles of equality and
neutrality as masking deeper racial biases); Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract
Equality, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (indicating abstract principles of equality as failing to secure
meaningful equality for women); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002) (critiquing
conventional discrimination law for implicitly reinforcing privileged norms that place
demands on members of subordinated groups to assimilate and “cover” their identities).
Utility aside, the leveling down problem casts doubt on whether
conventional equality jurisprudence serves the interests of those
whom it supposedly protects.  The permissibility of leveling down5
confronts persons disadvantaged by inequality with a double bind:
challenge the inequality and risk worsening the situation for others
instead of improving one’s own situation, or continue to endure
unlawful discrimination.  This Article argues that there is a way out6
of this double bind: to recognize that leveling down is not always
consistent with the meaning of equality as reflected in U.S.
discrimination law.
The current approach to leveling down rests on two contestable
understandings. First, leveling down implicitly relies on a principle
of equal treatment as the exclusive meaning of equality without
taking into account alternative understandings that would render
leveling down problematic in certain settings. Second, leveling down
proceeds from an abstracted and objectified analysis of equality that
ignores the lived experience of inequality and implicitly privileges
the perspective of those doing the abstracting. Current analysis of
leveling down treats equality as if it were about balancing faceless
pieces of clay on a scale with the single goal of arriving at equal
weights in either direction. As much critical scholarship has shown,
that kind of abstracted analysis often incorporates privileged norms
that obscure the full extent of injuries to subordinated persons.  By7
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8. Cazares v. Barber, No. CIV-90-0128-TUC-ACM (D. Ariz. May 31, 1990), aff’d, 959 F.2d
753 (9th Cir. 1992).
9. See Nat Hentoff, Editorial, The Moral Education of a Native American, W ASH. POST,
Sept. 22, 1990, at A25.
10. Id.; see also Deborah M. Levy, Sex in High School: Boys Play, Girls Pay, LEGAL TIMES,
June 11, 1990, at 24.
11. Hentoff, supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. Levy, supra note 10. Because the school was operated by the Federal Bureau of Indian
Affairs of the Department of the Interior, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
was the source of the equal protection guarantee. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK &  RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 681 (7th ed. 2004) (explaining that the Fifth Amendment Due
process clause incorporates the equal protection guarantee and applies it to the federal
government).
14. Cazares v. Barber, No. CIV-90-0128-TUL-ACM, slip op. at 3-5 (D. Ariz. May 31, 1990),
aff’d, 959 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1992). In support of this ruling, the court pointed to evidence that
a male student who had fathered a child out of wedlock had been accepted into the chapter,
while Cazares, who was otherwise qualified, was denied entrance. Id. at 2.
injecting the lived experience of inequality back into the equation,
leveling down is revealed as a questionable strategy that is
sometimes used to preserve dominance contrary to the values of
equality.
As an example of how leveling down can thwart rather than
secure equality, the lesser known case of Cazares v. Barber adds a
human dimension to the problem.  Elisa Cazares became pregnant8
when she was fifteen-years-old and a student at the Tohono
O’Odham High School on the Tohono O’Odham Nation reservation
in western Arizona.  Cazares, a member of the Papago Indian Tribe,9
was ranked first in her sophomore class, served as a leader in
student government, and actively participated in a number of
student activities.  When the school obtained a charter in 198910
entitling it to induct members into the National Honor Society
(NHS), Cazares had every reason to expect that she would be
included.  The school’s selection committee, however, found11
Cazares unworthy of membership because she was “pregnant,
unmarried, and not living with the father of her future child.”12
Cazares sued in federal district court, challenging her exclusion as
a violation of both Title IX and equal protection.  The district court13
found that the school had discriminated against Cazares on the
basis of sex in violation of her rights under both Title IX and the
Fifth Amendment, and entered an injunction ordering that she be
included in the school’s induction ceremony.  The victory, however,14
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15. See Cazares v. Barber, 959 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1992).
16. This language is loosely borrowed from Martha Chamallas, whose work in feminist
legal theory has shown “how a difference in starting points and basic commitments can alter
both what we describe as the law and our aspirations for what the law should be.”
CHAMALLAS, supra note 6, at xxiii.
17. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
18. Id. at 219. The city also operated its public parks on a racially segregated basis. Id.
at 218.
19. Id. at 218.
proved to be hollow: the school responded by cancelling the cere-
mony and terminating its participation in the NHS.15
Whether the school district complied with the equality guarantees
of Title IX and the Fifth Amendment turns on one’s conception of
equality and the values that it protects. This, in turn, depends on
one’s prior commitments and aspirations for equality law.  If legal16
guarantees of equality require only formal equality, satisfied by
eliminating differential treatment, then the school district’s actions
are difficult to challenge. If equality law includes a richer kind of
equality principle that recognizes injuries other than tangible
differences in treatment, however, then the cancellation of the
induction ceremony not only failed to secure equality, but placed it
farther out of reach. Although all of the students were treated the
same with respect to the denial of NHS participation, Elisa Cazares
was left no better off, and quite possibly worse off, for having won
her sex discrimination case. The cancellation may have been even
more stigmatizing to Cazares than her initial exclusion—the school
deemed her so unworthy of membership in the organization that it
preferred to cancel the NHS completely rather than to include her
as an honoree. Further, it positioned her as the scapegoat responsi-
ble for disappointing the expectations of the students who otherwise
would have been inducted into the NHS.
The current understanding of leveling down’s compatibility with
equality norms may be traced to Palmer v. Thompson,  one of the17
earlier and more prominent cases in which this tactic was success-
fully employed. Specifically, Palmer arose out of an equal protection
challenge by African American residents of Jackson, Mississippi, to
the city’s operation of racially segregated recreational facilities.18
Of the city’s five publicly operated swimming pools, four had
been restricted to whites only, leaving just one open to African
Americans.  Three African American residents of Jackson obtained19
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20. Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. M iss. 1962), aff’d, 313 F.2d 637 (5th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). The district court declined to enter an injunction
ordering the city to integrate its public facilities. Id. The court’s opinion exemplifies racial bias
in judicial decision making. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to pursue the matter as
a class action, suggesting that the plaintiffs were not representative of other members of their
race, and noting that “voluntary separation of the races in the use of public facilities has
operated smoothly and apparently to the com plete satisfaction of all concerned for many
years.” Id. at 541. The court attributed recent assertions of rights by African Americans to
“the self-styled Freedom Riders” who “aroused strained racial feelings,” and explained the
existing racial segregation in housing and public facilities in Jackson based on the choices
made by the city’s “colored citizens.” Id. Finally, the court denied injunctive relief partly
because the plaintiffs failed “to show that their individual needs require injunctive relief,” and
partly because of the court’s high esteem for Jackson’s white city leaders. Id. at 543. In
contrast to its pejorative treatment of the African American plaintiffs, the court lavished
praise on the city defendants:
The individual defendants in this case are all outstanding, high class gentlemen
and in my opinion will not violate the terms of the declaratory judgment issued
herein. They know now what the law is and what their obligations are, and I am
definitely of the opinion that they will conform to the ruling of this Court
without being coerced so to do by an injunction. The City of Jackson, a
municipality, of course is operated by some of these high class citizens. I am
further of the opinion that during this period of turmoil the time now has
arrived when the judiciary should not issue injunctions perfunctorily, but should
place trust in men of high character that they will obey the mandate of the Court
without an injunction hanging over their heads.
Id.
21. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 219. The city parks and other previously segregated facilities
within them, other than the pools, were kept open and maintained on an integrated basis. Id.
22. Id.
a declaratory judgment affirming their right under the Equal
Protection Clause to the desegregated use of the city’s public
recreational facilities.  However, rather than integrate the pools,20
the city decided to end its role in providing public pools to city
residents by closing the four pools that it owned and relinquishing
its lease on the fifth.  The pool closures prompted a second lawsuit21
by Jackson’s African American residents that challenged the
closures as another equal protection violation. The district court, the
Fifth Circuit, and finally the U.S. Supreme Court all upheld the
city’s action as a legitimate response to the equal protection
violation caused by the prior segregation.22
Although the rationale for upholding leveling down responses has
shifted somewhat since Palmer, the underlying premise—that
equality law has little or nothing to say about leveling down as a
response to inequality—has remained largely unchallenged. More
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23. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 214 (D.R.I. 1995).
24. See To Keep An All-Male V.M.I., Its Alumni Consider Buying It, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
1996, at A11; David Reed, All-Male VMI Might Go Private, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 28, 1996,
at 22. VMI’s Board of Visitors ultimately rejected the proposal to go private by a one-vote
margin. See Donald P. Baker, By One Vote, VMI Decides to Go Coed; Nation’s Last All-Male
Military School to Enroll Women Starting in ’97, W ASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at A1.
25. See Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997) (declaring unconstitutional a state
funding scheme that permitted wealthier school districts to add to the per-student allotment
from the state without giving sufficient funds to poorer school districts to modernize and
repair school buildings); Neil MacFarquhar, Whitman Offers Fiscal Plan for Parity in Schools,
N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1996, at 1; see generally Martha S. West, Equitable Funding of Public
Schools Under State Constitutional Law , 2 J. GENDER RACE &  JUST. 279 (1999) (discussing the
New Jersey school funding litigation).
26. See, e.g., Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd County,
258 F. Supp. 2d 667, 680-84 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (holding that the school board violated the Equal
Access Act in excluding Gay Straight Alliance because, even though it voted to suspend all
than three decades after Palmer, leveling down the treatment of
the favored group continues to be a viable strategy for thwarting
equality claims. In addition to Cazares, recent examples of actual or
threatened leveling down responses include the following:
# In a Title IX challenge to inequality in men’s and women’s
intercollegiate athletics, Brown University proposed to
remedy the Title IX violation by cutting the number of
opportunities available to male athletes until they reached
parity with the lower number of opportunities for female
athletes.23
# After losing an equal protection challenge to its males-only
admissions policy, the Virginia Military Institute (VMI)
threatened to become private and conducted a study of the
feasibility of discontinuing its status as a public institution.
This option was explored as a way to remedy the equal
protection violation by eliminating VMI as a public institution
altogether instead of admitting women.24
# In response to successful litigation challenging inequality in
public school funding under the New Jersey Constitution,
former Governor Christine Whitman proposed a plan to level
down spending in wealthier school districts to reach equality
with poorer districts.25
# Several school districts charged with discriminating against
gay and lesbian student groups in violation of the federal
Equal Access Act have responded by banning, or threatening
to ban, all extracurricular student clubs.26
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art8
2004] WHEN EQUALITY LEAVES EVERYONE WORSE OFF 521
student clubs, it continued to permit other clubs to use school facilities; but noting that the
board could have complied with the Act if it had implemented a ban on all student clubs); East
High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166,
1172-73 (C.D. Utah 1999) (holding that the school could exclude the Gay Straight Alliance if
it maintained a closed forum and did not allow student groups that are not directly related
to the curriculum); see also Randy Furst, Gay Straight Alliance Gains Limited Status as
Orono Student Group, STAR TRIB., Aug. 14, 1998, at 1B (discussing response by Minnesota
school district which created two tiers of student organizations when students tried to form
a Gay Straight Alliance, grouping the GSA with other informal student groups in the second
tier); Jeff Gottlieb & Kate Folm ar, O.C. District’s New Rules for Clubs Trigger More Protests;
Education: Parents Object to Ban on Groups in Lower Grades, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2000, at
B1 (discussing Orange County school board decision to ban all extracurricular school clubs
not related to school work in middle and elem entary schools to keep out gay student clubs);
Katherine Kapos, M ajority Favors Clubs as Granite District Holds Hearings on a
Controversial Issue, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 17, 1997, at B2 (discussing debate in Salt Lake
City over whether to ban all student clubs or to allow the form ation of gay student clubs);
Joseph Landau, Ripple Effect, NEW REPUBLIC, June 23, 2003, at 12 (discussing a Texas school
district’s response to student effort to start a Gay-Straight Alliance by “banning all school
groups that promote crim inal behavior”); Esther Pan, Safety is Priority for Gay Students,
Speaker Says, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 10, 1997, at 1F (noting Alaska school board
member’s suggestion of banning all extracurricular clubs in response to student request to
form a Gay Straight Alliance). Other schools that are not willing to ban clubs completely have
instituted new parental consent requirements for all student clubs in response to the
formation of gay student clubs. See, e.g., Stacy Milbouer, Gay Graduate Tells How Group
Helped Him Cope, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 15, 1999, at 1; Barbara Whitaker, School Board,
Facing Suit, Agrees to Recognize Gay Club, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2000, at A18.
27. Kate Zernike, Gay? No Marriage License Here. Straight? Ditto., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
2004, at A8 [hereinafter Zernike, No License].
28. Id. Benton County officials imposed the marriage moratorium as a temporary
measure, intended to last only until a decision from the Oregon Supreme Court clarified the
validity of Oregon’s marriage law under the state constitution.
# In late March of 2004, in response to uncertainty generated
by legal challenges from gay and lesbian couples to a law
limiting marriage to a man and a woman, Benton County,
Oregon suspended marriage licenses to all couples.  County27
officials had announced earlier that they would begin issuing
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, following the footsteps
of another Oregon county, but changed course in response to
a lawsuit contending that such actions would violate the
state’s marriage law.28
These cases differ in many respects, but they share one important
feature: the assumption that leveling down would remedy the
unlawful inequality was largely uncontested.
Even when it is not raised overtly, the presumptively available
option of leveling down hangs over potential discrimination claims
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29. My initial interest in this topic stemmed from my own experience representing female
athletes in Title IX challenges to discrimination in school athletic programs. In my
conversations with potential plaintiffs, there was nothing more chilling to their consideration
of litigation than their fear that a lawsuit would result only in the loss of men’s opportunities,
and that they would be scapegoated as spoilsports. 
30. See Welch Suggs, Federal Commission Considers Reinterpreting Title IX , CHRON. OF
H IGHER EDUC., Sept. 6, 2002, at 54 (discussing the debate over Title IX and allegations by
wrestlers and other male athletes that Title IX has resulted in losses in their sports
opportunities); see also Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory
Behind Title IX , 34 U. M ICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 20-22 (2000-2001) (discussing the backlash
against Title IX fueled by charges that Title IX has resulted in serious losses to male sports
opportunities). For the time being, the current administration has decided not to revise Title
IX. See Valerie Strauss & Liz Clarke, Sex Bias Ban Upheld for School Athletics, W ASH. POST,
July 12, 2003, at A1.
31. See Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation
and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 747-53 (2001) (discussing and critiquing the
limits of modern antidiscrimination law).
like a dark cloud, undermining the effectiveness of equality rights,
and even deterring individuals from bringing such claims in the first
place.  In addition to its power to thwart specific challenges to29
inequality, the uncritical acceptance of leveling down functions to
undermine popular support for equality law, as is evident in the
recent controversy over whether Title IX should be abandoned or
diluted based on the perception that it has resulted in the leveling
down of men’s athletic opportunities.  30
Despite its pervasiveness, the problem of leveling down in
equality law has received scant attention in legal scholarship. Issues
of how to define discrimination and close the gap between law and
widespread inequality have taken precedence for many scholars
writing in related areas. Leveling down as a remedy to inequality
takes center stage in practice only after the inequality in question
has been recognized as actionable. With few exceptions over the past
two decades, the trend in the courts has been to narrow the types of
bias and discrimination within the reach of both statutory and
constitutional equality law.  Those who challenge inequality often31
encounter insurmountable hurdles at the liability stage in proving
unlawful discrimination. Consequently, questions of how to remedy
discrimination arise less frequently in legal scholarship than
concerns about the limited scope of legally recognized discrimina-
tion.
Yet, beliefs about leveling down as an acceptable remedy to
inequality influence prevailing understandings of the meaning of
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art8
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32. See generally Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 593 (1983)
(“Thus, when people disagree in their assessments of the relative ‘effectiveness’ of a particular
remedy in curing the violation of a right, they are often disagreeing about how the right itself
should be defined.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 858 (1999) (“[R]ights and remedies are inextricably intertwined. Rights
are dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for their scope,
shape, and very existence.”).
33. For recent critiques of equality rights, see Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1997); Christopher J. Peters, Slouching Towards Equality, 84 IOWA
L. REV. 801 (1999). For responses by scholars defending equality against these critiques, see
Kent Greenawalt, “Prescriptive Equality”: Two Steps Forward, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1997);
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Equality as Uncertainty, 84 IOWA L. REV. 377 (1999); Joshua D. Sarnoff,
I Com e to Praise Morality, Not to Bury It, 84 IOWA L. REV. 819 (1999); Kenneth W. Simons,
The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L. REV. 693 (2000).
34. Unfortunately, the existing articulations of limits to leveling down are inadequately
equality as guaranteed in law.  The conventional understanding of32
leveling down bolsters and reinforces a selective and overly narrow
conception of equality, masking interpretive choices and contribut-
ing to the view that equality itself is misguided in law and in theory.
For example, in the one area of legal scholarship that has paid
significant attention to leveling down, the concept is invoked to
undermine the normative appeal of equality rights altogether. In a
recently rekindled debate, critics and defenders of equality argue
about whether the permissibility of leveling down indicts equality
as a principle of justice.  Both the critics and defenders assume a33
greater degree of flexibility in permitting leveling down than is
necessary. A more contextual analysis of the case law and real world
examples of leveling down demonstrates that there is room for
further development of equality-based limits.
This Article contends that courts and commentators have
assumed too readily that leveling down is an acceptable, if unfortu-
nate, response to discrimination, and that the flexibility of equality
law in this respect has been significantly overstated. Part I
examines current doctrine and mines existing precedent for possible
limitations. A survey of the case law shows that there is more room
for contesting the validity of leveling down than is generally
acknowledged. Although lower courts typically follow Palmer’s
approach, Supreme Court precedent does not foreclose a more
critical analysis of leveling down and its relationship to equality.
Indeed, the Court has shown some discomfort with leveling down
and has struggled to articulate limits to this remedy.  Although the34
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theorized and fail to capture the potential for conflict with the values of equality.
Court has not yet done so, there is room to further develop equality-
based limits on leveling down.
Part II seeks to develop a more complete understanding of
leveling down and its relationship to equality law. It begins by
exploring the content of equality law and arguing that the funda-
mental principle of equality requires equal concern, a broader
principle than mere equal treatment. An equal concern principle
must be sensitive to inequality in social relations and must reject
actions that devalue and exclude persons from equal membership
in a shared community. Recent scholarly work on both the signifi-
cance of expressive harms and the reproduction of status inequality
and social stratification helps explain why some leveling down
actions may violate a principle of equal concern. Insights from this
literature also undermine the faith that the political process will
adequately check leveling down because the majority will not
unnecessarily deny itself benefits. Understanding the significance
of status in intergroup relations exposes the political process as an
insufficient check on leveling down when it functions as a strategy
for preserving social inequality.
Part III applies this framework to examine particular examples
of leveling down and how they fare under an equal concern princi-
ple. This section first examines the three cases of Palmer, Cazares,
and the Virginia Military Institute’s threat to privatize, and
explains why the leveling down in each case should be viewed as a
violation of equality law. It then explores three types of cases where
leveling down may fit comfortably with an equal concern principle:
(1) where the injury from the discrimination is a formal equality
injury that may be remedied by the end of differential treatment; (2)
where some leveling down is necessary to set a sustainable baseline
consistent with equal concern; and (3) where the benefit at issue is
so distorted by privilege that equal concern requires the relin-
quishment, rather than the extension, of unjust privilege. As these
examples show, any analysis that does justice to equality law must
attend to the facts and socio-historic context of the cases and must
remain sensitive to the social meaning expressed by leveling down.
Finally, Part IV contrasts this Article’s approach to leveling down
with that taken by those scholars who have written about leveling
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35. See infra notes 56-83 and accompanying text.
down in the debate over equality. Critics of equality raise the
permissibility of leveling down as part of their indictment of
equality’s normative appeal. Defenders of equality respond by
arguing that leveling down is not so problematic as to warrant the
rejection of equality rights. In my view, neither side in this debate
explores the relationship between leveling down and equality law
adequately. The existing discourse on equality’s value and the
leveling down objection reflects an overly abstracted view of equality
and insufficient attention to the relational injuries of inequality that
leveling down may exacerbate. Both sides too readily assume
leveling down’s consistency with equality rights. A more nuanced
understanding of leveling down would enrich the debate over
equality’s value.
I. THE TREATMENT OF LEVELING DOWN BY THE COURTS
Courts have not foreclosed the possibility that leveling down
might conflict with equality law so much as they have not consid-
ered the issue thoroughly. For the most part, lower courts continue
to take their lead from Palmer with little or no discussion. Palmer’s
acceptance of the pool closure set the tone for future cases by
viewing differential treatment as the touchstone of discrimination.
Although Palmer’s reasoning was expressly disclaimed in later
Supreme Court precedent,  the discriminatory intent standard that35
replaced it has not functioned, and is not likely to function in the
future, as a meaningful limit on leveling down. Still, there is some
precedent that supports setting limits on leveling down as a
response to inequality in certain circumstances. None of the limits
to date have been fully developed or adequately tethered to a basis
in equality law, but their very articulation by courts suggests some
doctrinal discomfort with the presumptive acceptability of leveling
down remedies. The bottom line of this trek through the case law is
that the prospects for regarding leveling down more critically are
not as bleak as generally supposed, even if they require additional
theoretical work.
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36. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
37. Id. at 220.
38. Id. To critics of formal equality, this will sound strikingly similar to the Court’s
opinion in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974) (“There is no risk from which men
are protected and women are not.”).
39. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
40. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224 (“[N]o case in this Court has held that a legislative act may
violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it.”).
41. Id. at 222. For exam ple, the Court’s decision in Griffin v. County School Board of
Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), forbidding a school district from  closing its public
schools in response to a desegregation order, was explained in Palmer based on the county’s
continuing involvement in maintaining segregated schools by covertly partnering with
private, racially exclusive schools. See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 221-22. The Palmer Court offered
a similar explanation for Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967), which affirmed the
A. Palmer v. Thompson Revisited: Formal Equality and
Discriminatory Intent
The Court’s resolution of the equal protection issue in Palmer v.
Thompson,  and its treatment of Palmer in later decisions, provides36
a starting point for understanding the prevailing judicial approach
to leveling down. In Palmer, Justice Black’s opinion for the majority
began with the rather obvious statement that nothing in the
Constitution places “an affirmative duty on a State to begin to
operate or to continue to operate swimming pools.”  Framing the37
issue in terms of equal access to swimming pools, Justice Black
viewed the decision to close the pools as one that did not provide
white residents with any benefit or service that was denied to black
residents.  The Court then turned to the doctrinal question of what38
role a defendant’s intent plays in an equal protection analysis.
Significantly, the Court decided Palmer five years before its decision
in Washington v. Davis, which rejected a discriminatory effects
standard and required proof of discriminatory intent to obtain
heightened scrutiny of facially neutral practices under the Equal
Protection Clause.  In Palmer, however, a majority of the Court39
took the opposite position and proclaimed the irrelevance of the
Jackson city council’s motives to the equal protection analysis.40
Justice Black’s opinion then waded through a series of prior
Supreme Court decisions that might be thought to conflict with this
pronouncement, recasting them as cases in which the seemingly
neutral denial of a benefit was really a facade for ongoing discrimi-
natory treatment.  The Court then distinguished Palmer from the41
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California Supreme Court’s ruling that a statewide referendum allowing private parties to
engage in race discrim ination in real estate transactions violated equal protection. Palmer
explained this decision as an appropriate recognition that the referendum constituted a
government endorsement of private discrimination and did not, unlike the pool closures,
represent a true leveling down of treatment. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 223-24. Finally, Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), a decision striking down a redistricting scheme that diluted
the votes of minority voters, was explained as a case based on the discriminatory effects of the
redistricting legislation, not on discrim inatory intent. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 225. But see id. at
266-68 (W hite, J., dissenting) (arguing that the pool closures did indeed harm African
Americans in Jackson differentially).
42. The distinction was somewhat fuzzier than the majority let on. As Justice White
observed in his dissent, one of the formerly public pools continued to be operated by a private
owner on a whites-only basis. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 252 (W hite, J., dissenting). In addition to
this distinction, the Court also suggested in Palmer that the different result in school
desegregation cases might be attributed partly to differences in the public importance of pools
and schools, although the Court made less of this distinction than of the state’s role in
perpetuating discrim ination. Id. at 221 n.6; see infra Part I.C.1.
43. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 266-67 (W hite, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas dissented
separately, arguing that the Ninth Amendm ent provided a basis for invalidating the city’s
action. Id. at 231-40. Justice Marshall also wrote a separate dissent, joined by Justices
Brennan and W hite, taking issue with the majority’s view that the pool closures equally
affected all persons regardless of race. Id. at 271-73.
44. Id. at 246-60 (White, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 266 (“[B]y closing the pools solely because of the order to desegregate, the city
is expressing its official view that Negroes are so inferior that they are unfit to share with
whites this particular type of public facility, though pools were long a feature of the city’s
segregated recreation program.”).
46. Id. at 268.
prior precedent, highlighting it as a case where the differential
treatment ended fully with the pool closures.42
The dissenters in Palmer disagreed with the Court about the role
of intent in an equal protection analysis, and found the city’s actions
to have been motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Justice White,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concluded that “[c]losing
the pools without a colorable nondiscriminatory reason was every
bit as much an official endorsement of the notion that Negroes are
not equal to whites” as official segregation.  Justice White began43
his discussion of the case by providing a detailed history of Jackson
city officials’ intransigent resistance to racial integration and their
avowed determination to resist desegregation of the city’s public
facilities.  To Justice White, the pool closures did not remedy the44
harm of segregation, and may have exacerbated it.  As he put it,45
“the closed pools stand as mute reminders to the community of the
official view of Negro inferiority.”46
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47. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
48. This critique of Palmer was offered most prominently by Paul Brest. See Paul Brest,
Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971
SUP. CT. REV. 95 (1971).
49. See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (requiring a
challenger of a facially neutral practice to prove that the measure was adopted “‘because of,’
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects” on the disadvantaged group). One might argue that
even with proof of intent, a leveling down response m ay still be valid because it does not
impose discriminatory effects, if one reads Davis to require both discriminatory intent and
effects. Disproportionate effects, however, are not difficult to discern in many leveling down
cases, given the greater access of nonstigmatized groups to substitute benefits (as with private
pools in Palmer) and the disparate social stigma inflicted by some leveling down decisions.
50. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 228 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The other factors that Justice Blackmun cited
were the nonessential quality of public pools, the fact that the pools had operated at a fiscal
Five years later, Justice White’s view of the significance of motive
in an equal protection analysis prevailed in Washington v. Davis.47
The Court’s revised stance in Davis appeased the most prominent
criticism of Palmer at the time: that an actor’s discriminatory intent
should invalidate an otherwise legitimate state action under the
Equal Protection Clause.  After Davis, Palmer’s critics could take48
comfort in the belief that, however problematic the result in Palmer,
equal protection doctrine would henceforth ensure the absence of
discriminatory intent behind a leveling down response. Under
current doctrine, the presence of a discriminatory motive may
provide a basis for challenging an otherwise acceptable leveling
down response.49
The intent standard, however, has turned out to be not much of
a limit on leveling down. The difficulty with focusing on the motive
behind a leveling down response was foretold by Justice Blackmun’s
concurrence in Palmer. Justice Blackmun agreed with the dissent-
ers that an impermissible motive could give rise to an equal
protection violation, and joined with the majority on this point five
years later in Washington v. Davis. Yet, he found Palmer to be a
“‘hard’ case” in which “there is much to be said on each side.”50
Siding with the majority, he cited several factors that impressed
him, including the fact that the city had not shut down its other
recreational facilities under the threat of integration and his lack of
conviction that the pool closures were “an official expression of
inferiority toward black citizens,” as Justice White and the other
dissenters contended.51
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deficit, and the fear that the city would be “locked in” to providing public pools for the
indefinite future. Id. at 229-30.
52. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We
Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1166 (1991) (arguing that the
intent standard deters the filing of legitimate claims because of the difficulty of proving
intent); Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 M ICH. L. REV. 953, 957 (1993) (criticizing the intent
standard as reflecting white transparency, the selection of legal standards based on implicit
white norms); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After
Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1277-91 (1998) (discussing extensive literature on
social psychology and cognitive bias dem onstrating that much discrimination is not
“intentional” in the legal sense) [hereinafter Krieger, Civil Rights]; Linda Hamilton Krieger,
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186-1201 (1995) (discussing the failure of
an intent standard to capture cognitive bias and the actual mental processes that drive real
world discrim ination) [hereinafter Krieger, Cognitive Bias]; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism , 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987) (arguing that much discrimination is unconscious and that a discriminatory motive
standard is insufficient to capture it); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming
of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989) (arguing that the Court settled on the intent standard
not for a principled reason, but because it feared the potential breadth of an effects standard,
but also arguing that an intent standard, applied in a principled fashion, is both sweeping and
incoherent).
53. Cf. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 28 (1976) (acknowledging that the Court’s turn-around on discriminatory intent “does
not entirely obviate the problems implicit in Palmer v. Thompson,” given the difficulty of
determining “whether a decision was discriminatorily motivated”).
54. See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U .S. at 260, 279 (accepting the state’s proffered legitimate
purpose for a veteran’s preference with “a devastating impact upon the employment
opportunities of women,” absent proof that it was enacted “because it would accomplish the
collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotypic and predefined place”); Arlington Heights
v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (stating that impact alone is insufficient
to establish discriminatory intent where there is a legitimate, neutral explanation for the
action taken). See also Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and
Black Abstraction, 32 WM. &  MARY L. REV. 1, 26-29 (1990) (discussing the Court’s refusal to
see any perpetrators of discrimination in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), and the
The problems associated with proving discrimination under an
intent standard, and the reluctance of courts to attribute discrimi-
natory motives to public and private actors, have been the subject
of much scholarly criticism.  The difficulties identified in these52
well-founded critiques are no more daunting when the search for
intent occurs at the leveling down phase of a case rather than at the
point of determining an initial violation.  Under the prevailing53
version of the intent standard, it is extremely difficult to prove
discriminatory motive where another legitimate explanation is
possible.  As a decision to uniformly deny favorable treatment may54
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
530 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:513
rhetorical pull of “white innocence” in the Court’s race discrimination jurisprudence).
55.  Palmer, 403 U.S. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice White’s masterful telling
of the history of resistance to integration by Jackson city officials, however, leaves no doubt
that fiscal concerns had nothing to do with the real reason for the pool closures. Id. at 249-60
(White, J., dissenting). Moreover, although Justice White only challenged the evidentiary
basis for the city’s argument that integrated pools would require greater expenditures to keep
the peace, such justifications should not be considered race-neutral motives, given their
obvious pandering to racial hostility.
56. W ashington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243 (1976) (explaining the Court’s holding in
Palmer).
57. See also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 923 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining
that Palmer has come to be understood for the principle that only when the races are treated
dissimilarly is there a violation of equal protection).
always be explained in terms of conserving resources and rearrang-
ing societal priorities, it is exceedingly difficult to establish a
discriminatory motive as the foundation for a leveling down
response. Indeed, Justice Blackmun noted in Palmer that the pools
had been running at a fiscal deficit, and he deferred to “the judg-
ment of the city officials that these deficits would increase.”  Thus,55
even though Washington v. Davis reversed the rationale relied on by
the majority in Palmer, the Court’s shift to an intent standard does
not necessarily unsettle Palmer’s result.
The Court’s subsequent treatment of Palmer makes explicit the
understanding that the use of an intent standard might not have
changed the result in that case. Writing for the majority in Davis,
Justice White stated that:
The holding was that the city was not overtly or covertly
operating segregated pools and was extending identical treat-
ment to both whites and Negroes.... [T]he legitimate purposes of
the ordinance—to preserve peace and avoid deficits—were not
open to impeachment by evidence that the councilmen were
actually motivated by racial considerations.56
In Justice White’s revisionist account, Palmer stands for the
principle that equal protection is satisfied when persons of all races
are treated the same and proof of a discriminatory purpose is
lacking.  Ironically, the intent standard that Justice White fought57
for in his dissent in Palmer turned out to be inadequate to capture
even the discriminatory motive that he thought present in that very
case. That Palmer plausibly can be explained as a case lacking proof
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58. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
59. Id. at 265 n.11.
60. 451 U.S. 100, 102 (1981).
61. Id. at 105-06 n.7. In actuality, as in Palmer, a good deal of evidence suggested that the
city’s action was at least partially motivated by a discrim inatory intent. Id. at 136-38, 143-44,
155 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Ross, supra note 54, at 1, 30-31 (criticizing the Court’s
opinion in Greene as distorted by “black abstraction,” abstracting the lives of African
Americans to avoid empathy, and noting “the refusal to place the case in any real and vivid
social context”). Likewise, evidence suggesting the presence of a discriminatory motive was
also present in Palmer. See Palm er v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 246-61 (1971) (W hite, J.,
dissenting) (discussing evidence of discriminatory purpose).
62. Cazares v. Barber, 959 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1992). The district court’s order said
that if the school district held the NHS ceremony, then it must include the plaintiff. Cazares
v. Barber, No. CIV-90-0128-TUC-ACM, slip op. at 4-5 (D. Ariz. May 31, 1990), aff’d, 959 F.2d
753 (9th Cir. 1992).
of discriminatory intent shows just how anemic the intent standard
is when applied to leveling down.
Equal protection cases post-Davis provide little reason for
optimism that an intent standard, as applied by the Court, will
provide a meaningful tool for policing leveling down responses
to discrimination claims. In Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,  the Court expressly58
noted the difficulty of discerning a discriminatory motive, citing
Palmer for support.  In City of Memphis v. Greene,  the Court59 60
continued to explain Palmer as a case that involved neither
differential treatment nor a discriminatory motive, citing it to
support its holding that Memphis could close a street connecting a
black and white neighborhood, in the absence of evidence of a
discriminatory purpose, because the closing did not confer any
benefit on whites that was refused to blacks.61
The upshot is that the Court’s adoption of a discriminatory intent
standard in Davis does little to set meaningful limits on leveling
down. As long as leveling down is uniform and ends differential
treatment, it is likely to elude a discriminatory intent standard.
Indeed, lower courts confronted with leveling down proposals
typically assume that it is a permissible response to discrimination
without any serious inquiry into intent. Two examples from more
recent cases reflect this current approach.
In Cazares, the Ninth Circuit expressed displeasure with the
school’s response, but did not view it as inconsistent with the
equality guaranteed by either Title IX or the Constitution.  After62
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63. See Cazares v. Barber, 959 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1992).
64. Id. at 755.
65. Id. at 756-57 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
66. Under the Equal Justice Act, a prevailing party may be awarded attorney’s fees in
litigation against the United States, “unless the Court finds that the position of the United
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2000). However, to grant fees against the government in excess of $75 per
hour, the court must find that the government litigated in “bad faith.” Cazares, 959 F.2d at
754. The district court found that the government exhibited an arrogant and calloused
attitude toward the litigation from the beginning and cited the school’s cancellation of the
ceremony as a clear indication. Id. at 755. A majority of the appellate court found that the
district court’s findings in this regard were not clearly erroneous. Id.
the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the school
cancelled the awards ceremony and terminated its participation in
the NHS, the plaintiff sought attorney’s fees under the Equal
Justice Act, which authorizes fees for prevailing plaintiffs in civil
rights cases against the government.  In the litigation over attor-63
ney’s fees, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit cited the
school’s response in canceling the honor society as a discretionary
factor that supported an award of fees in excess of the statutory
cap.64
Although the treatment of the cancellation under the Equal
Justice Act shows some discomfort with the leveling down remedy,
the courts did not connect their concerns with any limits imposed by
the underlying substantive law. Neither court questioned whether
the school’s response might violate the equality principle embodied
in Title IX or the Constitution. Judge Kozinski, who dissented from
the panel decision affirming the award of attorney’s fees, was the
most explicit on this point. He objected to the lower court’s reliance
on the cancellation to support a higher fee award, stating “[i]t
doesn’t matter, of course, why a party chooses one of two permissible
ways of complying with a district court’s order.”  Neither the65
majority nor the district court offered any response to Judge
Kozinski’s point that cancellation was a valid remedial choice,
presumably agreeing that neither Title IX nor the Equal Protection
Clause prevented the school from canceling the ceremony, even
though they disagreed with Judge Kozinski about whether the
cancellation could support a higher award of fees under the fee
shifting statute.  The bottom line is that the school’s response was66
assumed to satisfy the requirements of equality without any inquiry
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67. 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
68. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (permitting
damages claims under Title IX in actions for intentional discrimination).
69. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 214 (D.R.I. 1995).
by the court into the school district’s intent in canceling its partici-
pation in the NHS.
Another case involving a Title IX claim, Cohen v. Brown
University,  also treated a proposal to remedy discrimination by67
leveling down as compatible with equality law without any inquiry
into discriminatory intent. In Cohen, female student-athletes
challenged Brown University’s (Brown) failure to provide male and
female athletes with equal opportunities to play varsity sports.
Although this case did not include an equal protection claim, Title
IX also prohibits intentional discrimination and would have
provided recourse for an adverse action motivated by a discrimina-
tory intent.  Yet, the First Circuit gave Brown seemingly unlimited68
discretion to achieve equality by leveling down, without any inquiry
into whether Brown’s proposal was motivated by a discriminatory
intent.
The leveling down issue came before the court after Brown had
been found in violation of Title IX. Rather than impose its own
remedy, the district court gave Brown the opportunity to come
forward with a remedial plan emphasizing the law’s remedial
flexibility:
Brown may achieve compliance with Title IX in a number of
ways. It may eliminate its athletic program altogether, it may
elevate or create the requisite number of women’s positions, it
may demote or eliminate the requisite number of men’s posi-
tions, or it may implement a combination of these remedies. I
leave it entirely to Brown’s discretion to decide how it will
balance its program to provide equal opportunities for its men
and women athletes.69
At the same time, however, the district court sounded a note of
skepticism as to whether Brown actually needed to eliminate men’s
opportunities in order to achieve compliance, as the university had
claimed throughout the litigation:
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70.  Id.
71. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 213-14. The district court rejected Brown’s proposal to create
new junior varsity opportunities for women because the additional junior varsity positions
were not comparable to the existing varsity opportunities for men. Id. at 214.
72. See id. (summarizing Brown’s proposal for compliance).
Defendants frequently raised the specter of being forced by
financial constraints to eliminate men’s athletic opportunities in
order to achieve compliance under plaintiffs’ interpretation of
the law. I feel compelled to point out that an institution has
much flexibility, even within a finite resource base.... Thus,
defendants’ plea that “[t]here is nothing further Brown can do
except cut, cap or eliminate men’s teams,” ... is simply not true.
Brown certainly retains the option to distribute its resources in
a way that may slightly reduce the “standard of living” for its
university-funded varsity sports in order to expand the partici-
pation opportunities for its women athletes and closer approach
equal opportunity between its male and female athletes.
Whether it will follow this course of action is, of course, well
within its discretion.70
The district court’s skepticism turned to disbelief when presented
with Brown’s plan for compliance. Rather than accept the district
court’s invitation to lower the standard of living for its high-status
teams in order to make way for new playing opportunities for
women, Brown proposed to cap existing men’s teams, while
recognizing several new junior varsity teams for women. In case the
district court found these measures inadequate, which it did,71
Brown proposed a back-up plan: eliminate men’s athletic opportuni-
ties until their number reached parity with the lower number
provided to women, with the end result that no new athletic
opportunities would be added for women.72
The district court rejected this plan and chastised Brown for the
proposal’s draconian nature:
In order to bring Brown into compliance ... under defendants’
[plan], I would have to order Brown to cut enough men’s teams
to eradicate approximately 213 men’s varsity positions. This
extreme action is entirely unnecessary. The easy answer lies in
ordering Brown to comply ... by upgrading the women’s gymnas-
tics, fencing, skiing, and water polo teams to university-funded
varsity status.... This remedy would entail upgrading the
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73. Id. at 187. The difference in the num bers is due to the different ways in which
institutions may comply with Title IX: either by providing opportunities for men and women
that are substantially proportionate to their enrollment or by fully accommodating the
athletic interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex. In Cohen, Brown provided
approximately 213 more opportunities for men than women, which it would have had to cut
to meet the former standard. In contrast, Brown would have to have added approximately
forty opportunities for women in order to meet the latter standard. See Brake, supra note 30,
at 47-49 (explaining the various ways institutions may comply with Title IX’s requirement of
equal opportunities to participate in sports). Even focusing on substantial proportionality as
the path to compliance, Brown still could have complied without cutting as many male
athletes as it proposed if it used the resources saved from the mens’ cuts to add some new
opportunities for women, thus leveling only part of the way down while still adding new
opportunities for women. Brown’s proposal would have ensured that women received no gains
whatsoever from the lawsuit.
74. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 187 (1st Cir. 1996).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 185-87.
positions of approximately 40 women. In order to finance the 40
additional women’s positions, Brown certainly will not have to
eliminate as many as the 213 men’s positions that would be cut
under Brown’s ... proposal.73
Although the district court did not explicitly find that Brown’s
remedial proposal violated Title IX, the court’s explanation for its
ruling came close by suggesting a perceived conflict between
Brown’s proposal and the purpose of Title IX:
It is clearly in the best interests of both the male and the female
athletes to have an increase in women’s opportunities and a
small decrease in men’s opportunities, if necessary, rather than,
as under Brown’s plan, no increase in women’s opportunities and
a large decrease in men’s opportunities. Expanding women’s
athletic opportunities in areas where there is proven ability and
interest is the very purpose of Title IX and the simplest, least
disruptive, route to Title IX compliance at Brown.74
Concluding that Brown had not made a good faith effort to comply,
the district court imposed its own remedy, ordering Brown to add
several new women’s varsity teams.75
The First Circuit treated the leveling down issue very
differently.  It did not share the district court’s perception of any76
tension between Brown’s plan and Title IX, and faulted the district
court for imposing its own remedy rather than permitting Brown to
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77. Id. at 185.
78. Id. (discussing principles of academic freedom, but noting that “academic freedom does
not embrace the freedom to discriminate”). The court stated, “[i]t is clear ... that Brown’s
proposal to cut men’s teams is a permissible means of effectuating compliance with the
statute.” Id. at 187. See also Neal v. Bd. of Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 198 F.3d 763, 770 (9th
Cir. 1999) (stating that “[i]f a university wishes to comply with Title IX by leveling down
programs instead of ratcheting them up, as Appellant has done here, Title IX is not offended”).
79. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 187-88 (discussing district court’s ruling).
80. See Lynette Labinger, Title IX and Athletics: A Discussion of Brown University v.
Cohen  by Plaintiffs’ Counsel, 20 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 85, 91-94 (1998) (discussing the terms
of the settlem ent of the case).
81. See, e.g., supra note 52 and accompanying text.
level down the men’s opportunities until they reached parity with
the women’s.  The First Circuit based its ruling in part on the view77
that the proposal fully satisfied the equality required by Title IX.78
The First Circuit did not inquire into Brown’s motives for its
proposal to cut men’s opportunities drastically, despite the district
court’s finding that its proposal was not warranted by fiscal
necessity or by a good faith desire to achieve compliance without
allocating new resources to athletics.  Brown ultimately chose not79
to cut men’s sports and to comply instead by funding new varsity
opportunities for women, despite the court’s approval of the legality
of its initial proposal.80
The judicial approaches in Cazares and Cohen reflect the
prevailing assumption that leveling down satisfies equality law and
a reluctance to look deeper. Although, in theory, the existence of a
provable, discriminatory intent may undermine an otherwise valid
and facially-neutral leveling down response, courts typically do not
look past the surface of the uniform treatment itself. Even if they
did, in light of the widely shared and forceful critique of the intent
standard,  there is little reason to believe that they would find81
anything other than simple neutrality.
Perhaps part of the reason for the judicial complacency toward
leveling down is the belief that it is self-limiting and subject to
correction in the political process. Conventional wisdom suggests
that the majority will not often choose to fix inequality by subjecting
itself to more negative treatment. As Justice Jackson observed in
his well-known concurrence in Railway Express Agency v. New York:
[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary
and unreasonable government than to require that the princi-
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82. 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
83. See infra notes 246-57 and accompanying text.
84. Again, this objection assumes that the saved resources from leveling down would not
be put to better use, thereby effecting a net increase in the overall level of well-being.
85. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
86. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court in Cumming dodged the issue of whether the county’s
racial segregation of schools itself violated the equal protection clause, stating that, although
the plaintiffs argued that it did in oral argument, “we need not consider that question in this
case. No such issue was made in the pleadings.” Cumming, 175 U.S. at 543. It was not until
over half a century later that the Court was able to see the inherent inequality in the state-
enforced racial segregation of the schools. That separate but equal was never really equal,
however, was obvious to everyone even as far back as Cumming.
ples of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be
imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick
and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and
thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited
upon them if larger numbers were affected ....82
Although such confidence in the political process as a check turns
out to be questionable when leveling down operates to serve the
nonmaterial interests of the majority,  it may well provide some83
comfort to courts in reviewing these types of responses to inequality.
B. Doctrinal Discomfort with Leveling Down
Although the prevailing approach accepts leveling down as all
that equality requires, this acceptance sits somewhat uncomfortably
alongside a vague judicial dislike of leveling down remedies. As with
much of our established legal doctrine, there are indications of
instability and dissension underneath the surface. Some judges,
such as the district court judge in Cohen, express discomfort with
leveling down and seek ways to thwart it. Such an inclination is
easy to understand if leveling down leaves some people worse off,
and no one better off, in terms of access to benefits and resources.84
Just such a utilitarian concern may have motivated the Court in
one very early equal protection case to reject the plaintiffs’ claim
where the only remedy sought would have taken away benefits from
the advantaged class. In Cumming v. Richmond County Board of
Education,  a case decided over fifty years before Brown v. Board85
of Education,  African American taxpayers sued Richmond County,86
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87. Cummings, 175 U.S. at 529-31. The plaintiffs’ choice of rem edy reflected the realistic
assessment that a remedy seeking affirmative relief, requiring the county to establish and
fund a high school for African Americans, would have been met with possibly greater
resistance. Because a court order requiring integration was unthinkable at the time, the
Court’s rejection of the injunction against spending left the plaintiffs with no effective
recourse.
88. Id. at 544.
89. Justice Harlan’s discussion of the merits of the equal protection issue foreshadowed
the Court’s adoption of an intent standard much later in W ashington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), as well as the subsequent criticism of that standard. In explaining the Board’s decision
to expand its primary education programs for African American children rather than offer a
high school for African Americans, Justice Harlan blithely asserted that there was no bad
intent behind the county’s failure to offer a high school for African American students.
Cumming, 175 U.S. at 544 (“W e are not permitted by the evidence in the record to regard that
decision as having been made with any desire or purpose on the part of the Board to
discriminate against any of the colored children of the county on account of their race.”).
90. Cumming, 175 U.S. at 545. 
If, in some appropriate proceeding instituted directly for that purpose, the
plaintiffs had sought to compel the Board of Education, out of the funds in its
hands or under its control, to establish and maintain a high school for colored
children, and if it appeared that the Board’s refusal to maintain such a school
was in fact an abuse of its discretion and in hostility to the colored population
Georgia, seeking an injunction to prevent the county from spending
taxpayer funds to support a public high school for white students
without providing one for African American students.  Justice87
Harlan, writing for the Court, dismissed the claim, objecting that:
The substantial relief asked is an injunction that would either
impair the efficiency of the high school provided for white
children or compel the Board to close it. But if that were done,
the result would only be to take from white children educational
privileges enjoyed by them, without giving to colored children
additional opportunities for the education furnished in high
schools. The colored school children of the county would not be
advanced in the matter of their education by a decree compelling
the defendant Board to cease giving support to a high school for
white children.88
Justice Harlan suggested that, assuming the plaintiffs could prove
an equal protection violation, an assumption about which he
expressed skepticism,  the case might have succeeded had the89
plaintiffs sought to force the county to spend money on education for
African American students rather than seeking to forbid spending
for the established high school.  Justice Harlan’s discomfort with90
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because of their race, different questions might have arisen in the state court.
Id. Given the long and tortured history of the Court’s am bivalence about affirmative remedies
in the school desegregation context, however, this assessment reads more like a judicial
platitude than a realistic appraisal of the plaintiffs’ chances.
91. It also might reflect Justice Harlan’s discomfort with an equal protection challenge
to racially segregated schools and his own racial biases. Indeed, the tone of Justice Harlan’s
opinion expresses no shock or outrage that the county failed to provide any high school
education for African Americans, suggesting that he found the school system sensible or at
least understandable. See generally Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal
Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733 (1995) (discussing racial bias
in judicial decision making); Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1994)
(explaining that even those judges who try to make logical and impartial decisions cannot be
completely free from  the influence of personal biases).
92. See infra Parts II-III.
the posture of the case might be read, in part, to suggest the
perspective that equality law should strive to improve the situation
of the disadvantaged group rather than take away benefits from the
favored group.91
In discussing Justice Harlan’s reluctance to endorse a leveling
down remedy in an equal protection action, I do not mean to endorse
either his conclusion or his reasoning. Justice Harlan focused
primarily on the implications of a leveling down remedy for the
advantaged group and its impact on the ability of white students to
attend high school in the county. He also observed that the remedy
sought would not help African American children in the county,
but he offered only a superficial analysis of this point, limited to
the material withholding of educational resources. As elaborated
below, a central consideration in evaluating leveling down should be
whether it fully remedies all of the injuries, material and nonma-
terial, to the persons disadvantaged by inequality.  Such an92
analysis should explore the expressive meaning of leveling down
and the relational harms of inequality, from the perspective of the
persons disadvantaged by the inequality, rather than engaging in
a utilitarian calculus that factors in the well-being of the advan-
taged group and the costs of relinquishing inequality’s privileges.
Although flawed in its approach, Harlan’s resolution of the case
suggests an early recognition that equality law might be problem-
atic if it allowed a leveling down response, and a possible openness
to interpretations that limit such responses.
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93. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
94. Id. at 717.
95. Id. at 704-05. The statutory remedy is a type of leveling down response in that it
deprives everyone of the benefits of federal funding rather than raising the treatment of the
disfavored group to match that of the favored group.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 705. Justice Stevens cited Justice Harlan’s opinion in Cumming to support a
preference for a remedy that does not achieve uniformity of treatment by lowering the level
of treatment for everyone, without any reference to the infamy of the case in its effective
preclusion of legal challenges to racial segregation at the tim e. Id. at 705 n.39.
98. Id. at 705-06.
A more recent expression of the Court’s ambivalence about
leveling down is found in Cannon v. University of Chicago.  In93
Cannon, the Court ruled that Title IX contains an implied private
right of action for persons injured by sex discrimination in federally
funded education programs.  In support of this ruling, the Court94
cited the potential harshness of the express statutory remedy that
would terminate federal funds to educational programs that engage
in discrimination.  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,95
observed that Title IX’s purpose of providing individuals with
effective protection against discrimination would not be well-served
by holding the termination of funds to be the exclusive remedy.  As96
Justice Stevens explained, “it makes little sense to impose on an
individual, whose only interest is in obtaining a benefit for herself,
... the burden of demonstrating that an institution’s practices are so
pervasively discriminatory that a complete cutoff of federal funding
is appropriate.”  This consideration counsels against leveling down97
remedies more generally. The implication is that a person who is
harmed by discrimination and successfully prosecutes a discrimina-
tion claim should benefit from the suit and that persons should not
be made worse off unnecessarily.98
Although outside the mainstream of judicial discourse, these
cases suggest at least some degree of judicial distaste for leveling
down remedies. They provide no guidance, however, as to when
leveling down is illegitimate, nor do they go so far as to suggest that
leveling down conflicts with the mandate of equality law. Rather,
the concerns seem to reflect a preference for solutions that raise,
rather than lower, the material well-being of persons for reasons
external to equality norms.
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99. Of course, if the interest at stake is one that the Court recognizes as im plicating a
fundamental right, state action that denies such a fundamental right receives strict scrutiny
under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK &  RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 415, 433 (6th ed. 2000). In a narrow class of cases, the Court has
applied strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to state actions that are facially
neutral, but which disparately burden the fundamental interests of some persons, even if the
interest in question does not rise to the level of a fundamental due process right. See, e.g.,
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating state poll tax
requirement for voting in state elections; even if the state is not constitutionally required to
provide elections, a poll tax disparately burdens the poor in their exercise of the vote); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (invalidating state requirement that all criminal defendants pay
for their trial transcripts in criminal appeals because, even if the state is not constitutionally
required to provide criminal appeals, a fee requirement disparately burdens indigent
defendants in appealing their convictions). At present, the list of such fundamental interests
is short and not likely to expand any tim e soon. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972) (ruling that education is not a fundam ental interest, and
applying the rational basis test under the Equal Protection Clause to uphold a state funding
system that disparately affected the education of poor children). Most of the Court’s
fundamental interest equal protection cases involve differential treatment of the interest at
stake, suggesting that deprivations that equally deprive everyone of the interest are less
likely to be objectionable under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free
Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating state law permitting some residents but not
others to vote in school district elections without a sufficiently weighty reason under Equal
Protection Clause); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating state law
sterilizing larcenists but not embezzlers under the Equal Protection Clause). Thus, the
C. Seeds of Constraint
As the undertone of dissatisfaction with leveling down suggests,
there is room within the case law for exploring doctrinal limits on
leveling down. Indeed, concerns about the desirability of an
interpretation of equality that results in leveling down have spurred
judicial efforts to search for rationales for rejecting leveling down
remedies. As yet, however, these rationales tend to be incompletely
theorized and, with one exception, grounded in values distinct from
equality.
1. The Significance of the Benefit
One potential limiting principle floated by the Court draws the
line based on the importance of the benefit at stake, as weighed
from the perspective of the majority. Even if the dictates of equality
may be satisfied by taking away recreational benefits like public
swimming pools, perhaps equality requires something more when
a more important interest is at stake.  Justice Black’s opinion in99
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significance of the benefit as a potential limit on leveling down does not fit neatly within
existing equal protection doctrine. The discussion here presupposes that the interest in
question is m ore important than others and yet not so fundamental as to trigger strict
scrutiny under existing equal protection or due process doctrine.
100. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 221-23 (1971); Griffin v. Sch. Bd. of Prince
Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that the county’s decision to close public schools
in response to a court desegregation order violated equal protection); Bush v. Orleans Parish
Sch. Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La. 1960), aff’d, 365 U.S. 569 (1961) (holding that state
statutes authorizing the governor to close integrated schools were unconstitutional).
101. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 221 n.6. In addition, Justice Black distinguished the cases on the
ground that a discriminatory motive was implicit from the statutes authorizing the closure
of integrated schools, whereas, he implied, the motive behind the pool closures was more
ambiguous. Id. (“Of course there was no serious problem  of probing the motives of a
legislature in Bush because most of the Louisiana statutes explicitly stated they were
designed to forestall integrated schools.”).
102. Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
103. Id. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“The pools are not part of the city’s educational
system. They are a general municipal service of the nice-to-have but not essential variety, and
they are a service, perhaps a luxury, not enjoyed by many communities.”).
104. Id. at 221 n.6 (“More important, the laws struck down in Bush were part of an
elaborate package of legislation through which Louisiana sought to maintain public education
on a segregated basis, not to end public education.”).
105. Id. at 262 n.16 (W hite, J., dissenting) (“When a public agency furnishes a
service—regardless of whether or not it is an ‘essential’ one—it must act in a
nondiscrim inatory manner with regard to that service.”). Under current law, differences in
Palmer suggested this as a potential limit by distinguishing the
swimming pool closures in that case from prior cases involving
school closures, which the Court did not permit as a remedy to
unlawful segregation.  Among other distinctions, the Court noted100
the comparatively greater importance of education.  Contrasting101
the two contexts, Justice Black emphasized that the Court has
previously described public education as “perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments.”  Justice102
Blackmun, concurring in Palmer, sounded a similar note in listing
his reasons for upholding the pool closures.103
The entirety of the Court’s opinion, however, suggests that this
distinction was ultimately less important than the Court’s percep-
tion of the state’s continuing involvement in segregated education
and its contrary perception with respect to the city’s role in
Palmer.  The dissenters in Palmer explicitly disagreed with the104
majority’s suggestion that inequality with respect to a relatively
insignificant benefit might legitimize inequality that would
otherwise violate equal protection, and their view has carried the
day.  Subsequent cases have explained Palmer based on the lack105
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the nature of the benefit only make a difference where the discrim ination does not target a
suspect class and the only path to strict scrutiny is through fundamental interest analysis.
106. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 923 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Palmer to
stand for the principle that differential treatment is the touchstone of an equal protection
violation); City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 105-06 n.7, 107-08 nn.10-11 (1981) (citing
Palmer to support the proposition that an action that does not involve differential treatment
based on race and does not depend on an invidious purpose will not violate equal protection);
W ashington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1976) (describing Palmer as holding “that the city
was not overtly or covertly operating segregated pools and was extending identical treatment
to both whites and Negroes,” and that “the legitimate purposes of the ordinance—to preserve
peace and avoid deficits—were not open to impeachm ent by evidence that the councilmen
were actually motivated by racial considerations”); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77
(1973) (explaining the result in Palmer based on the difficulty of discerning an impermissible
legislative motive).
107. The Court’s view of the relative triviality of what it saw at stake in Palmer comes
through perhaps most clearly in its rejection of the plaintiffs’ Thirteenth Amendment
challenge: “[T]he Thirteenth Amendment is a skimpy collection of words to allow this Court
to legislate new laws to control the operation of swimming pools throughout the length and
breadth of this Nation ....” Palmer, 403 U.S. at 227.
of differential treatment and the absence of proof of discriminatory
purpose, without mentioning the relative significance of the benefit
withheld.106
In Palmer, the musings of Justices Black and Blackmun on the
nature of the benefit may have given them some comfort in believ-
ing that there was a stopping point to the city’s strategy. Leveling
down might be more palatable if a city could get away with closing
its pools to avoid integration, but not with taking similar action
with respect to more important public services. As a limiting
principle, reliance on the significance of the benefit has the
advantage of restricting the harms of leveling down to the cases that
do not matter so much, at least to the Court.  A limitation on107
leveling down based on the significance of the benefit at stake has
a certain utilitarian appeal as well, in that any damage to the
overall social welfare caused by leveling down would be minimized.
This approach seems largely concerned with protecting the interests
of the majority by preventing a self-inflicted wound carried out in a
fit of spite.
Deciding the permissibility of leveling down based on the
significance of the benefit at stake is not a limit that adequately
accounts for the values protected by a substantive conception of
equality. Benefits classified as relatively unimportant, such as
swimming pools and perhaps even NHS ceremonies, may nonethe-
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108. See infra Part II.B.
109. Again, such a calculation assumes that the losses from leveling down are not
compensated for by the diversion of the saved resources into more socially beneficial uses.
110. 465 U.S. 728 (1984).
less have a significant impact on social relationships and may serve
as a vehicle for generating powerful stigmatizing effects. Even if the
tangible effects of the deprivation are not as devastating as those
that would result from the loss of more significant resources and
services, the nonmaterial harms do not necessarily depend on the
importance of the thing itself. Injuries to social status and expres-
sive harms caused by leveling down may be just as powerful,
regardless of the relative significance of the unequally distributed
benefit.  As a potential limit on leveling down, a focus on the108
importance of the benefit merely ensures that the advantaged group
does not achieve gains in status and relational privilege at too great
a cost to itself. It does nothing to protect those disadvantaged by
inequality from further injury.
2. Remedial Principles Favoring Extension of Benefits
A close reading of the case law reveals another possible limit
fashioned by a set of loosely defined remedial principles that favor
curing inequality through the extension, rather than withdrawal, of
benefits where the inequality arises from an underinclusive statute.
Both the source and content of these principles are unclear,
however, as is the rationale for why they should apply in equality
challenges. These principles seem to stem from utilitarian concerns
similar to those that prompted attention to the significance of the
benefit as a limit: a desire to avoid an outcome that may worsen the
overall level of welfare.  Upon inspection, these remedial principles109
turn out to be very weak limits on leveling down, easily trumped by
a clear statement of legislative intent to the contrary. Most impor-
tantly, they too are unconnected to any value relating to the
underlying equality claim.
The most prominent reference to remedial principles that might
set limits on leveling down is found in Heckler v. Mathews,  an110
equal protection challenge by a male plaintiff to a provision in the
Social Security Act (SSA) that allowed women, but not men, to
receive certain spousal benefits without subtracting amounts
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111. Id. at 731-33. The issue in Mathews was com plicated by the compound statutory
background of the case. The SSA provision in question was part of a series of am endments to
the Act in response to an earlier Supreme Court decision, Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977), striking down a gender-based presum ption entitling wives and widows, but not
husbands and widowers, to full spousal benefits without proof of financial dependency. After
the Goldfarb decision in 1977, Congress amended the statute to eliminate the gender-based
financial dependency requirement. Mathews, 465 U.S. at 730-32. To ensure fiscal solvency,
the amendment required spousal benefits to be offset by the government pension monies and
required proof of financial dependency. However, to protect the reliance interests of those who
planned their retirement based on the earlier system, the amended Act revived the gender-
based classification in one respect: it exempted those persons who were eligible to receive
pension benefits prior to December 1982, and who would have been eligible to receive
unreduced spousal benefits under the pre-Goldfarb system , from the pension offset and
financial dependency provisions. Id. at 732-33. In effect, wives and widows who becam e
eligible for government pensions within a five-year grace period could still obtain full spousal
benefits without proof of financial dependency and without offsetting for other pension
monies. Id. at 733-34. Husbands and widowers, however, did not have recourse to such a grace
period.
112. Id. at 734.
113. The Court found that Congress had sufficiently weighty reasons for reviving the
gender-based classification for a limited time to protect the reliance interests of persons near
retirement, and that the use of the classification was sufficiently narrowly tailored to protect
those interests. Id. at 750-51.
114. The district court had found the severability clause to be an invalid attempt by
Congress to discourage challengers by defeating standing, and thus ordered the Secretary to
extend benefits to the plaintiff class. Id. at 736-37. The Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 737-
40.
115. Id. at 739-40.
received in government pensions and without proof of financial
dependency on their spouse.  Foreseeing that this gender-based111
classification might encounter equal protection challenges, Congress
included a severability clause. In the event that a court found the
provision unconstitutional, the benefits conferred by the statutory
exemption were to be withdrawn from women rather than extended
to men.112
Although the Court ultimately upheld the gender-based classifica-
tion against the equal protection challenge,  it discussed the113
permissibility of leveling down in the context of the male plaintiff’s
standing, at issue because success on the claim would not have
raised men’s benefits.  The Court rejected the challenge to114
standing, explaining that the injury from the discrimination was not
the lower level of benefits per se, but the noneconomic injury from
the discriminatory treatment of similarly situated persons.115
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116. Id. (quoting Miss. Univ. for W omen v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)). See also Orr
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1978) (finding a male plaintiff had standing to contest an order
requiring payment of alimony to his ex-wife under state gender-based alimony statute, even
though the result might be to require similarly situated women to pay alimony, rather than
to invalidate the order requiring plaintiff to pay). Numerous cases have cited Mathews for the
principle that plaintiffs have standing to challenge discrimination even if they will not benefit
tangibly from a successful challenge. See, e.g., Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States
[IRS], 964 F.2d 1556, 1559-61 (5th Cir. 1992) (in equal protection challenge to exemptions to
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, holding that plaintiffs had standing, even though the relief that
they sought would eliminate tax breaks for others rather than reduce their own tax liability,
because disparate treatment itself is a recognizable injury); Cruz v. Bowen, 672 F. Supp. 1300,
1304 (N.D. Cal. 1987); see also N.E. Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (“The ‘injury in fact’ in an equal protection case of this
variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the
ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”).
117. Mathews, 465 U .S. at 740. The Court’s recognition of nonmaterial injuries in equal
protection cases provides fertile ground for exploring equality-based limits on leveling down.
Mathews stops short, however, of recognizing that nonmaterial injuries may be furthered,
rather than remedied, by leveling down. The Court’s appreciation of the intangible injuries
from discrimination was limited to injuries resulting from facially different treatm ent,
without acknowledging that even facially neutral actions may inflict injuries of devaluation
and stigma. As argued below, leveling down may conflict with equality’s requirements where
it expresses unequal concern towards the challengers of inequality. See infra Parts II.B, III.
118. Mathews, 465 U.S. at 736-37.
Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, explained the
harm to the plaintiff as follows:
[D]iscrimination itself, by perpetuating “archaic and stereotypic
notions” or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as
“innately inferior” and therefore as less worthy participants in
the political community ... can cause serious noneconomic
injuries to those persons who are personally denied equal
treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored
group.116
So framed, this noneconomic injury conferred standing on the
plaintiff because the Court could redress it by ending the use of the
more advantageous formula to calculate benefits for women.  117
In the course of deciding that a withdrawal of benefits from
women would redress the plaintiff’s injury, the Court engaged in a
more general discussion of the acceptability of leveling down
remedies. In the decision below, the district court invalidated the
severability clause as an effort by Congress to thwart possible
discrimination claims by “making such a challenge fruitless.”  The118
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119. Id. at 738.
120. Id. (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
See also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272 (1979) (“In every equal protection attack upon a statute
challenged as under-inclusive, the State may satisfy the Constitution’s commands either by
extending benefits to the previously disfavored class or by denying benefits to both
parties ....”); Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501, 504 n.4 (1977) (“[W]e emphasize that Utah is
free to adopt either 18 or 21 as the age of majority for both m ales and females for child-
support purposes. The only constraint on its power to choose is the principle ... that the two
sexes must be treated equally.”).
121. Mathews, 465 U.S. at 739. See, e.g., Orr, 440 U.S. at 272; Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S.
313, 316 (1977); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17-18 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351,
352 (1974).
122. Mathews, 465 U.S. at 740 (quoting Iowa-Des Moines Nat’l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S.
239, 247 (1931) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
Supreme Court disagreed, stating that it had “never suggested that
the injuries caused by a constitutionally underinclusive scheme can
be remedied only by extending the program’s benefits to the
excluded class.”  Rather, 119
a court sustaining such a claim faces “two remedial alternatives:
[it] may either declare [the statute] a nullity and order that its
benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to
benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include
those who are aggrieved by the exclusion.”  120
Indeed, the Court noted, it had “frequently entertained attacks on
discriminatory statutes or practices even when the government
could deprive a successful plaintiff of any monetary relief by
withdrawing the statute’s benefits from both the favored and the
excluded class.”  Emphasizing the general consistency of leveling121
down with equality rights, the Court stated: “[W]hen the ‘right
invoked is that to equal treatment,’ the appropriate remedy is a
mandate of equal treatment, a result that can be accomplished by
withdrawal of benefits from the favored class as well as by extension
of benefits to the excluded class.”122
So far, the Court’s discussion was fully consistent with the
conventional understanding of leveling down as an acceptable fix for
inequality. At this point, however, the Court’s opinion took an
interesting turn. At the same time that it emphasized the overall
permissibility of leveling down as a remedy in discrimination cases,
it suggested that remedial principles might nonetheless place some
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123. Id. at 739 n.5 (quoting Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89, 91 (1979)).
124. Id. (citing Califano, 443 U.S. at 91).
125. Id. (quoting Califano, 443 U.S. at 94).
126. Id. (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 365 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
127. Id. The Court left open the door to a possible limit on leveling down remedies where
“a legislative attempt to thwart a court’s ability to remedy a constitutional violation would
itself violate the Constitution.” Id. The Court declined to address this argument, because it
ultimately concluded that the Court’s rem edial powers were not thwarted by the severability
clause, as leveling down would remedy the harm. Its treatment of the issue, however, left
open the possibility that a legislative effort that does thwart a Court’s remedial power might
violate the separation of powers, a topic that is beyond the scope of this Article.
128. 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
129. Id. at 79-80, 89, 93-94. There were two defendants in the case, the Secretary of the
limit on leveling down. In a footnote to its discussion of the remedial
flexibility of discrimination claims, the Court stated that the
remedial choice between leveling up or leveling down is “within the
‘constitutional competence of a federal district court,’” and that
“ordinarily ‘extension, rather than nullification, is the proper
course.’”  The Court did not explain why a court should ordinarily123
prefer extension, and cited only one case in support of such a
preference.  In the same breath, the Court emphasized that a court124
“should not, of course, ‘use its remedial powers to circumvent the
intent of the legislature,’”  directing courts instead to “‘measure125
the intensity of commitment to the residual policy and consider the
degree of potential disruption of the statutory scheme that would
occur by extension as opposed to abrogation.’”  It found this to be126
a case where Congress had clearly expressed a preference for
nullification rather than extension; therefore, the Court found that
leveling down was not only permissible, but required.  As framed127
by the Court in Mathews, any preference for the extension of
benefits only carries force when it does not conflict with a contrary
legislative intent.
The source of the remedial preference asserted in Mathews for
extension of benefits remains something of a mystery. The one
case cited in Mathews in support of extension remedies, Califano
v. Westcott,  does not add much to the understanding of why128
and when leveling down might be disfavored in an equality claim.
In Westcott, the Court unanimously agreed that a federal provi-
sion authorizing benefits to families with unemployed fathers,
but not unemployed mothers, violated equal protection, but split
on the question of remedy.  Five Justices voted to extend the129
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former U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW ), and the Commissioner of
the Massachusetts Department of Public W elfare. The federal defendant contested the finding
on liability, but did not contest the remedy. In contrast, the state defendant accepted the
liability finding but disputed the remedy, arguing that the violation could be remedied by
adopting a gender-neutral “unemployed principal wage-earner” test. Id. at 78-79, 82-83 n.4.
The issue, then, was whether to extend full benefits to fam ilies with unemployed mothers, or
partially level down by providing benefits at an intermediate level. No party proposed leveling
benefits all the way down to the level of the disadvantaged class, a remedy which would
provide no benefits to any fam ilies with unemployed mothers or fathers, regardless of wage-
earner status.
130. Id. at 93-94.
131. Id. at 89 (citing Jiminez v. W einberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637-38 (1974) and Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 n.25 (1973)). This principle qualified the Court’s
acknowledgement that a court confronting an underinclusive statute has two remedial
alternatives: extension or withdrawal of the benefits in question. Id. at 89 (citing W elsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
132. Id. at 90.
133. Id. As the dissent notes, such a calculus can be difficult to gauge. Id. at 96 (“There is
the possibility, not mentioned by the Court, that other hardships might be occasioned in the
allocating of limited funds as a result of court-ordered extension of these particular benefits.”).
If utilitarian concerns about how best to maximize social welfare are the guiding principles
courts use in setting lim its on leveling down remedies, the dissent’s separation of powers
argument, that Congress and not the Court should set the balance, has some force. However,
a limit on leveling down that stem s from  equality law, rather than general equitable
considerations, would be properly implemented by a court. 
“unemployed father” benefits to families with unemployed mothers;
the remaining four Justices would have enjoined the program until
Congress amended the statute to cure the violation and to select its
preferred remedial course.  The majority defended its choice of130
extension by characterizing prior equal protection cases as
“suggest[ing] that extension, rather than nullification, is the proper
course,” citing two such cases,  and noting that it had “regularly ...131
affirmed District Court judgments ordering that welfare benefits be
paid to members of an unconstitutionally excluded class.”132
The decision does little to illuminate the source of, or justification
for, a preference for extension of benefits. The selection of the
remedy in Westcott turned more on the Court’s view of congressional
intent than any independent remedial principle favoring extension
as a remedy to inequality. The Court cited “equitable consider-
ations” in support of the extension remedy, highlighting the
hardship that would befall the 300,000 children of unemployed
fathers who would otherwise be denied AFDC benefits.  The Court,133
however, justified its attention to this concern because of “a
congressional intent to minimize the burdens” on AFDC beneficia-
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134. Id. at 90.
135. In the end, the majority saw no need “to elaborate ... [upon] the conditions under
which invalidation rather than extension of an underinclusive federal benefits statute should
be ordered” because no party had presented that issue for review. Id. The Court’s framing of
the issue, however, as about the form the extension should take and not about nullification
versus extension, was a bit facetious. Although it would not have leveled the benefits all the
way down to zero, the state argued for a remedy that would have imposed some leveling down
of benefits by tightening the requirements for receipt of such benefits. The state’s position
squarely presented the issue of whether a partial leveling down remedy is acceptable in an
equal protection challenge to an underinclusive statute.
136. Although the majority purported to give Congress’s specific intent less weight on the
question of how to craft the extension at this stage, the Court’s reading of legislative intent
ultim ately carried the day. Id. at 82-83, 90-91. W hile giving lip service to equitable concerns
about needy fam ilies if additional criteria, such as breadwinner status, were imposed on
otherwise eligible families, the Court again justified this concern by reference to Congress’s
intent. Id. at 91-92 (expressing doubt that Congress would approve of a remedy that
incorporated a new dividing line, such as breadwinner status, into the benefits scheme).
137. Id. at 89 (citing Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) and Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
138. See, e.g., BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW:
H ISTORY, PRACTICE, AND THEORY 209 (2d ed. 1996) (“W ithout discussing the matter, the
Burger Court mostly extended coverage of unconstitutional sex-based statutes to ‘those who
are aggrieved by the exclusion.’”).
139. For example, in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), cited in Westcott, the
Court struck down a Social Security Act (SSA) provision that discriminated against
illegitimate children, and remanded the case to give the plaintiffs a chance to show that they
met certain judicially created criteria for receiving SSA benefits. In effect, the Court rewrote
the statute to conform to what it viewed as Congress’s rational purposes underlying the
ries in the event that part of the statute was found unconstitu-
tional.  Thus, the existence, much less content, of any independent134
equitable consideration favoring extension remains unclear.  As in135
Mathews, the asserted remedial principle ultimately collapses into
the Court’s prediction of what the legislature would have wanted.136
The pedigree and normative justification for the preference
expressed in Mathews and Westcott are opaque at best. Mathews
cited only Westcott in support of the remedial preference it espoused,
and the two cases cited for this principle in Westcott merely select
the remedial course of extension with no discussion.  These cases137
fall within a subset of cases involving equal protection challenges to
underinclusive statutes where the Court has, with little or no
discussion, opted for extending the more favorable treatment to the
disadvantaged class.  In these cases, the Court has been guided by138
its sub silentio reading of legislative intent, as opposed to a clearly
articulated remedial preference for leveling up.  This line of under-139
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statute, including the prevention of spurious claims and the provision of support for the
dependents of a disabled wage earner, without explicitly discussing the rationale behind its
remedial choice or other remedial alternatives. Id. at 634-37. Likewise, in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the other case cited in Westcott, the Court im plicitly
extended spousal benefits to servicewomen on the same terms as servicemen, without any
discussion of a preference for extension over nullification, and without an acknowledgement
of other possible remedial choices. Id. at 691 n.25 (invalidating the statutory scheme only
insofar as it required a servicewoman to prove the dependency of her spouse). The Court
seemingly viewed extension as consistent with Congress’ purpose to attract career personnel
through the provision of spousal benefits. Id. Although Frontiero cited three cases in support
of the continuing validity of the remainder of the statutory scheme, none of these cases
discuss, much less endorse, a general preference for extension remedies in equal protection
cases. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972) (holding state workers
compensation law that discriminated against “unacknowledged illegitimate” children violated
equal protection, and extending the right to recover to illegitimate children); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute that
permitted legitimate but not illegitimate children to recover in tort suit for wrongful death
of parent, and extending the rights to recover to illegitimate children); Moritz v. Comm’r, 469
F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1972) (finding equal protection violation in tax code’s gender-based
denial of deduction for the costs of caring for taxpayer’s dependent invalid m other where
taxpayer is a never-married male, and finding extension “logical and proper, in view of [the
deduction provisions] purpose and the broad separability clause in the act.”).
140. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151-53 (1980) (declining
to decide whether state statute that treated widows and widowers unequally in violation of
equal protection should be cured by extending benefits to widowers or taking them away from
widows, and remanding to state court to decide based on state legislature’s intent); Skinner
v. Oklahom a, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (vacating on equal protection grounds a sterilization order
in which the state statute in question sterilized persons convicted of larceny but not persons
convicted of embezzlement, leaving it to the state to decide whether to broaden the statute so
as to sterilize embezzlers as well); see also Johnson Bros. Liquor v. Comm’r of Revenue, 402
N.W .2d 791, 793 (Minn. 1987) (“When a statutory scheme has been declared unconstitutional,
our prim ary goal in determining a remedy is, insofar as possible, to effectuate the intent of
the legislature had it known the statutes were invalid.”); People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152
(1984) (finding gender-specific state rape statute unconstitutional, and extending statute’s
coverage to persons previously excluded, rather than striking down the conviction, based on
belief that legislature would have preferred extension over invalidation).
theorized cases stands in contrast to other equal protection cases in
which the Court has suggested that the choice between extension
and invalidation should be decided exclusively based on legislative
intent, without referring to any principle favoring the extension of
benefits.  When one follows the thread of case law to Mathews, the140
general remedial principle cited turns out to be the proverbial
emperor’s new clothes.
One final reed of support for a remedial principle favoring
extension lies in early Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) guidance directing employers to cure any discrimination
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141. According to the regulation:
[a]s to other kinds of sex-oriented State employment laws, such as those
requiring special rest and meal periods or physical facilities for women,
provision of these benefits to one sex only will be a violation of Title VII. An
employer will be deemed to have engaged in an unlawful employment practice if:
... (ii) It does not provide the same benefits for male employees. If the employer
can prove that business necessity precludes providing these benefits to both men
and women, then the State law is in conflict with and superseded by Title VII
as to this employer. In this situation, the em ployer shall not provide such
benefits to members of either sex. 
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(4)(ii) (2003)
(em phasis added).
142. Id. If that is the case, the employer may comply with Title VII by refusing to provide
the benefits to either sex, in which case Title VII would preclude the conflicting state law. Id.
143. This period of uncertainty ended in the 1980s, when the Supreme Court upheld state
statutes requiring preferential treatment for pregnant women as consistent with Title VII.
See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). By that time, other types of
special treatment state employment laws not involving pregnancy were vulnerable under
equal protection.
144. See, e.g., Homemakers, Inc. v. Div. of Indus. Welfare, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974);
Burns v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Arkansas v. Fairfield Communities
Land Co., 538 S.W .2d 698 (Ark. 1976); Vick v. Pioneer Oil Co., 569 S.W .2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978). But see Hays v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972) (deferring to the
EEOC Guidance and requiring the employer to pay its male employees overtime pay in order
to comply with both Title VII and state law requiring female employees to receive overtime
pay).
that results from state-imposed special maternity benefits by
extending such benefits to men, absent proof of business
necessity.  In this guidance, the EEOC interpreted Title VII to141
require that employers who provide certain benefits to women in
compliance with state law must provide those benefits to male
employees also, unless the employer can establish that business
necessity precludes offering the benefits to both men and women.142
Much like the Court in Mathews, the EEOC did not cite any
reasons or legal precedent for its requirement that employers must,
absent business necessity, comply with Title VII by extending the
state-mandated benefits to men rather than withdrawing them from
women. During the time when courts were grappling with possible
conflicts between Title VII and state laws requiring the preferential
treatment of maternity,  this portion of the EEOC guidance143
received a rather lukewarm reception in the courts.  Courts144
objected primarily that the state legislatures that passed laws
requiring special benefits for women did not intend to burden
employers with the requirement of extending similar treatment to
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145. Homemakers, Inc. v. Div. of Indus. Welfare, 356 F. Supp. 1111, 1112-13 (N.D. Cal.
1973); Burns, 346 F. Supp. at 997; Vick, 569 S.W .2d at 634.
146. Of course, it is possible that the Court’s reading of congressional intent as supporting
extension itself reflects an implicit determination that a contrary reading of congressional
intent would violate equality law, and that the legislature should be presumed to act with the
intent to act constitutionally. That is not, however, how the Court has explained what it is
doing.
147. This is especially true when the source of the equality guarantee is a federal statute,
and the underinclusive statute is a state statute. Even if both the equality guarantee and the
discriminatory statute are at the same level in the hierarchy of law, however, it is still not
clear why the legislature’s intent with respect to how to remedy the discriminatory statute
should prevail. At a minimum, when the intent to permit only leveling down remedies
conflicts with the intent to protect equality rights, such a conflict would require a
determination of which competing intent should prevail. Generally, the more specific or most
recently expressed legislative intent prevails, but conflicts between legislative intentions are
notoriously difficult to resolve.
148. See Evan H. Caminker, Note, A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive
men.  Similar to the fate of the preference for extension cited in145
Mathews, the EEOC preference retained little or no force when
confronted with judicial impressions of a contrary legislative intent.
Chasing down the source of a remedial principle favoring
extension over the withdrawal of benefits in a discrimination claim,
referenced so obliquely by Mathews and the EEOC, turns out to be
like following a disappearing trail of breadcrumbs. In the end, all
that is clear is that any such principle is not connected to the values
of equality and is easily trumped by a contrary legislative intent.146
Still, the various references to such a preference suggest a palpable,
if inarticulate, receptivity to further development of judicial limits
on leveling down. If such a limit is grounded in equality principles,
it is not at all clear why a conflicting legislative intent should
prevail, particularly if the source of the equality requirement is
constitutional rather than statutory. Even if the source of the
equality guarantee is statutory, it is not clear why legislative intent
on the question of remedy would necessarily prevail if it conflicted
with the meaning of the equality guarantee itself.147
3. External Limits Fixing the Level of Treatment for One Class
One settled limit that does constrain leveling down, independent
of any ties to equality principles, is the fixation of treatment for one
group by some external principle so that a court can provide relief
by equalizing benefits or burdens in only one direction.  Thus,148
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Statutes, 95 YALE L.J. 1185, 1187 n.8 (1986).
149. For example, in an equal protection challenge to a federal statute making citizenship
automatic for the foreign-born children of citizen-mothers but not citizen-fathers, Justice
Scalia observed that even if the Court had found an equal protection violation, it would not
have been able to extend citizenship to the challenger because only Congress, not the Court,
has that power. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 453-59 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). If
Scalia is correct, the Court would have been precluded from imposing a leveling up remedy.
But see Wauchope v. United States Dept. of State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1993)
(upholding district court’s extension of U.S. citizenship to foreign-born offspring of citizen-
mothers in equal protection challenge to gender-based citizenship statute); Aguayo v.
Christopher, 865 F. Supp. 479, 486-88, 492 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (granting citizenship to foreign-
born daughter of citizen-mother as rem edy for unconstitutional gender-based statute
conferring citizenship on foreign-born children of citizen-fathers but not citizen-mothers). For
criticism of the Court’s resolution of the equal protection challenge in Miller, see Cornelia T.L.
Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive
Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (discussing the majority’s
reliance on gender stereotypes about mens’ and womens’ parenting roles).
150. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
W here a statute is defective because of underinclusion there exist two remedial
alternatives: a court may either declare it a  nullity and order that its benefits
not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend
the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion. 
Id. at 361.
151. Id. at 340, 344.
152. Id. at 342-44.
153. Id. at 356-57 (describing the Establishment Clause as embodying a “neutrality
where the level of benefits for the favored class is fixed, leveling up
may be required as the only path to equal treatment. Of course,
external principles may work in the other direction too, thereby
precluding a court from raising the level of treatment for the
disfavored group.149
Welsh v. United States provides an example of the former
situation.  In Welsh, a case most often cited for Justice Harlan’s150
observations about the flexibility of equality in terms of possible
remedies, the Court held that the federal conscientious objector
statute violated the establishment clause by privileging religious
opposition to war over non-religious belief systems.  Rather than151
striking down the conscientious objector statute in its entirety, the
Court reversed Welsh’s  conviction, thereby extending the statute’s
protection to the previously excluded group.  Although the case152
was litigated under the Establishment Clause and did not involve
an equality claim, the Court engaged in the same kind of analysis
used to confront an underinclusive statute under the Equal
Protection Clause.  In Welsh, however, the Court could not level153
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principle” which requires “an equal protection mode of analysis” to “eliminate ... religious
gerrymanders”); see also Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46
STAN. L. REV. 235, 254 n.68 (1994) (noting that the Establishment Clause contains a
miniature equal protection clause).
154. 398 U.S. at 362.
155. If the action had been for prospective relief, such as a declaratory judgment, this
constraint would not have applied. The Court would have approached the question by looking
at statutory intent, as it does when underinclusive statutes are challenged under the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 364-66 n.18 (Harlan, J., concurring).
156. Cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (invalidating sex-based exclusion of non-
volunteer women from  jury venire and ordering state to include both women and men equally
in the jury venire; because jury trials are guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, the inequality
could be cured only by including both men and women in the jury pool).
157. See, e.g., Davis v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817-18 (1989) (finding that
a state tax treating retired state and local government employees differently from other
retired employees violated equality requirement of intergovernmental tax immunity, but that
a federal court may not remedy the inequality by increasing the tax burden on those treated
more favorably because it lacks the constitutional power to directly impose state taxes). See
also Caminker, supra note 148, at 1185 (conceding that the constitutional mandate of equal
treatment does not itself dictate a preference for extending or withdrawing favorable
treatment as a remedy to inequality, but arguing that other constitutional norms may impose
limits on such a choice by the courts).
158. See Equal Pay Act, 29 U .S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000) (“an em ployer who is paying a wage
rate differential in violation of [the Act] shall not, in order to com ply with the provisions of
[the Act], reduce the wage rate of any employee”); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(3) (2000) (forbidding employers “to reduce the wage rate of any employee in
down to resolve the disparity of treatment among religious and
nonreligious objectors because it could not retroactively convict
similarly situated religious conscientious objectors without violating
the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder.  The154
extension of conscientious objector status to Welsh, therefore, was
the only possible remedy.  This limit, and other possible due155
process limits, will prevent courts from imposing a leveling down
remedy in a criminal case where a convicted person seeks relief
through an equality claim.  External limits derived from other156
constitutional values also may limit leveling down remedies in civil
cases.157
External principles that preclude leveling down choices also may
have statutory sources. Specifically, two federal antidiscrimination
statutes contain provisions barring remedies that would take away
benefits from the favored class. Both the Equal Pay Act and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibit employers from
lowering the wages of more highly paid workers in response to a
lawsuit alleging pay discrimination against lower-paid workers.158
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order to comply with this chapter”).
159. See, e.g., 109 CONG. REC. 9196 (1963) (the “lower wage rate must be increased to the
higher level so that there will not be an adverse effect on already established wage patterns”)
(remarks of Congressman Thompson).
160. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1971) (“If the time ever comes when
Jackson attempts to run segregated public pools either directly or indirectly, or participates
in subterfuge whereby pools are nominally run by ‘private parties’ but actually by the city,
relief will be available in the federal courts.”).
161. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
These constraints were included in the legislation to mitigate
concerns about the costs of equality if it resulted in lowering the
standard of living for those privileged by inequality.  Currently,159
however, these statutory constraints are understood as distinct
from the equality principle embodied in these statutory nondis-
crimination guarantees. 
Although external constraints may sporadically limit leveling
down, they are exceptional and disconnected from any substantive
value in equality law. As a result, they are not a substitute for an
analysis of whether leveling down responses may conflict with
equality principles themselves under some circumstances.
4. Leveling Down as a Cover for Continuing Discrimination
In addition to the discriminatory intent standard discussed above,
and in contrast with the three potential limits just discussed, there
is one existing limit on leveling down that does have its moorings
in equality law. It too, however, falls short of providing an adequate
account of leveling down in relation to equality law. This limit
comes into play when the remedy does not actually lower the level
of treatment all the way down to that experienced by the most
disadvantaged. In such a case, the continuation of the discrimina-
tory treatment violates equality law. The Court in Palmer recog-
nized the presence of ongoing, if obscured, discrimination as a
potential limit, although one that it thought not to be implicated in
Palmer itself.  Several of the cases distinguished in Palmer can be160
understood as falling within this exception. In Griffin v. School
Board of Prince Edward County, the Court held that Prince Edward
County’s decision to close its public schools, rather than comply with
a desegregation order, violated the Equal Protection Clause.  The161
Court explained its decision as based on the county’s unconstitu-
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162. Id. at 231. 
But the record in the present case could not be clearer that Prince Edward’s
public schools were closed and private schools operated in their place with state
and county assistance, for one reason, and one reason only: to ensure, through
measures taken by the county and the State, that white and colored children in
Prince Edward County would not, under any circumstances, go to the same
school. Whatever nonracial grounds m ight support a State’s allowing a county
to abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and grounds
of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.
Id.
163. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 221-22 (explaining that the private schools in Prince Edward
“were in fact run by a practical partnership between State and county,” and that there were
“many facets of state involvement in the running of the ‘private schools.’”); see also id. at 225
(explaining Griffin as a case not based on motive, but the reality that “the State was in fact
perpetuating a segregated public school system by financing segregated ‘private’ academies”).
164. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (holding state’s provision of
textbooks to private discriminatory schools violated equal protection); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) (holding state court’s enforcement of racially restrictive covenant violated equal
protection); see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (holding that Macon, Georgia
could not transfer its city park from public to private hands in order to avoid desegregation,
because the city continued to maintain the park and thus was implicated by the “private”
park’s exclusion of African Americans). But see Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (affirming
the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision that the trust given to Macon, Georgia in Senator
Bacon’s will failed after the Supreme Court’s decision in Evans v. Newton because the testator
had clearly expressed an intent that the park remain segregated, so that the land reverted
to the state under Georgia state property law, and would not be used as a public park).
tional purpose: to stop children from attending integrated schools.162
In Palmer, however, which rejected an intent standard, the Court
explained Griffin as a case where the county was covertly continu-
ing to treat white students preferentially, despite the façade of
neutral treatment constructed by the closure of public schools.163
This reading of Griffin finds support in the Court’s cases treating
state support of private discrimination as discrimination by the
state.  In other words, Griffin was not a true leveling down case164
because the county continued to subsidize the education of white
students, who could attend publicly-subsidized “private” schools, but
did nothing for black students, who had no such schools to attend.
Unlike the other limits described above, this constraint is
grounded in equality law. Without a complete leveling down, the
mandate of equal treatment is violated. Because it is limited to
fulfilling an equal treatment principle, however, it does not impose
any constraints where a complete leveling down of treatment has
occurred. If the defendant in Griffin had truly leveled educational
opportunities, by playing no role in assisting white students to
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165. See infra notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
166. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
obtain a private education, it could have avoided this check. The
only remaining equality-based limit under existing doctrine that
could have challenged the school closure is the discriminatory intent
standard, which, as discussed above, is an inadequate constraint on
leveling down. Like the intent limit, the limit on partial leveling
down assumes a narrow conception of equality that requires only
equal treatment and the absence of a discriminatory motive.
Accordingly, it does not fully account for the ways in which leveling
down may perpetuate inequality.
D. Room for Further Development of Equality-Based Limits
Despite rumblings of doctrinal limits, courts typically approve
leveling down with minimal constraints. In addition, the constraints
that do exist are either unmoored from the principles of equality law
or grounded in an overly narrow and formalistic conception of
equality. As currently conceived, existing doctrine does not ade-
quately account for the ways in which leveling down can perpetuate
and compound inequality. Still, the Court has not foreclosed
additional limits on leveling down that are grounded in a more
substantive conception of equality. As precedent, Palmer is a case
that is sorely outdated, perhaps more a reflection of the Court’s
reluctance to squarely overrule prior cases than a  continuing
approval of the substantive result. 
Similarly, the Court’s acceptance of the leveling down remedy in
Mathews does not foreclose the rejection of leveling down in other
cases. Mathews accepted leveling down in a case where the injury
was limited to differential treatment and where the leveling down
would not have contributed to the social inequality of men or
stigmatized them in relation to women.  The Court’s stated165
preference for extension remedies suggests that the Court may be
amenable to the further development of limits to leveling down. 
Nor does the shift to a discriminatory intent standard in
Washington v. Davis  foreclose a more searching inquiry into the166
potential tension between leveling down and equality norms. At the
point of evaluating a leveling down response, discrimination has
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167. In related contexts, once a violation of rights is established, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendant to prove that some other nondiscriminatory reason actually caused the harm
to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) (amending
Title VII so that once plaintiff proves discrimination was a “motivating factor,” a violation is
established, and defendant’s proof that it would have made the same decision anyway limits
the remedy); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (finding that once plaintiffs
prove systemic disparate treatment, defendant has the burden of proof at the remedy stage
with respect to individual relief to show that the harm to any particular plaintiff was not
caused by discrimination); Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977) (holding that once plaintiff shows that exercise of rights was a “motivating factor” in
decision not to rehire him, defendant has burden to prove that it would have reached the same
decision even in the absence of the plaintiff’s protected conduct). An analogous rule would be
that if the defendant responds by leveling down once discrimination has occurred, the
defendant has the burden to prove the absence of a discriminatory intent behind the action.
168. Cf. Gewirtz, supra note 32, at 585, 587 (“The function of a remedy is to ‘realize’ a legal
norm ....”).
already occurred. The Court’s institutional concerns in Davis about
frequent clashes with other branches of government in reviewing
limitless challenges to facially neutral policies should be less
pressing once a violation of equal protection has been established.
With discriminatory intent or facially different treatment having
already been established once, leveling down in response to that
discrimination deserves a more critical look.  Once leveling down167
enters the picture, the focus should be on whether it remedies the
full extent of the injuries cognizable under equality law. Nothing in
Davis precludes a more critical approach to leveling down as a
remedy to inequality.
Although inadequately theorized, the recurrent judicial expres-
sions of dislike for leveling down suggest an openness to closer
scrutiny of the conventional wisdom that inequality can always be
remedied in this manner. To begin a more complete analysis of
leveling down and its relationship to equality, we should revisit the
question of whether equal treatment is indeed, as courts often
assume, the only norm to be reckoned with in equality law.
II. A  MORE CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON LEVELING DOWN AND
EQUALITY
An evaluation of the legitimacy of leveling down requires a more
precise look at the normative content of equality law and the
injuries from which it protects.  Although some injuries cognizable168
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169. Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. &  PUB. AFF. 107,
107-08 (1976) (remarking upon the need for a mediating principle to add content to the Equal
Protection Clause).
170. As currently construed by the Court, the discriminatory intent requirement for facially
neutral treatment protects against certain kinds of animus in the decision-making process,
such as race or sex bias. See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Vill.
of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
under equality law are of the equal treatment order, others are not.
The permissibility of leveling down should depend on its responsive-
ness to the injuries of discrimination. Where the injury inheres in
the materially dissimilar treatment of persons otherwise similarly
situated, it may be remedied by eliminating the differential
treatment either by leveling down, leveling up, or setting a baseline
at some point in between. Where the injuries from discrimination
transcend the material consequences of differential treatment and
are social or relational in nature, however, leveling down may
exacerbate the injuries of discrimination and is not consistent with
equality law.
A. Equality as Equal Concern
The meaning of equality depends on one’s perspective, as there is
no inherent meaning discoverable in the Equal Protection Clause or
in statutes that prohibit discrimination based on certain criteria.169
With countless books, articles, and essays grappling with the
meaning of equality, the purpose of this discussion is to make the
more limited point that equal treatment is not the only, nor even the
most predominant, norm in equality law. To be sure, equality law
as it has developed is concerned with the unequal treatment of
persons deemed to be similarly situated. This unequal treatment
includes both different treatment and facially neutral treatment
with a discriminatory purpose. Although superficially treating
people the same, the latter type of treatment still involves an equal
treatment principle. The prohibition on discriminatory intent seeks
to ensure the equal treatment of persons in the decision-making
process, so that they are not treated less favorably than they would
have been absent an impermissible reason.  Thus, both facially170
neutral classifications based on a discriminatory purpose and
facially discriminatory classifications violate an equal treatment
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171. A wide variety of scholars have identified the overriding norm of equality law as the
principle that all human beings deserve to be regarded with equal concern and respected as
equals. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING R IGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1977) (discussing
equality in political morality as meaning not just equal treatment, but the more fundamental
principle of equal concern); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 82 (1980) (embracing
Dworkin’s concept of equal concern); KENNETH L. KARST, LAW’S PROMISE, LAW’S EXPRESSION:
V ISIONS OF POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER AND RELIGION x (1993) (explaining his
premise that legal guarantees of equality in U.S. law are based on a principle of “equal
citizenship,” such “that every individual is entitled to be treated by the organized society as
a respected and responsible participant”); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND
SOCIAL EQUALITY 98 (1996) (identifying as the central theory of antidiscrimination law, “the
denial of the belief that some persons deserve less concern and respect because of their race,”
and subsequently applying this principle to gender and sexual orientation in addition to race);
Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6, 7 (1976) (explaining the antidiscrimination principle as a
prohibition on race-dependent decisions because of their propensity to “reflect the assumption
that members of one race are less worthy than other people,” and “are likely in fact to rest on
assumptions of the differential worth of racial groups”); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive
Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 M INN. L. REV. 1, 13-18 (2000) (discussing and elaborating
a principle of equal concern as the guiding principle for deciding equal protection cases);
Lawrence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063, 1072 (1980) (framing equality principle as “equal respect in which we as a
society aspire to hold each individual”).
172. See DWORKIN, supra note 171, at 272-73.
173. Id. at 227.
174. Id. at 273 (“[T]he right to treatment as an equal must be taken to be fundamental
under the liberal conception of equality, and ... the more restrictive right to equal treatment
principle unless they are adequately justified by their relationship
to a sufficiently weighty and acceptable purpose.
Although unequal treatment does violate equality law where
insufficiently justified, it does not follow that the normative content
of equality law is fully exhausted by an equal treatment mandate.
Rather, when unequal treatment violates equality law, it is only
because it violates the more fundamental principle of equal
concern.  Perhaps the most well-known proponent of equal concern171
as the guiding normative theory of equality is Ronald Dworkin.172
According to Dworkin, “the right to treatment as an equal is
fundamental, [while] the right to equal treatment [is] derivative.”173
In other words, the right to be treated as an equal may not always
require or be satisfied by equal treatment. When unequal treatment
violates equality law, it does so not because equality always requires
treating similarly situated people the same, but rather because the
unequal treatment in question violates the more fundamental
principle of equal concern.174
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holds only in those special circumstances in which, for some special reason, it follows from the
more fundamental right ....”).
175. See, e.g., MARTHA M INOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 151-52, 194 (1990) (critiquing
legal liberalism for regarding persons as separate and autonomous individuals instead of in
the context of social relationships); Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Freedom from  Unreal
Loyalties”: On Fidelity in Constitutional Interpretation , 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1773 (1997)
(criticizing Dworkin’s theoretical approach to equality as overly abstract and ungrounded in
the lives of those who are subjected to inequality); Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom
Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 69, 71-72, 75-76 (1990) (criticizing Dworkin for contributing
to an “atomistic focus on rights” and an “insulation” of the persons claiming rights, such that
citizens are constructed with “almost none of the so-called ‘civic virtues’: mercy, compassion,
public involvement, fellow-feeling, sympathy, or, simply, love”).
176. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1219-20, 1223-25 (1992) (arguing that
Dworkin’s equal concern has been given an overly narrow and atomistic reading in some
feminist criticism, and that equal concern “is not myopic with regard to differences among
people and their needs,” that it “combines notions of both reciprocity and response,” and that
it is sensitive to community membership in determining obligations and responsibilities).
177. Id. at 1220 (interpreting Dworkin’s equal concern as incorporating a perspective in
which “one does not merely substitute oneself for the other but engages in perspective taking
that attempts to see the other in the other’s own terms”).
178. Cf. Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860
(1987) (seeking to reconstruct rights as sensitive to social relationships and community
membership, rather than as instruments held by atomistic, insular individuals).
Dworkin’s version of equal concern has been the subject of much
commentary and criticism by feminist scholars who have justly
criticized it for positing a neutral observer whose “concern” is
dispassionate and at arm’s length, and who implicitly adopts the
perspective of the persons in power who are obligated to exercise
equal concern, rather than the perspective of those who are the
object of concern.  As a mediating principle, however, equal175
concern should, and is broad enough to, encompass a more active
and connected kind of concern that is empathetic and relational.176
Rather than defining equal concern from the perspective of a
neutral actor who is obligated to act with equal concern, an enlarged
perspective should include that of the persons for whom the
obligation attaches.  Equal concern should value the connections177
between people, not just their interests as atomistic individuals.178
It should insist upon an openness to forming connections with
persons as equal members of a shared community, and take
responsibility for relational injuries to persons’ self-conceptions by
following Patricia Williams’ instruction to account for the damage
that occurs when we disregard those persons whose “lives qualita-
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179. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing
as the Law’s Response to Racism , 42 U. M IAMI L. REV. 127, 151 (1987). See also Seyla
Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and
Moral Theory, in W OMEN AND MORAL THEORY 164, 169 (Eva Federer Kittay & Diana T.
Meyers eds., 1987) (defining an equal concern principle that makes each “entitled to expect
and to assume from the other forms of behavior through which the other feels recognized and
confirmed as a concrete, individual being with specific needs, talents, capacities”).
180. See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 291, 365-69 (1985) (formulating a feminist account of equal respect that does
not ignore or trivialize persons’ differences, but refuses to attach normative significance to
them).
181. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
182. Id. at 494 (“To separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”).
183. 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303 (1880).
tively depend on our regard.”  Under such a reading, equal concern179
does not allow those in power to sever some persons from the
community or devalue them for their differences.  In short, equal180
concern should include an obligation to act with equal empathy for
our shared humanity, rather than a dispassionate weighing of the
interests of abstracted individuals from the perspective of those
doing the weighing. It is this view of equal concern that I endorse
here.
Such a reconstruction of equality law is perhaps not so far out of
reach under existing law as one might suppose. The Court’s own
case law leaves room for an equality that is larger than equal
treatment, one that is grounded in an equal concern based on
respect and empathy for persons as members of a shared commu-
nity. As a starting point, the Court’s justifications of its most
revered equal protection rulings support the conclusion that the
constitutional guarantee of equality is, at bottom, about more than
equal treatment. In Brown v. Board of Education   itself, the Court181
rejected state-enforced racial segregation, notwithstanding its
far-fetched and hypothetical assumption of tangible equality, in
language that places equal concern at the forefront of an equal
protection analysis.  Similarly, in Strauder v. West Virginia,  the182 183
Court spoke of the state’s exclusion of African Americans from jury
service as “a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of
their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an
impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice
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184. Id. at 308.
185. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
186. Id. at 11.
187. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
188. Id. at 634-35.
189. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
190. Id. at 574-77.
191. Id.
which the law aims to secure to all others.”  In Loving v.184
Virginia,  the Court looked beyond the state’s facially symmetrical185
prohibition on interracial marriage to see it as a “measure ...
designed to maintain White Supremacy.”186
The Court’s more recent equality decisions also give voice to an
equal concern principle. For example, the Court’s decision in Romer
v. Evans  might stand for the principle that the state must respond187
to the needs of gay and lesbian persons with equal concern. In that
decision, the Court viewed the amendment to Colorado’s state
constitution that prohibited local governments from enacting
antidiscrimination measures guarding against sexual orientation
discrimination as an expression of unequal concern.  Even more188
recently, the opinion in Lawrence v. Texas  reads like an equal189
protection case dressed up in due process garb, with the value of
equal concern showing up prominently in admonitions about the
need for gays and lesbians to “retain their dignity as free persons,”
and the recognition that “[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship
may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons
do.”  The Court explicitly suggested a linkage between its due190
process reasoning in Lawrence and the values implicated by the
Equal Protection Clause:
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of
liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the
latter point advances both interests. If protected conduct is
made criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined
for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it
were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons.
When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in
the private spheres.191
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192. See Brest, supra note 171, at 1, 7-8 (contending that selective empathy and
indifference, and not just conscious animus, violates equal concern).
193. See, e.g., Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (treating worker
leave policies that are premised on stereotypes about the allocation of fam ily duties between
m en and women as a form of sex-based discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
194. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (drawing the line at discriminatory
intent out of concern that an alternative discriminatory effects standard would “raise serious
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes”); Strauss, supra note 52, at 935, 954-56 (contending that
Washington v. Davis “tamed” Brown  by cutting short the scope of the equal protection
principle in deference to the Court’s fears of getting more deeply enmeshed in policing
inequality); see also Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (explaining that, for institutional reasons,
courts do not always accord the full normative scope of legal guarantees and distinguishing
between the content of the law and the extent to which a court is willing to enforce it).
195. See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065 (1998) (arguing
that the stringency of the intent requirement in equal protection cases varies significantly by
context); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1989)
(arguing that in contexts where liberal political theory permits nonmarket allocations, such
as voting, jury selection, and sometimes education, a strict intent standard is not applied as
a serious requirement in equal protection challenges).
Although the Court used the terminology of equal treatment, the
underlying value protected was one of equal concern, with attention
to the state’s role in fomenting prejudice by others.
This principle of equal concern may be violated even without
facially different treatment or proof of a conscious discriminatory
intent, as selective empathy and indifference can violate equal
concern as much as an intentionally discriminatory act.  The192
Court’s stricter formulations of the discriminatory intent standard
notwithstanding, it has periodically recognized that the acting out
of stereotypes or unconscious bias is a form of disparate treatment
that violates statutory equality guarantees.  In the equal protec-193
tion context, the Court settled on an intent standard not so much
because it set the limits or scope of constitutional equality, but
rather for institutional reasons, to avoid what it perceived would be
incessant clashes with other branches and levels of government
under an alternative discriminatory effects standard.  Even in the194
equal protection context, the intent standard is not always applied
consistently or strictly.195
Understanding why equality law concerns itself with unequal
treatment at all requires us to look deeper at the content of equality,
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196. Of course, equal concern does not require that all persons be accorded equal respect,
regardless of their actions. Cf. Conn. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (holding
that Connecticut’s sex offender registry requirem ent did not violate due process when the
public registry requirem ent was based on prior conviction and not current or future
propensity for dangerousness). Rather, it requires a substantive theory about what kinds of
identities must be equally respected. W hen grounded in democratic theory, it would make
sense that equal concern should respect those aspects of identity that are central to
personhood and autonom y, so as to enable people to make the kinds of choices that further
their development as human beings with the responsibility for self-governance.
197. See, e.g., Holly Dyer, Gender-Based Affirmative Action: Where Does it Fit in the Tiered
Scheme of Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 41 KAN. L. REV. 591, 595 (1993) (explaining that the
Court justifies the tiered system of scrutiny on a theory of group treatment where the group
lacks access to the political process and has historically been subjected to discrimination).
198. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
and to examine why some kinds of unequal treatment are unobjec-
tionable while others are suspect. As American law has developed,
unequal treatment is only problematic when it is based on
characteristics that signal likely bias without a legitimate basis
for penalizing people.  Thus, race, sex, and, increasingly, sexual196
orientation, are more suspect as bases for unequal treatment than
height, intelligence, income, or other personal and social character-
istics. While there is a vast quantity of literature attempting to
make sense of why some classes but not others are treated as
suspect, a common understanding is that the criteria selected for
higher scrutiny reflect the Court’s judgment that these classifiers
correspond to the kind of systemic disadvantaging and unjustified
discrimination likely to indicate a violation of equal concern.197
Without reference to a norm of equal concern, equal treatment
would not make sense as a guiding theory, as it would have nothing
to say about which types of equal treatment are more suspect than
others. If equal treatment alone were the guiding principle, equality
law would be an ahistoric mandate about consistency in applying
the correct rules of decision to all similarly situated persons.
As further proof that equal treatment is not coextensive with
constitutional or statutory guarantees of equality, these guarantees
permit different treatment among members of suspect classes in
certain situations, and occasionally even require something more
than mere identical treatment. An example of the former comes
from the Court’s recent decision upholding race-based affirmative
action at the University of Michigan Law School. In Grutter v.
Bollinger,  the Court upheld the university’s policy permitting the198
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199. Id. at 326-29.
200. Id. at 330 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 296a).
201. Id. at 342 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989)).
202. Id.
limited use of race in admissions decisions against an equal
protection challenge. To begin the equal protection analysis, the
Court made an uncharacteristically emphatic statement about the
importance of context: “Context matters when reviewing race-based
governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.”  The199
context that mattered in that case included how the university used
diversity and why it was important to do so. In upholding the plan,
the Court emphasized the role of racial diversity in producing
cultural transformation, as it “promotes ‘cross-racial understand-
ing,’ helps to break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students]
to better understand persons of different races.’”  In other words,200
it fosters, rather than undermines, the precept of equal concern.
Although Justice O’Connor’s opinion made reference to a “norm of
equal treatment”  in emphasizing the importance of time limits to201
protect the equal protection rights of the program’s non-beneficia-
ries, her opinion defies such a limited understanding of the equal
protection principle’s scope. Indeed, even the reference to equal
treatment as an underlying norm reveals a larger and overriding
norm embodied within equality law:
The requirement that all race-conscious admissions programs
have a termination point “assures all citizens that the deviation
from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups
is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal
of equality itself.”202
Thus, equality itself must be about something larger than equal
treatment. 
While the Michigan plan could be said to violate a principle of
equal treatment, it did not violate the more fundamental norm of
equal concern. In Grutter, the overarching principle of equal concern
that animated the opinion was relational, recognizing the interde-
pendence of persons of all races, encouraging shared responsibility
for correcting racism, and validating the benefits to all in doing so.
The Court has taken a similar approach to statutory prohibitions on
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
568 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:513
203. See, e.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (holding that the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) did not conflict with a state statute granting a limited
right to unpaid leave and reinstatement for pregnant workers but not for other workers
temporarily disabled from  working, and that PDA did not require equal treatment in all
instances, but set “‘a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop—not a
ceiling above which they may not rise.’”); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)
(permitting limited affirmative action program benefiting women under Title VII).
204. Adarand Contractors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (quoting Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality)).
205. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
206. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
207. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
208. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 21.
209. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 431.
210. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-8.
discrimination by allowing occasional departures from equal
treatment in the service of the more fundamental principle of equal
concern.203
Likewise, the Court has justified its selection of strict scrutiny for
race-based affirmative action with reference to a norm of equal
concern, stating that strict scrutiny is necessary to ensure that a
racial classification is truly benign and not based on “illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority.”  Although, in my view, strict scrutiny204
as applied to racial affirmative action is a very poor proxy for a
norm of equal concern, its use does not prove that the equal
protection principle has been reduced to formally equal treatment.
Not only does equality law permit departures from equal
treatment in the service of equality, it may sometimes require more
than the same treatment. Equal concern may sometimes forbid
formally equal treatment where it gives effect to, or exacerbates, an
expression of unequal concern towards some persons by others. The
celebrated (if puzzled over) equal protection cases of Shelley v.
Kramer,  Palmore v. Sidoti,  and Loving v. Virginia  can all be205 206 207
understood as cases where formally similar treatment did not
satisfy equal protection. In Shelley, the state claimed to treat all
persons the same in enforcing private racially restrictive
covenants.  In Palmore, the state could claim that it treated all208
parents the same in avoiding custodial decisions that would subject
children to prejudice or other harm against their best interests.209
In Loving, the state claimed that it treated African American and
white citizens alike in forbidding their intermarriage.  The Court210
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211. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
212. Id. at 629.
213. Id. at 635.
214. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 171, at 24-31, 43-47 (arguing that antidiscrimination law
m ust address the governm ent’s role in furthering the cultural bias of supposedly private
actors in order to ensure that the outcomes of the dem ocratic process comply with a norm of
equal concern).
215. Disparate im pact without proof of discriminatory intent is not actionable under the
Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Disparate
impact was first recognized as a basis for liability in the statutory context of Title VII
litigation. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000) (1991 Civil Rights Act, amending Title VII, and subsequently
incorporated into various other antidiscrimination statutes). See, e.g., Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000); Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a), (b) (2000);
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(3), (6) (2000). By judicial interpretation, disparate impact claims are not actionable
under certain other antidiscrim ination statutes. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275
(2001) (Title VI regulations); Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)
(Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); General Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458
U.S. 375 (1982) (42 U.S.C. § 1981). Under certain other antidiscrimination statutes, such as
the Age Discrimination in Employm ent Act and Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, the fate of disparate impact doctrine remains uncertain. See, e.g., Adams v. Fla. Power
Corp., 255 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that disparate impact theory is not available
under the ADEA), cert. granted, 534 U.S. 1054 (2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 535 U.S. 228 (2002); EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 1999)
(holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA);  Katherine Connor &
Ellen J. Vargyas, The Legal Implications of Gender Bias in Standardized Testing, 7 BERKELEY
W OMEN’S L.J. 13, 42-43 (1992) (arguing that Title IX, unlike Title VI, is not necessarily
limited to the reach of the Equal Protection Clause and should encompass disparate impact
claims).
saw through each of these claims of formally similar treatment by
striking down each action because it gave further expression to
racism and unequal concern for African Americans. Romer v.
Evans  continues this rejection of formally equal treatment. In211
Romer, Colorado prohibited any person, straight or gay, from
obtaining protection from sexual orientation discrimination through
the normal political process.  The Court easily dismissed the212
state’s claim of formally neutral treatment by finding a clear
message of inferiority and a lack of equal concern for gay and
lesbian persons.  In each of these cases, equal concern required213
more than mere formal equality: it required the state to avoid
otherwise neutral actions that gave added effect to private preju-
dice.214
Even disparate impact law, most prominent in Title VII
litigation,  may be understood as a doctrine that serves as a proxy215
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216. See Krieger, Cognitive Bias, supra note 52, at 1251, 1293-98 (discussing how cognitive
bias unintentionally affects selection of qualifications for m easuring “merit”).
217. See generally Robin West, The Meaning of Equality and the Interpretive Turn, 66 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 451 (1990) (acknowledging that constitutional guarantees of equality, like any
text, require interpretation, and discussing various constraints on such interpretation).
218. Cf. MacKinnon, supra note 175, at 1773, 1775 (discussing the relationship between
legal guarantees of equality and constitutional legitimacy, and seeking to “hold the
Constitution to its promise, for the first time if necessary”).
for unequal concern. The selection of qualifications that have a
markedly disparate impact without a sufficient relationship to job
performance gives reason to suspect selective empathy or indiffer-
ence to the group that is disproportionately affected—a violation of
equal concern.  Although disparate impact is not a proxy that the216
Court has adopted in the equal protection context, the use of
disparate impact doctrine in limited statutory contexts suggests
that the specific rules giving teeth to an equal concern norm may
exceed an admonition to treat likes alike.
The goal here is not to spell out the full content of an equal
concern principle, or even to argue that it is the best or only
plausible interpretation of legal equality guarantees.  Rather, my217
agenda is to show that, descriptively, equality law embraces the
principle of equal concern, and to seek to hold the law to its
promise.  Once equal concern is understood as the animating218
principle of equality law, leveling down no longer fits so comfortably.
The assumption that leveling down adequately remedies inequality
is based on a narrow understanding of equality as equal treatment.
If equality law requires equal concern and not just equal treatment,
leveling down requires closer scrutiny. In some circumstances,
leveling down may represent the antithesis of equal concern, a
refusal to connect or to broaden the boundaries of community to
share its privileges. Such a determination requires further study of
the expressive meaning of leveling down and attention to its social
context.
B. An Expressive Meaning Approach to Leveling Down
If equal concern is the guiding principle of equality law, actions
that signal or express unequal concern become problematic. Recent
scholarship on the expressive dimension of law and other govern-
ment action demonstrates that the expressive meaning of an action
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219. See, e.g., Andrew Altman, Expressive Meaning, Race, and the Law: The Racial
Gerrymandering Cases, 5 LEGAL THEORY 75 (1999); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H.
Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000);
Hellman, supra note 171; Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 943 (1995); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,”
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 M ICH.
L. REV. 483 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law , 144 U. PENN. L. REV.
2021 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law]; Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norm s and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social
Norms]; see also Lawrence, supra note 52 (proposing a “cultural meaning” test for determining
equal protection violations).
220. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 219, at 1527, 1531, 1542 (explaining that an action
may have an expressive meaning that is harmful, regardless of the material consequences of
that action).
221. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 219, at 951 n.20 (noting the similarity between Lessig’s
definition of social meaning and Pildes’s discussion of the “expressive dimension” of action);
Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 219, at 925 (describing social meaning as the expressive
dimension of conduct in a relevant community, a product of social norms, context and culture).
Although most actions do have social meaning, some actions have little or no social meaning.
Among the latter classes of actions, Lessig gives the example of a m an turning over in his
sleep. Lessig, supra note 219, at 954.
222. See Lessig, supra note 219, at 958. Lessig further defines “social meaning” as “the
sem iotic content attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a particular
context.” Id. at 951. As he explains, these actions “have associations with other actions, or
meanings, and these associations are constitutive of what I am calling their semiotic content.”
Id. at 954.
223. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 219, at 1525. Lessig gives examples of tipping and
flying the confederate flag as actions which have a particular, context-dependent, social
meaning. Lessig, supra note 219, at 952-54.
is critical in determining whether it comports with the normative
requirements of the governing law.  The expressive meaning of an219
action exists wholly apart from its material consequences.  Even220
if leveling down treats everyone the same in material respects, it
may express selective disdain or disregard for some persons. In
some contexts, leveling down may reproduce inequality through its
expressive meaning, in violation of equal concern.
Like many actions, leveling down the more favored treatment in
response to inequality contains a social meaning (used here
interchangeably with expressive meaning).  If an action may be221
understood as a text, then the social meaning of an action is the
product of a combination of text and context, or “the collection of
understandings or expectations shared by some group at a particu-
lar time and place.”  The expressive meaning of an action is222
socially constructed and heavily dependent on context.  Relevant223
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224. Andrew Altman, for example, contends that the social meaning of an action depends
on four criteria: 
(1) the motives or traits of character that explain the act, 
(2) the constitutive social rules and practices in term s of which an act is
understood, 
(3) the ways in which the act can best be justified by those seeking to defend it,
and 
(4) the causal consequences of the act for the interests of those affected by it,
insofar as those consequences are mediated by perception of one or more of
(1)-(3).
Altman, supra note 219, at 77.
225. See Lessig, supra  note 219, at 955 (“Even if there is no single meaning, there is a
range or distribution of meanings, and the question ... is how that range gets made, and, more
importantly, changed.”).
226. See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 219, at 1533-45 (arguing that modern equal
protection law is best understood as regulating expressive harm, in the sense that the Court
views the expressive meaning of government action as critical to its constitutionality);
Hellman, supra note 171, at 13-18 (arguing that the core value of equal protection is to protect
against state action that expresses a message of unequal concern). Cf. Kathryn Abrams,
Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183,
1210-13 (1989) (arguing that sexual harassment should be unlawful if it conveys a dismissive
message that devalues women as employees).
227. See Altman, supra note 219, at 80-99 (agreeing that the Court did, and should have,
tested the governm ent action in Shaw v. Reno under an expressive harms theory, but
disagreeing with the Court’s interpretation of the expressive message in Shaw , because the
district could have been justified as a response to the recognition that private prejudice
reduces minority voting strength, so as to be consistent with equal concern); Anderson &
Pildes, supra note 219, at 1508-10; Pildes & Niemi, supra note 219, at 506-11 (explaining
Shaw v. Reno as a vindication of a theory of expressive harms); see also Sunstein, Social
Norms, supra note 219, at 963-64 (contending that government action enforcing a norm of
women as domestic caregivers would violate equal protection because it conflicts with the
requirement of equal concern).
features of context include how an act is understood in light of
surrounding social practices, how it is justified, and how it will be
perceived and understood by those persons affected.  As with much224
interpretation, there is no single, unambiguous social meaning for
any given action as interpretive choices are required. Yet, the need
for interpretation does not mean that any action is open to an
endless and unlimited set of possible social meanings.225
If leveling down expresses unequal concern, it should be under-
stood as incompatible with the mandate of equality law. Expressive
meaning matters, and should matter, in an equality analysis.226
Satisfying the normative content of equality law requires that the
actions of those actors governed by the law express norms consistent
with equal concern.  The social meaning of an action may inflict227
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228. That is not to say that material inequalities and unequal allocations of tangible
benefits are less important in an equality analysis. The point here is that expressive meaning
and harms to social status are also important. Cf. NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS:
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE “POSTSOCIALIST” CONDITION (1997) (arguing that social justice
movements must attend to both distributional inequality in material goods and social status
harms from  cultural meaning).
229. This is essentially the view of Brown taken by Professor Charles Black, in his classic
defense of the decision. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions,
69 YALE L.J. 421, 427 (1960) (describing “the social meaning of segregation” as “putting ... the
Negro in a position of walled-off inferiority”). Taking a similar approach, Professors Elizabeth
Anderson and Richard Pildes argue that the Court’s much-criticized use of social science data
in Brown to show the negative effects on African American children was beside the point. In
other words, the expression of inferiority was itself a constitutionally recognized harm,
regardless of the tangible consequences. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 219, at 1542-43.
230. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 54, at 16-17 n.55 (1990) (discussing legal rhetoric of race in
Plessy v. Ferguson and quoting passages from the plaintiffs’ briefs describing the Louisiana
segregation law as “am ount[ing] to a taunt by law  of that previous condition of their class
[slavery]—a taunt by the State, to be administered with perpetually repeated like taunts in
word....”).
231. See Mary Becker, Family Law in the Secular State and Restrictions on Same-Sex
Marriage: Two Are Better Than One, 2001 ILL. L. REV. 1, 54-55 (discussing the “status
difference” between civil unions and same-sex marriage, and endorsing the view that to
extend civil unions but not m arriage to same-sex couples “‘is to engage in an act of pure
stigmatization’”); Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570-71 (Mass. 2004)
(ruling that a bill proposed by the Massachusetts Senate that would offer civil unions, but not
marriage, to same-sex couples would violate the Massachusetts Constitution because “it is a
considered choice of language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of sam e-sex, largely
homosexual, couples to second-class status.... and the Massachusetts Constitution does not
permit this type of labeling.”). 
expressive harms that are cognizable, and the refusal to acknowl-
edge another as an equal violates the requirements of equal concern
even if unaccompanied by tangible differences in treatment.  This228
understanding of equal protection is consistent with the animating
principle of Brown v. Board of Education, that the state’s segrega-
tion violated equal protection because it expressed a message of
racial inferiority.229
Equality claims are largely about challenges to existing social
meaning and the reconstruction of social relationships based on
changes in social meaning.  The current debate over same-sex230
marriage and the social meaning of marriage starkly illustrates this
point.  Expressive meaning plays an important part in the process231
of negotiating social relations. Expressions of regard or disregard
toward persons construct the social relationships between them, as
“social relations are partially constituted by mutual acknowledge-
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232. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 219, at 1550.
233. See Lessig, supra note 219, at 962 (explaining that “social construction proceeds by
breaking up the understandings or associations at a particular time or built into a relatively
uncontested context and upon which social texts have meaning”).
234. Id. at 987.
235. Id. at 991.
236. In speaking of social groups, I do not mean to imply that such groupings are in any
way inherent or static. Rather, I use the term to signify the social reality that in the United
States, certain markers of identity, including race, sex, and sexual orientation, are socially
significant in that they both affect the self-constructed identities of persons who share them
and are given social significance by outsiders. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points
Against Postmodernism , 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687, 703 (2000) (“The fact that reality is a
social construction does not mean that it is not there; it means that it is there, in society,
where we live.”).
ment of the terms on which people are relating to one another.”232
Since social meaning is always being constructed, successful
equality claims challenge existing social meaning and have the
potential to forge new social relationships based on new social
meanings.233
Such a challenge to existing social meaning can set in motion
what Professor Larry Lessig has termed a “defensive construction”
of “social meaning”—actions seeking to preserve existing social
meanings.  Professor Lessig uses the enactment of antimiscegena-234
tion laws in response to the abolition of slavery and attacks on Jim
Crow laws as examples of how communities engage in the defensive
construction of social meaning:
A social meaning is challenged by an emerging practice, and to
preserve the old meaning, the emerging practice is prohibited or
opposed. This resistance is a kind of social meaning construction
because it aims to resist what would otherwise be an evolving
social meaning. It “changes” the social meaning because but for
the intervention, the meaning would become something else.
Thus ... whites resist intermarriage to preserve the loyalty and
sensibility of “whiteness.”235
One social meaning that is often contested in equality claims is
the status of persons who are members of certain social groups.236
When an equality claim challenges existing status hierarchies and
the social meanings that have held them in place, struggles over
status ensue. Once social groups that have been ranked lower in
social status achieve some success in narrowing the status hierar-
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237. See J. M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2335 (1997). On the
other hand, Professor Balkin explains that when status hierarchies are rigid and largely
unchallenged, those advantaged by them can afford to blur the lines som ewhat between lower
and higher status groups without jeopardizing their position. Id. at 2333. This leads to what
Balkin terms the “paradox of status hierarchy”: that societies with relatively rigid status
hierarchies “tend to appear relatively stable and peaceful on the surface.” Id. at 2333-34.
238. See supra notes 8-15.
239. See Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness”
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 77-78 (2000)
[hereinafter Siegel, Discrimination] (defining social stratification as the status inequality
among social groups that arises out of the interaction of social structure (social institutions
or practices) and social meaning); see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997)
[hereinafter Siegel, Equal Protection].
240. See Siegel, Discrimination, supra note 239, at 78 (stating that “a commitment to
chy, the response by higher-status groups is often a “rearguard”
effort to reassert traditional hierarchies in other ways, or to use
Lessig’s terminology, a defensive construction of social meaning.237
An application of the defensive construction of social meaning is
readily apparent in the leveling down context. When an equality
claim is asserted successfully, the existing social meaning is
threatened and in danger of being replaced by a new understanding
of social relationships. In such a case, leveling down may effectively
thwart such changes by excluding the challengers from what was
previously valued, and by expressing a preference for losing the
benefit rather than broadening the community of persons sharing
in it. Thus, the separateness and social inequality of challenger and
challenged is preserved. For example, Cazares’s challenge to the
school board contested the social meaning of pregnancy and unwed
motherhood. At the same time, her actions questioned the commu-
nity’s expectations of honor students, and even the definition of
“honor” itself. In response to this challenge to existing social
meaning, the school board engaged in a defensive construction of
social meaning, reasserting its definition of honor as one which
excludes young women like Cazares.238
As a defensive construction of social meaning, leveling down may
be understood as a practice that perpetuates social stratification.239
Equality law, which strives to regulate the social practices that
sustain group inequality, has often failed to account for the ways in
which the practices and meanings that sustain group inequality
evolve as they are contested.  Discrimination is a social practice240
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alleviating stratification is and has been central to the project of antidiscrimination law since
the beginning of the Second Reconstruction”).
241. Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 239, at 1113 (arguing that after Jim Crow was
challenged and defeated, it was replaced by new practices and principles such as the trope of
colorblindness and the intent requirement that have sustained new social practices that
preserve m uch of the prior stratification); id. at 1142 (noting that “status-enforcing state
action is m utable in form ”).
242. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2178-87 (1996) [hereinafter Siegel, “The Rule of Love”].
243. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
244. See generally CHAMALLAS, supra note 6, at 10 (discussing feminist legal scholarship
on the reproduction of dominance, and discussing how changes can occur without altering
basic gender hierarchies, or, “‘the more things change, the more they stay the same’”).
that evolves over time and has no fixed form, and therefore,
discriminatory social practices can be expected to assume more
accepted forms as their legitimacy is contested over time.  To241
borrow a term from Professor Reva Siegel, leveling down may be
understood as a form of “preservation-through-transformation” that,
depending on the social and historic context in which it occurs, may
serve to sustain social stratification despite, and perhaps even
because of, its abandonment of differential treatment.  By242
preserving the unequal status relationships that were previously
enforced by differential treatment, leveling down may simply
represent a transformation in the form of the discriminatory
practice that it replaces. In a case like Palmer,  for example,243
leveling down serves the same function as the prior segregation: it
perpetuates social hierarchy and racial separation by preventing
whites and blacks from sharing city pools as equals. The shift to a
facially neutral form should not obscure the role that leveling down
plays in the continued enforcement of social stratification.244
In the contest over social meaning, part of the power of leveling
down comes from its assertion of the privilege to change the rules
and shift the terrain on which equality is negotiated. Implicit in
leveling down is the determination that the benefit that had been
allocated unequally suddenly has become unworthy of preservation
if it must be shared on equal terms with those previously excluded.
One example of how efforts to achieve equality can lead to shifts in
the value of what is pursued, thus reproducing inequality, comes
from the experience of efforts to integrate the workforce. When
marginalized groups enter the ranks of previously exclusive
professions, it often results in the devaluation of the field, rather
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245. Id. at 10-11; see also Marina Angel, The Glass Ceiling for Women in Legal Education:
Contract Positions and the Death of Tenure, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (2000) (discussing research
showing that the entry of more women into the legal academy has coincided with a shift away
from tenure and toward short-term contracts and lower status jobs).
246. See Balkin, supra note 237, at 2326. For a discussion of how law helps constitute
status and social roles, see Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 219, at 923. See also Richard
Y. Bourhis, Power, Gender, and Intergroup Discrimination: Some Minim al Group
Experiments, in 7  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 173, 201 (Mark
P. Zanna & James M. Olson eds., 1994) (discussing social power as determined by “the degree
of control that one group has over its fate and that of outgroups”).
247. See e. christi cunningham, Identity Markets, 45 HOW. L.J. 491, 507 (2002); see also
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1713-14 (1993).
248. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 237, at 2323. W hile Professor Balkin recognizes that the
status of individuals within a group varies widely, he focuses on that component of status that
is identified with membership in a social group. Id. at 2321-22.
than meaningful equality in the workforce. As Professor Martha
Chamallas has explained, “‘gains’ in integrating occupations can
easily be offset by counter-trends, including the reconfiguration of
jobs.... The net result may be that even as women successfully enter
formerly male-dominated fields, they remain disadvantaged as
workers relative to men.”  As a form of leveling down, this example245
illustrates how redefinitions of value can operate to preserve
inequality.
The potential for leveling down to affect social status and social
meaning, thereby preserving existing social arrangements, helps
explain why persons in power may be willing to impose some
material cost on themselves in order to stave off attacks on the
social order. Social groups compete not just for material rewards
and resources, but also for status.  For example, work by critical246
race scholars demonstrating a property interest in race shows the
importance of social status in determining a social group’s welfare.
As professor e. christi cunningham explains, persons whose racial
identities are subsidized by the state accumulate “identity
capital.”  Status, or identity capital, plays a key role in maintain-247
ing a group’s social position. Status inequality between groups is
sustained by a system of social meanings that assigns one group
“relatively positive associations and another correspondingly
negative associations.”  The status of social groups is relational,248
therefore status hierarchies create zero sum games, in that a change
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249. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 H ARV. L. REV. 1003, 1031 (1995); see also
cunningham, supra note 247, at 512 (“In identity markets, the value of any particular racial
identity is measured against the value of all other racial identities in the market.”).
250. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and
Affirmative Action, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1100-05 (2002).
251. See Bourhis, supra note 246, at 195. See also Adams, supra  note 250, at 1102-03
(discussing research on social identity theory showing that individuals tend to engage in
discriminatory behavior that advances their social group even when they do not stand to gain
directly from  the discriminatory behavior, if the discrimination enhances the status of their
social group).
252. See JIM SIDANIUS &  FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF
SOCIAL H IERARCHY AND OPPRESSION 18-19 (1999) (discussing research on social identity
theory showing the tendancy of persons to make allocation decisions that maximize status
differentials favoring their own social group, even at some material costs to their own social
group); McAdams, supra note 249, at 1063 (“The discriminator does bear a cost in
discriminating—forgoing otherwise beneficial trade with the objects of the discrimination—
but that cost is an investment in the production of status.”).
in the meanings associated with one social group affects the relative
positioning of another.249
The significance of social status explains why groups at the top of
a status hierarchy may be willing to impose some material cost on
members of their own group in order to preserve a status hierarchy.
In competition among social groups, status is important for its own
sake, wholly apart from whatever material goods are attached to
status at a given moment.  Symbols and social meaning, not just250
material resources, determine the status of competing social groups.
In fact, a group’s relative social power may be more important even
than its pecuniary resources in advancing its social position.251
Consequently, a material loss is not a sufficient deterrent to persons
who discriminate against others at some cost to themselves for the
sake of relational gains in status.  As long as the expressive252
message is one that supports the existing hierarchy, the loss of
benefits to the advantaged group may not be a sufficient deterrent
to leveling down when it functions as a practice that enforces status
hierarchy.
Indeed, leveling down may be a particularly effective way to
enforce status hierarchies for the very reason that the higher status
group has deprived itself of a material benefit in order to preserve
existing status differentials. Where the leveling down signals a
refusal to share resources or benefits with a lower status social
group, the action may be understood as a defensive effort to fight off
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253. Cf. cunningham, supra note 247, at 497-514 (explaining how, historically, maintaining
property value in race and racial identity markets has depended on the state’s role in policing
the boundaries of race as a meaningful social category).
254. McAdams, supra note 249, at 1048 (discussing research showing that insults to other
groups are particularly effective where they do not otherwise coincide with the self-interest
of the competing social group).
255. Professor McAdams makes this argument with respect to discrimination generally,
since the discriminator forgoes market efficiency for the benefit of enhancing his or her own
group’s status. As he explains: “By definition, the discriminator makes a material sacrifice
(giving up an otherwise favorable trade or engaging in costly behavior) as a means of lowering
the status of the victim.” Id. at 1076. Leveling down imposes a distinct material deprivation
in addition to whatever sacrifice the discriminator makes in carrying out the underlying
discrimination.
256. See Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
257. See id.
258. For example, Professor Sunstein argues that laws against littering shape social norms
against littering and thereby influence behavior even when violations are not punished
through the legal process. See Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law , supra note 219,
at 2030.
challenges to the boundaries of social group identity.  The253
deprivation of the benefit to the socially advantaged group may
make the across-the-board denial of benefits especially effective
toward this end. Insults to social groups are particularly effective
when they do not otherwise coincide with the self-interest of the
group imposing the insult.  The material cost of leveling down is254
thus part of what makes it an effective means of signaling low
esteem. The refusal to share benefits on equal terms, precisely
because it comes with the cost of denying benefits to the in-group,
may be even more effective in preserving status inequality than
outright differential treatment.  This account demonstrates the255
fallacy of Justice Jackson’s faith in the political process as an
adequate check on the unjustified extension of burdens to members
of the majority.  Justice Jackson’s account fails to acknowledge the256
importance of status in maintaining social arrangements that
privilege majority group members.257
In addition to its importance in maintaining status hierarchies
and social inequality, attention to the social meaning of leveling
down is important for another reason. When the expressive force of
law and other government action shapes social meaning, this
influence on social meaning may affect individual and collective
behavior wholly apart from the sanctions of law enforcement.  Law258
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259. See id. at 2045; Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 219, at 957. On the relationship
between social norms and social meaning, see Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 219, at 914
(defining social norms as “social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought
to be done and what ought not to be done”); id. at 928 (explaining that social norms are
influenced by the social m eaning of actions and the social role of the actor, and at the same
time play a role in determining that social meaning).
260. Cf. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law , supra note 219, at 2044
(“Antidiscrimination law is often designed to change norm s so as to ensure that people are
treated with a kind of dignity and respect that discriminatory behavior seems to deny.”).
261. Social psychology research confirms that social norms governing the acceptability of
discrim ination do influence discrim inatory behaviors. See, e.g., Fletcher A. Blanchard, et al.,
Condemning and Condoning Racism: A Social Context Approach to Interracial Settings, 79
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 993 (1994) (describing research showing that the social influence of
hearing someone else condemn or condone racism strongly affected the subject’s own reactions
to racism, and citing other research on inter-group relations finding that norms favoring
egalitarian interracial behavior are im portant in fostering interracial harmony); Alexander
M. Czopp & Margo J. Monteith, Confronting Prejudice (Literally): Reactions to Confrontations
of Racial and Gender Bias, 29 PERSONALITY &  SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 532, 533 (2003)
(describing the powerful effect that norm-saliency has on people, and stating, “[i]n fact,
several studies have suggested that when norm s of egalitarianism are made salient, people
become less likely to provide prejudiced responses”); Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Civil Law:
Employment and Discrimination, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE
325 (Ronald Roesch et al. eds., 1999) (discussing prelim inary studies of racism and sexual
harassment finding that when norms for appropriate nondiscriminatory behavior are clearly
defined, persons exhibit less prejudice and fewer discriminatory behaviors).
262. See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 219, at 907 (arguing that “behavior is
pervasively a function of norms”); Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law , supra note
219, at 2043 (“If a discriminatory act is consistent with prevailing norms, there will be more
in the way of discriminatory behavior. If discriminators are ashamed of themselves, there is
likely to be less discrim ination.”). But see Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories
and other government actions play a role in “norm management” by
functioning to encourage shifts in social norms.  To the extent that259
law shapes norms through its expressive force, equality law’s
uncritical acceptance of leveling down as a remedy to inequality has
the potential to undermine the construction of equality norms and
their power to shape behavior. If antidiscrimination law seeks to
enforce a social norm of equal concern and respect, then the
acceptance of leveling down when it signals a lack of equal concern
may dilute the expressive force of the equal concern norm.  By260
accepting a conflicting message at the end-stage of an equality
claim, the overriding take-home message may be one of unequal
concern for the group challenging the inequality. To the extent that
the law’s role in shaping social norms affects discriminatory
behavior,  we may expect additional expressions of unequal261
concern as the social norm favoring equal concern is weakened.  If262
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of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1605-06 (2000) (questioning the assumptions
of expressive theorists and their belief that the expressive effects of law stimulate changes in
hum an behaviors). The concern suggested in the text, that uncritical acceptance of leveling
down weakens equality law’s normative force, possibly leading to more discrimination, would
apply to other weak applications of equality law as well. A strict intent requirement, for
example, would also be subject to this criticism.
263. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 171, at 4 (arguing that cultural transformation is, and
should be, the central project of antidiscrimination law).
264. Indeed, utilitarian objections to leveling down are complicated by the instability that
arises from trying to measure preferences and levels of welfare when social norms are in flux.
The utilitarian premise is that the identity of those persons whose welfare is being measured
remains stable under the alternatives explored. However, as Professor Lessig has explained,
when social meaning is contested, changes to social meaning may affect persons’
determinations of whether they are “better off,” and even their very identity, insofar as it
depends on stable preferences. See Lessig, supra note 219, at 1003. For example, whether
whites are better off from the pool closure in Palmer than they would be with integrated pools
turns on conceptions of social status that are affected by social meaning. Because social
meaning itself depends on social context, however, the very possibilities evaluated under
utilitarian norms may affect the identity and preferences of the persons whose welfare is
being measured.
265. See Lessig, supra note 219, at 1005; see also Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 219,
at 954 (noting that where social norms are part and parcel of a caste system, such that they
turn a morally irrelevant characteristic like race or gender into “a signaling device with
respect to social role and associated norms,” then the norms, roles, and meanings that
perpetuate the caste system should be altered).
a primary project of antidiscrimination law is to end the state’s
encouragement of private discrimination and cultural bias, then
equality law should not permit leveling down when it undercuts
that agenda.263
The few limits on leveling down under existing law do not begin
to recognize adequately the extent to which leveling down may
implicate the very concerns which equality law purports to address.
Doctrinal efforts focused on the significance of the benefit, remedial
principles favoring extension, and a fixed level of treatment for one
group, are grounded in external norms, distinct from equality, and
typically driven by utilitarian concerns to maximize the level of
benefits for the greatest number of persons. The approach advocated
here looks to equality for the normative basis for limits on leveling
down, focuses on how acts expressing unequal concern function to
maintain social inequality, and is notably not grounded in efficiency
or utilitarian values.  Such a focus better suits the remedial264
purpose of equality law than centering the analysis on efficiency and
utility, values not thought to be appropriately enforced by equality
law.265
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
582 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:513
266. See supra notes 236-57 and accompanying text.
267. As Professor Deborah Hellman has explained, the search for expressive meaning is
closer to a search for what some scholars call an “objective intent,” as opposed to a “subjective
intent.” See Hellman, supra note 171, at 31-35. Objective intent focuses on the message that
an action conveys, as distinct from the subjective motivations underlying the action, and is
often used interchangeably with “social meaning” and “expressive content.” Id. at 34-35. An
expressive meaning test also is distinct from discriminatory effects. Not all actions that
disproportionately harm a systemically disadvantaged social group necessarily express
unequal concern toward persons in that social group. Id.
268. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 219, at 1512-13; see also id. at 1513 (“[u]ltimately it is
a question of law, and hence of external normative judgment, whether the state action does
indeed express impermissible purposes or values.”).
269. Id. at 1525.
The two doctrinal limits that are tied to equality, specifically the
failure to level all the way down and leveling down premised on a
discriminatory intent, do not fully capture the potential for leveling
down to violate the principle of equal concern. The first continues to
assume that differential treatment is the only harm that equality
law addresses. As explained above, however, actions that express
unequal concern and solidify status differentials have the power to
perpetuate social inequality even without resorting to differential
treatment.  Indeed, they may be particularly effective in doing so.266
A limitation that requires only that differential treatment be leveled
all the way down, if at all, is blind to the ways that the social
meaning of leveling down can reproduce inequality.
The intent doctrine also is ill-suited to capture the potential for
leveling down to conflict with the norm of equal concern. If the
intent doctrine evaluates an actor’s subjective intent as the focal
point for measuring compliance with equality mandates, the search
for intent is not likely to uncover the expressive meaning of an
action.  It is the action’s public meaning that counts, not what the267
actor intends to express.  The expressive meaning of an action is268
not necessarily a function of the actor’s intent; rather, it is the
socially constructed meaning that is recognizable by the community,
exercising interpretive judgment.269
A test that focuses on subjective intent is likely to prove especially
obtuse as applied to leveling down actions that violate equal
concern. Constructions of social meaning, including defensive
constructions to preserve an existing social hierarchy, are likely to
be the most successful when they are viewed not as a direct attempt
to regulate social meaning, but as predicated on some other purpose.
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270. Lessig, supra note 219, at 1042.
271. See Balkin, supra note 237, at 2332.
272. See, e.g., Karen A. Hegtevdt & Karen S. Cook, Distributive Justice: Recent Theoretical
Developments and Applications, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 93, 97 (Joseph
Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001) (describing research on the salience of status
difference and competition between groups as explaining the propensity for groups to pursue
in-group enhancement at the expense of fairness); Richard N. Lalonde & James E. Cameron,
Behavioral Responses to Discrimination: A Focus on Action, in 7  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
PREJUDICE: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 257, 259 (Mark P. Zana & James M. Olsen eds., 1994)
(criticizing the tendency to see discrimination as the behavioral component of prejudice, and
stating “[a] definition of discrimination is correct when it states that individual prejudice is
not a necessary precondition for acts of discrim ination”); Adams, supra note 250, at 1093
(citing social science research describing racial inequality as “grounded in notions of group
identity and group conflict,” and not individual prejudice); Lu-in Wang, The Complexities of
“Hate,” 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 880-83 (1999) (discussing social science research emphasizing
the role that social status and social solidarity in one’s own social group plays in promoting
“gay-bashing”).
273. See McAdams, supra note 249, at 1032-43 (discussing research showing that
individuals are more likely to articulate a material motive, unrelated to furthering their own
status or esteem, to justify their role in struggles over symbols and status).
274. Id. at 1060 (“W hen one seeks to gain status by lowering the status of others, it is all
the more important to deny that one is degrading others in order to look better by
In other words, such actions are most effective at preserving
contested social meanings when their expressive objective is
obscured.  For this reason, the dynamic of status competition is270
particularly resistant to a motive-centered inquiry. Status competi-
tion does not necessarily involve animus or dislike of a competing
group, but is opportunistic in the sense that the higher-status group
acts to preserve its privileged status.  Research in social psychol-271
ogy suggests that disparities in social power may play a greater role
in inter-group discrimination than the dispositions of individuals
who carry out the discrimination.  Indeed, the drive to secure272
status is often linked to the express denial of a prejudiced motiva-
tion. Strategies to further one’s own group status are therefore less
effective when they are admittedly or transparently designed
toward that end.  As a result, decision makers can be expected to273
attribute leveling down decisions to pragmatic determinations about
resources and general welfare, rather than to a desire to preserve
existing social inequality or a lack of concern for the group challeng-
ing the discrimination. Because the disavowal of a discriminatory
or a self-interested motive is necessary for an effective quest for
status, a judicialized search for the desire to harm another group
out of “naked self-interest” will often prove futile.  Yet, even when274
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comparison.”).
275. Id.
276. Cf. CHAMALLAS, supra note 6, at 18, 43-44, 48-49 (discussing how a primary goal of
much feminist scholarship is to identify and seek recognition for injuries experienced by
women that are not yet recognized under existing law, and in particular applying this critique
to show that the conceptualization of equality as identical treatment reflects an implicit male
norm).
277. Derrick Bell’s criticism that even the implementation of equal protection remedies has
been marked by exclusion has a particular resonance here:
The central issue in remedying past discrimination commonly has been
conceived in the following terms: “Conceding that blacks have been harmed by
slavery, or segregation, or discrimination, which groups of whites should pay the
price or suffer the disadvantage that may be incurred in implementing a policy
nominally directed at rectifying that harm?” This question, which focuses on the
cost to whites of racial remedies rather than on the necessity of relief for
minorities, obviously has been framed by whites for discussion with other
whites. Their attitude is not unlike that of parents who, in the old strict-
upbringing days, might have hushed a protesting offspring with a curt, “Keep
quiet. We are talking about you, not to you.”
Derrick Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67
CAL. L. REV. 3-4 (1979).
individuals claim to be motivated by material ends, they may really
be struggling over status and social meaning.275
By failing adequately to address expressive harms and injuries to
social status—injuries more likely to be borne by members of
marginalized social groups—the uncritical acceptance of leveling
down incorporates an implicitly biased conception of the injuries
from discrimination.  The injuries most likely to be experienced as276
discriminatory by the members of dominant social groups, those
injuries grounded in the materially different treatment of persons
based on suspect criteria, are fully remedied by the existing
approach. The conventional understanding privileges a view of
discrimination and its remediable injuries that coincides with the
interests of relatively dominant groups while marginalizing the
interests of outsiders and members of socially subordinated groups.
This understanding is not preordained by the meaning of equality,
but merely reflects a choice to prioritize the injuries of the more
powerful while rendering the interests of others invisible. In this
respect, the acceptance of leveling down is part of the broader
problem—that remedies to discrimination often neglect the interests
of the persons most in need of them.  A more complete understand-277
ing of leveling down and its relationship to equality is needed to
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278. Cf. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 68-72 (1988)
(encouraging a “[r]econstructive feminist jurisprudence” that seeks to “explain or reconstruct
the reforms necessary to the safety and improvement of women's lives in direct language that
is true to our own experience and our own subjective lives”).
279. Cf. Balkin, supra note 237, at 2351 (explaining that not all status hierarchies offend
equality law, nor do all attempts to increase one group’s status come at the expense of
another, and framing the critical question as “whether state power has been harnessed to
maintain or perpetuate an unjust hierarchy of social status”).
280. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
reconstruct equality law so that it better represents the interests of
those whom it purports to protect.278
III. APPLYING AN EXPRESSIVE MEANING APPROACH
Under the approach advocated here, not all leveling down
responses should be viewed in the same light. The legitimacy of
leveling down as a response to inequality depends on its expressive
meaning, which turns on social context.  In some settings, a279
refusal to share benefits with a previously excluded group contains
social meanings incompatible with equal concern. In others, the
expressive meaning may have more to do with constraints on
resources and social priorities wholly apart from status hierarchies
and relations between social groups. An approach focused on the
expressive meaning of leveling down and its relationship to equality
law must examine leveling down in each particular case and ask
whether it remedies or reasserts the challenged inequality. The
examples that follow illustrate how an expressive meaning approach
might apply in this area.
A. Three Examples Where Leveling Down Conflicts with Equality
Law
Returning to Palmer,  the city’s decision to close the pools as the280
remedy to the unlawful segregation contains an expressive message
counter to equal concern. Even if, as the Court implied in subse-
quent interpretations of Palmer, the city’s decision to close the pools
could not be proven to rest on a subjective animus against African
Americans, an examination of the justifications for the pool closure
and the social context for the decision reveals an expressive message
of unequal concern. The city’s proffered justification, the greater
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financial costs it would take to ensure public safety in integrated
pools, falls flat in light of the city’s failure to introduce evidence of
a serious public safety threat that would have required significantly
greater expenditures.
Even if some greater expenditure would have been necessary, it
is unlikely that the public meaning of the pool closure in Jackson,
Mississippi at that time would have been understood as based on
fiscal concerns, informed by an equal concern for providing city
benefits to all residents at a reasonable cost. Having determined
public expenditures sufficiently worthwhile to justify providing
access to segregated pools, the city, assuming it had equal concern
for its African American citizens, should have been willing to spend
money to provide pool access for everyone on equal terms. Of course,
it is possible that the expenditure of funds needed to ensure safety
in integrated pools and to counter the threat of violence by those
opposed to integration would at some point become so great that the
city would be unwilling to provide pools for any of its citizens at
such a high price. However, even then, we must ask whether the
city would allow such a heckler’s veto to thwart public benefits
deemed important for whites, instead of spending additional money
to stem the tide of lawlessness and violence that threatened such
interests. For example, if significant numbers of white citizens
desired to use public parks, but felt threatened by the presence of
crime, would the city shut down the parks to avoid paying the cost
of crime control? Or, would the city spend the money to provide
police surveillance and other crime control measures in order to
make a desirable city resource usable for its citizens because it
values the preferences of those citizens? Significant expenditures on
crime control efforts to constrain persons, who are disproportion-
ately black, from interfering with the quality of life of other citizens
tend to suggest that local governments typically take whatever
measures they feel necessary to protect their citizenry from criminal
interference.
Rather than a simple concern for cost, the greater intimacy
involved in sharing swimming pools probably explains the city’s
reluctance to maintain integrated swimming pools, despite its
willingness to integrate its public parks. The Court in Palmer took
the city’s willingness to integrate its public parks as an indication
that city officials did not have an across-the-board resistance to
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281. See Hellman, supra note 171, at 15 (discussing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
282. Mississippi’s criminal prohibition on interracial marriage between white and black
persons dates back to 1865. Act of Nov. 25, 1865, ch. 4, § 3, 1865 Miss. Laws (stating that it
shall not be lawful for any freedman, free negro or mulatto to intermarry with any white
person; nor for any white person to intermarry with any freedman, free negro or mulatto; and
any person who shall so intermarry shall be deemed guilty of felony, and on conviction
thereof, shall be confined in the State Penitentiary for life.). In 1890, a prohibition on
interracial marriage was added to Mississippi’s Constitution. M ISS. CONST. of 1890, art. 14,
§ 263 (“The marriage of a white person with a negro or mulatto, or person who shall have one-
eighth or m ore of negro blood, shall be unlawful and void.”). Mississippi Supreme Court
Justice Ethridge explained the necessity for this section as follows:
The purpose of this section is to prevent race mixtures and avoid the evils that
invariably follow such marriages. It proceeds upon the idea that the separation
of the races as far as reasonably possible will promote the public peace and
welfare.... It seems that race deterioration invariably follows such mixtures,
usually the offspring of mixed marriages partake of the vices of both races and
inherit but little of their virtues.... God’s plan is for each race to live its own life
and develop its own civilization, and in the providence of God civilizations have
been divergent and radically different.
GEORGE H. ETHRIDGE, M ISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTIONS 453-54 (1928). Mississippi’s prohibition on
interracial marriage continued to exert its influence in the courts even in 1968, the year after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia, and only three years before the Court’s
decision in Palmer. See Vetrano v. Gardner, 290 F. Supp. 200, 202-03 (N.D. Miss. 1968)
integration, and that the swimming pool context posed unique
challenges. The Court’s narrow focus on the parity of treatment led
it to disregard the particular social context that shaped the
expressive meaning of the city’s decision. To a greater extent than
sharing a park, sharing a swimming pool involves a degree of
closeness and intimacy that signals a measure of social equality.
The physical exposure from wearing swimsuits and the intimacy of
sharing the same water are important in understanding the city’s
resistance to integrated pools. 
In some respects, the threat to the social order posed by inte-
grated pools was similar to the threat posed by interracial sexual
relationships. At the heart of the antimiscegenation statutes, as the
Court correctly understood in striking down such statutes, was the
expressive message of unequal concern.  The policing of the281
boundaries of intimate relationships between persons of different
races is fundamental to the preservation of existing racial hierar-
chies. In light of this social history, so clearly illustrated by the
history of antimiscegenation statutes in Mississippi itself, the pool
closure may have partly reflected concerns about summer romances
between African American males and young white females.  The282
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(upholding the denial of Social Security benefits to children of an African American mother
and white father where the parents had been unable to legally marry under a Mississippi
statute that made “all bigamous, incestuous, or miscegenate marriages” void).
283. Of course, it is quite possible that the Court would have settled on a different
interpretation of the expressive message of the pool closure had it embarked on such an
inquiry. Justice Blackmun, who concurred in the Court’s decision, insisted: “I cannot read into
the closing of the pools an official expression of inferiority toward black citizens, as Mr.
Justice W hite and those who join him repetitively assert.” Palmer, 403 U.S. at 229 (Blackmun,
J., concurring). As Professor Lessig has observed, “we can speak of social meaning[s] ...
without believing that there is a single, agreed-upon point for any social act.” Lessig, supra
note 219, at 954-55. The inevitability of disagreement about any particular expressive
meaning is not a sufficient reason for sidestepping the inquiry. Interpretations bearing on
equality will always be contested.
284. Cf. McAdams, supra  note 249, at 1045 (“Not only do people compete for esteem by
investing in subordination of previously defined groups, but people invest in preserving group
boundaries to maintain their position in a high-status group.”).
285. See supra notes 8-15.
choice of pool closure over the operation of integrated pools under-
scored the message that whites and blacks should not associate
together in a social setting such as swimming that involves intimacy
and physical proximity. Rather than remedying the message of
unequal concern contained in the initial segregation, the decision to
close the pools further intensified that message by showing the
lengths to which whites were willing to go in order to police the
social boundaries of race.283
Palmer is also an example of a case where leveling down was a
particularly effective strategy for lowering another group’s status in
relation to the socially privileged group. Status hierarchies depend
on preserving the boundaries that differentiate social groups.  In284
circumstances where a sharing of benefits would dilute the bound-
aries between the groups, as in Palmer, leveling down is a singu-
larly poor remedy for inequality. By closing the pools instead of
sharing them, whites in Jackson signaled lower esteem for blacks
and reinforced a status differential that forbade the sharing of space
in such an intimate setting. The infliction of the material depriva-
tion on whites themselves reinforced the depth of the insult. By
enforcing separation and exclusion rather than expressing connec-
tion and equal membership in the community, the response in
Palmer violated the norm of equal concern.
Cazares provides a second example of a case in which the leveling
down decision violated the norm of equal concern.  The social285
meaning of the school’s decision to cancel the NHS induction was to
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286. For a discussion of “identity performance,” where a person “perform s” his or her
identity in a way that calls attention to their membership in a subordinated group and causes
discomfort to those in power, and its function as a trigger for discrimination, see Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 701-03
(2001), and Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259,
1276-78 (2000).
287. The com plexity of the subject of discrimination is an omnipresent feature in equality
law, and Cazares’ status as a young Native American woman who did not live with the father
of her child involves multiple intersecting lines of discrimination that affect the construction
of her social group. See generally Kim berle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 141-50 (1989).
further the status differentiation enforced by the initial discrimina-
tion. Any plausible explanation for the school’s decision would
necessitate an expression of unequal concern for Cazares and young
women who performed their sexual and gender identities in similar
ways.  The decision to cancel the induction ceremony was not286
based on the cost of adding one more person. Instead, the cancella-
tion sought to underscore a definition of honor and community that
excluded and devalued Cazares in relation to her peers. The action
conveyed the message that the very presence of Cazares would
debase the values being honored in the ceremony. Far from
remedying the dishonor inflicted on Cazares from her initial
exclusion, cancellation further dishonored her by demonstrating the
depth of commitment about her worth. The conventions about
inclusion in such ceremonies, which have as their very purpose the
expression of appreciation and honor for the persons included,
reaffirmed this message. In all likelihood, Cazares herself, as well
as other young women in her situation, understood the cancellation
as an act that devalued Cazares, the antithesis of an expression of
equal concern.
The school district’s decision in Cazares also can be understood as
a contest in a struggle to maintain the lower social status of “bad”
girls—young women whose race, class and/or sexuality brand them
as less deserving of esteem than young women who are more
privileged. In Cazares’s situation, it was not simply that she was a
young Native American woman who became pregnant; of equal or
greater significance was the fact that she was unmarried and not
engaged to or living with the father of her child.  Her pregnancy287
made her visible as a sexual actor, and her independence from any
visible male partner in her life challenged the status of men as
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288. Cf. KARST, supra note 171, at 141-46 (discussing the importance of symbolism and
social meaning in the debate over welfare benefits to unmarried female heads of households).
289. Id. at 88 (discussing the expressive meaning of Jim Crow, and stating that much of
the Jim Crow system was “‘symbolic speech,’ drawing the boundaries of community and
placing black people outside”) (footnote omitted).
heads of households, protectors, and providers.  Under these288
circumstances, permitting Cazares to share the stage with other
students would not only signal her worthiness as an honoree on
equal terms with her peers, it would challenge the status hierarchy
of gender. Rather than honoring Cazares as an equal, the school
preferred to deprive all students of such honors. Presumably,
enough parents and students who would otherwise have benefited
from the ceremony went along with this decision, despite some cost
to themselves, so as to enable such a response. As the theory of
status competition explains, in doing so, they reaffirmed the lower
status of persons like Cazares and at the same time preserved their
own higher status.
After the cancellation, the message of unequal concern sounded
by the initial exclusion was not silenced by the end of the differen-
tial treatment; it was amplified by the “equal” deprivation of the
ceremony inflicted on other students. In language loosely borrowed
from Kenneth Karst, when the school made the initial determina-
tion to exclude Cazares from the ceremony, it drew the boundaries
of community and placed Cazares and others like her outside of it.289
When this practice was identified as unlawful discrimination, the
school’s response was to relinquish that particular site of commu-
nity rather than to broaden it to include Cazares. In the battle
over social meaning, the value of the honor society to the student
population at large took second place to the value of denying
Cazares equal concern.
As with Palmer, an inquiry into whether the leveling down
response in this case was motivated by an animus towards members
of Cazares’s social group would have been fruitless. The school’s
decision makers could have claimed (quite honestly, in all likeli-
hood) that they were motivated only by a desire to promote positive
social values and not any hostility towards Cazares or young women
similarly situated.
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290. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
291. These benefits included the existing grounds and facilities, as well as the intangible
qualities of reputation and tradition.
292. See supra Part I.C.4.
For a slightly different set of issues presented in a leveling down
response, consider the case of the Virginia Military Institute.  If290
VMI had proceeded with a plan to become a private university,
instead of opening its doors to women, it would have also deprived
men of a public military-style education. Even though male cadets
would have retained access to a private VMI, they would have lost
the benefits of attending a state-sponsored VMI. For example,
tuition for VMI cadets presumably would have increased with the
loss of state support. VMI ultimately rejected this path not because
of any qualms about its legality, but for financial considerations.
Such a response, however, should not have been accepted as
complying with equal protection. Although not acknowledged at the
time, VMI’s plan failed even to remedy the differential treatment in
the case. The state’s centuries of investment could not be wiped out
overnight, therefore a newly reconfigured private VMI would still
extend to men the state-subsidized benefits made possible by the
state’s prior relationship with VMI.  A newly private VMI would291
have continued to provide men, but not women, with the legacy of
a state-subsidized VMI education, so that the state would have
effectively continued to indirectly subsidize a VMI education for the
school’s male cadets.
The VMI example underscores a cautionary note that the
determination of whether leveling down complies with equality
should not be made from an ahistorical perspective that focuses only
on the precise moment in time that the remedy is implemented. In
this respect, VMI’s proposal to privatize should be invalid even
under existing precedent where the Court has recognized other
allegedly neutral responses as thinly veiled efforts to hide ongoing
state-sponsored discrimination.  These cases suggest that the VMI292
proposal to go private should have been rejected under traditional
equal protection doctrine even without attention to social meaning
and its relationship to a norm of equal concern.
Even if VMI’s proposal had truly leveled the treatment for
everyone by closing its doors entirely and depriving both men and
women of a VMI education, public or private, such a response would
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293. See KARST, supra note 171, at 113.
still conflict with the norm of equal concern. As suggested by the
preceding discussions of Palmer and Cazares, such a response would
have preserved the status differential enforced by the initial
exclusion of women from VMI, and possibly even enhanced it. A
decision to continue to keep women out of VMI, even at great cost to
men, would have signaled the extent to which women were deval-
ued, to the point where the very presence of women would debase a
VMI education. Such a decision would have functioned to preserve
men’s social roles as warriors and citizens, protecting the masculine
ideal of VMI from being diluted by the visibility of women who
performed the role of VMI cadets. As Kenneth Karst explains,
“[b]ecause manhood has no existence except as it is expressed and
perceived, the pursuit of manhood is an expressive undertaking, a
series of dramatic performances.”  A leveling down decision in this293
context would have functioned to preserve the social meaning of
masculinity and its linkage with civic virtue and VMI’s “citizen-
soldier” ideal.
B. Three Examples Where it May Not
While the previous examples all point in the same direction,
not all leveling down remedies necessarily violate equality law.
There are at least three kinds of situations where leveling down in
response to inequality may be consistent with the value of equal
concern. First, where the injury from the inequality is a formal
equality injury, adequately redressed by the end to differential
treatment, leveling down may not necessarily signal a lack of equal
concern for those who challenged the inequality. Second, where the
level of treatment for the favored class has been inflated by unjust
privilege, such that it has been set based on an exclusionary norm,
some leveling down may be necessary to extend the benefit on an
equal basis. Finally, there may be some instances in which inequal-
ity cannot be leveled up because the nature of the benefit itself is so
exclusionary that it cannot be extended to outsiders, such that
equality must be achieved by the elimination, not extension, of
privilege. These are not completely distinct categories, but they are
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294. 465 U.S. 728 (1984).
295. Id. at 730-40. This case is discussed in greater detail supra Part I.C.2.
296. As discussed above, the Court upheld the provision as a valid interim measure
designed to protect the social security system’s financial solvency and the reliance interests
of those persons who planned their retirement under the prior gender-based system. See
supra note 113 and accompanying text.
detailed separately to illustrate the variety of cases in which
leveling down may be compatible with an equal concern norm.
An example of the first situation is found in Heckler v.
Mathews,  in which the Court upheld standing for male plaintiffs294
challenging the SSA’s interim provision allowing wives and widows,
but not husbands or widowers, to receive full spousal benefits
without first having to show financial dependence on a spouse or
offset other government pension funds.  In upholding standing295
despite a severability clause that would have limited the remedy to
a withdrawal rather than an extension of benefits, the Court
explained that the injury in an equality claim inheres in the stigma
from the discriminatory treatment and not the deprivation of the
material benefit itself. The Court found that the injury was
redressable because the differential treatment could be eliminated
by denying benefits to women rather than extending them to men.
Although the Court’s appreciation of the stigmatic injury from
discrimination did not fully capture the expressive meaning of
leveling down, the Court correctly concluded that any injury in that
case was limited to the stigma that attached to the differential
treatment itself, and would be cured by equalizing the level of
benefits provided to men and women. The injury to the male
plaintiff in Mathews was a formal equality injury, the failure to
treat similarly situated persons similarly. Had the plaintiff
prevailed,  the subsequent leveling down of benefits for women296
would not have signaled the low social status of men or expressed
unequal concern for men.
To the extent that men experienced an expressive harm from the
disadvantageous treatment, it too would be remedied by the leveling
down of benefits to women. By providing men with less generous
social security spousal benefits, the provision reflected the tradi-
tional view of men as breadwinners, with the expectation that their
pensions would serve as the primary source of retirement money.
This expectation values a traditional version of masculinity while it
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marginalizes other kinds of masculinity in which men do not serve
as the primary financial providers for their families. To the extent
that the challenged law inflicted expressive harm on the male
plaintiffs by devaluing nontraditional masculinities, a shift to equal
treatment redresses this harm. With the differential expectation of
men’s and women’s breadwinning roles excised, the statute would
no longer express the expectation of a particular socially-preferred
male role or marginalize nonconforming men. 
Likewise, to the extent that the double-edged sword of gender
stereotypes inflicted an expressive harm on women, it too would be
remedied by the elimination of the differential treatment. By not
counting women’s government pensions to offset spousal benefits,
the challenged rule treated social security spousal benefits for
women as a handout, not linked to women’s participation in the
workplace, reflecting the expectation that women’s pensions would
not amount to enough to warrant offsetting them against spousal
benefits. This expectation reinforced the invisibility of women as
workers, treating their place in the workplace as peripheral. This
harm too would end with the uniform treatment of social security
spousal benefits for men and women. Leveling down in this case
would not devalue men or women in relation to each other, nor
would it reinforce an expectation of men as breadwinners that
marginalizes non-conforming men. Indeed, the withdrawal of
automatic benefits from women, by declining to subsidize women’s
presumed financial dependence on men, could be read as contribut-
ing to a construction of relationships between men and women
based on a new benchmark of social and financial equality. In short,
the expressive harm from the stereotypes underlying the statute
ended along with the differential treatment.
The second type of situation where leveling down may satisfy a
principle of equal concern is where the level of treatment reflects an
inflated privilege that was set using an exclusionary standard. In
such a case, some leveling down may be necessary to find a sustain-
able and inclusive level of treatment that is consistent with equal
concern. To return to the Title IX setting, some leveling down of
male athletic privilege may be necessary to extend athletic opportu-
nities to women on an equal basis. The baseline for the treatment
of male athletes has been set partially in reliance on notions of male
privilege. In particular, some of the privilege associated with being
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a male football or basketball player in a highly esteemed sports
program has been inflated by the privileging of masculinity.
Expenditures on the most highly valued men’s college sports,
football and basketball, continue to escalate at shocking rates.  It297
is no coincidence that these two most highly funded sports are also
the sports that most closely fit a cultural ideal of masculinity that
emphasizes brute force, explosive speed and a male body type that
is highly differentiated from the feminine. The extraordinary levels
of spending for these sports have been set based on an understand-
ing that they would not extend across the athletic program to female
athletes, or even to male athletes in less valued sports. It would
break the bank to extend this level of funding to women athletes,
and it is not required by the principle of equal concern. Rather,
equality law should permit some leveling down to find a baseline
that is not based on male privilege.
It should be emphasized, however, that although this rationale
may justify cuts in the inflated standard of living for some men’s
sports teams, it does not necessarily support cuts in the opportuni-
ties for lesser-valued men’s sports as an alternative to adding sports
for women. A proposal to do just that was offered by Brown
University as an attempt to comply with Title IX in the challenge
brought by female athletes seeking additional athletic teams.298
Rather than finding a sustainable level of funding so that equal
numbers of women could share in the benefits of sports, this
proposal would have preserved the more highly privileged status of
the most-valued male athletes, while sacrificing lesser-valued male
athletes, in order to avoid making room for greater numbers of
female athletes. The expressive message from such an action is that
women athletes are not worth the resources necessary to support
even those opportunities that had been provided to lesser-valued
male athletes, much less the reallocation of excess resources
provided to the most privileged male athletes. 
Brown University’s leveling down proposal was particularly
problematic because it proposed to cut even more men’s sports than
necessary to fund the additional opportunities that it would take to
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numbers and why the smaller number of added opportunities for women would have complied
with Title IX).
300. This kind of devaluation of women’s athletic opportunities in relation to men’s was
also ubiquitous in the popular culture at the tim e of the litigation. See Deborah Brake &
Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward Gender Equity in
Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. &  POL’Y 51, 91 (1996) (describing a New York
Times article reporting on the Cohen v. Brown University litigation which characterized the
potential loss of men’s opportunities as “more important” than the potential for prompting
new claims for additional women’s teams). It continues today in popular debates over Title
IX’s effect on men’s opportunities and the work of the Secretary’s Commission on Opportunity
in Athletics. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
301. Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983);
Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
302. See Norris, 463 U.S. at 1091-94; Manhart, 435 U.S. at 721-23.
comply with Title IX.  As the district court explained, Brown299
proposed cutting 200 men, even though it only needed to add about
40 new spaces for women in order to comply with Title IX. Yet, the
First Circuit chastised the district court for rejecting this proposal,
holding that Title IX’s equality mandate could be satisfied either by
adding sports for women or by cutting them for men. The court did
not engage in the kind of interpretive inquiry advocated here. Had
it done so, it may well have found that the expressive meaning of
Brown’s action was to devalue female athletes as less worthy than
male athletes of receiving sports opportunities and the resources
that support them.  Indeed, Brown’s proposal to cut enough men300
so that it could comply without adding a single woman to its athletic
programs was so severe as to contain a punitive message, namely,
that it does not pay for women to challenge inequality in sports. As
these messages conflict with the principle of equal concern, the
court should have rejected the proposal as inconsistent with Title
IX’s nondiscrimination mandate.
A similar issue of how to remedy inequality in benefits when
the baseline has been inflated by privilege surfaced in a pair of
Supreme Court cases addressing sex-based differentials in pension
plans. In these cases, the Court struck down the use of sex-based
tables that disadvantaged women in pension premiums and
benefits as a violation of Title VII.  The Court, however, refused to301
allow “retroactive relief,” as that would have disrupted the settled
expectation of employers and plan managers to pay out a certain
level of benefits based on past premiums.  The Court assumed that302
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art8
2004] WHEN EQUALITY LEAVES EVERYONE WORSE OFF 597
303. See Norris, 463 U.S. at 1091-94; Manhart, 435 U.S. at 721-22.
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Some of these everyday privileges—for instance, the ability to shop in a
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as “unearned power that is systematically conferred.”
Id.
a leveling up remedy that calculated future pay-outs based on
premiums already paid into the system, without regard to sex-based
differentials, would require pension plans to pay women an amount
matching the higher payments to men. The Court was unwilling to
impose such a remedy for those premiums already paid into the
system because of the financial burden of imposing unanticipated
costs on employers and their pension plans.  Instead, the Court303
required only a remedy for premiums prospectively paid into the
system, leaving unremedied inequality in pensions based on
amounts already paid into the system. As some scholars have noted,
the Court assumed wrongly that the only option was to elevate
women’s pensions to the higher benefit level that had been paid to
men under the sex-based tables modeled on the average male
worker.  That level of benefits, however, was artificially inflated304
by an exclusionary ideal because it had been based on a sex-specific
model using the average male worker as the norm. The Court
failed to consider an alternative choice that would have complied
with equal concern: leveling the amount of benefits to a baseline
for a gender-inclusive worker with an average, gender-neutral
life expectancy. This choice might have eased the Court’s fear of
bankrupting pension plans, while still complying with a principle of
equal concern.
A third and final example of situations where leveling down may
comply with equal concern is where the benefit at stake is so
exclusionary in nature and so distorted by privilege that it defies
restructuring on an inclusive basis.  In such cases, equality law305
may require the elimination of the privilege rather than extending
it to others. To return to the athletics context, certain privileges
accorded male athletes fall into this category. At the prestigious
level of NCAA Division I-A football, for example, it is a common
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306. See Kirk Johnson, Boulder Rattled By Charges Against Football Team , N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2004, at A12; see also Brake, supra note 30, at 93-102 (discussing male athletic
privilege in college and university sports programs).
307. Mayberry v. Waverly Pub. Sch., No. L89-50091-CA, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10249, at
*1-*2 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 3, 1990).
308. Id.
practice to have the football team housed in a hotel the night
before home games. The rationale typically rests on the difficulty of
otherwise controlling and disciplining the players to avoid the kind
of behavior that would hurt their game performance. The practice
is based on a model of a male athlete who embodies a ruggedly
uncontrollable masculinity and it is applied uniquely to football
players. Extending such a practice to female athletes, at least on the
same rationale, would make little sense. Instead, equality should
require readjusting the athletic model upon which the practice
is based to a gender-inclusive standard that holds all athletes
responsible for their own behavior. 
Other privileges afforded elite male athletes also fit this model.
For example, as the recent controversy at the University of Colorado
has highlighted, male athletes on the most valued men’s sports
teams often escape standard disciplinary consequences for a wide
variety of misbehavior, including, at the extreme, rape and sexual
assault of female students.  Their virtual exemption from institu-306
tional disciplinary structures is based on a decidedly male ideal of
an athlete embodying a particularly virulent form of hyper-mascu-
linity. Equality does not require the extension of such privileges to
female athletes, and is best served by eliminating them completely.
Another example of a case where an exclusionary benefit may
defy restructuring on an inclusive basis, and one toward which I
confess a greater degree of ambivalence than the prior examples,
comes from a case involving the cancellation of a school play
thought to be limiting in its roles for African American students.
In Mayberry v. Waverly Public Schools, the school district cancelled
the school play once it learned of the drama teacher’s decision not
to cast an African American student in a theatrical production of
“Arsenic and Old Lace.”  The teacher’s reason for not casting the307
student was “that she did not think the audience would accept an
interracial family set in the 1930s or 1940s.”  Instead of reversing308
the teacher’s decision when it was challenged, the school district
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cancelled the play and decided to seek out other theatrical opportu-
nities for the student, both in the school district and at other
schools and private institutions.  The court held that this was an309
appropriate remedy to the discrimination by the teacher, based on
its assumption that leveling down is an acceptable remedy to an
equality claim.  As the court explained, “all students were treated310
equally with regard to participation in the play.”  If the court is311
right, however, that this remedy corrects the prior inequality, it is
not merely because all students are treated the same with respect
to the school play. Rather, it is because the selection of this
particular school play, in which roles for African American students
are inadequate or nonexistent, confers a privilege on students of
other races that cannot be restructured on an inclusive basis. If
there were truly no theatrically appropriate roles for African
American students in the play, the expressive meaning of the play’s
cancellation would be to recognize that it is wrong to offer such a
benefit that cannot be shared with African American students. The
cancellation then would be an appropriate elimination of white
privilege, consistent with equal concern.
My ambivalence about this example comes from my strong
skepticism that the benefit in question could not have been made
available to African American students on an equal basis. If the
drama teacher’s decision was itself based on biased notions of proper
racial roles in the play and in society at large, or reflected an
accommodation of audience racism, then the cancellation of the play
may be read as endorsing racial prejudice in a way that furthers the
expressive harm of the discrimination in casting. It would have been
more consistent with equal concern to challenge fixed notions about
racially appropriate roles, using the play as a teaching tool to
challenge racism both in the society in which the play was set and
in contemporary audience expectations. Read in this light, the
decision to cancel the play, rather than adopt a racially inclusive
approach to casting, preserved and reinforced the outsider status of
African American students in the broader school community. In the
final analysis, whether the cancellation was an appropriate remedy
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313. Zernike, No License, supra note 27.
314. See id. (stating that “Oregon gay rights advocates see powerful— and somewhat
delicious— symbolism ,” and quoting one advocate as saying, “[i]t’s not altogether bad for a
heterosexual couple that has always thought of marriage as an inalienable right to be told no.
It might make them think about how same-sex couples get told no all the tim e.”); Oregon Gay
Marriage Case Consolidated, THE FRONTRUNNER, Mar. 25, 2004 (describing Benton County’s
decision to temporarily suspend issuance of all marriage licenses until the Oregon Supreme
Court rules on the validity of Oregon’s marriage law limiting marriage to one man and one
woman, and stating “‘[t]he decision has found favour with pro-gay marriage activists who
argue that at least it sends a clear message that everyone is entitled to equal rights.’”).
315. See Zernike, No License, supra note 27.
to inequality or furthered the expressive harm of the discrimination
turns on the expressive meaning of the cancellation, which is itself
subject to dispute.
A final example that raises the question of what privileges should
be eliminated, as opposed to restructured on an inclusive basis,
comes from the controversy over same-sex marriage as it played out
recently in Benton County, Oregon.  In my view, the county’s312
decision to temporarily suspend all marriage licenses pending
resolution of the validity of state marriage law did not violate equal
concern, given the particular social context of that situation. First
and foremost, the leveling down occurred not as resistance to the
equality challenge by gays and lesbians to the state’s marriage laws,
but in furtherance of it. Having first announced that it would begin
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, county officials acted
to suspend all marriage licenses only after a lawsuit was filed to
block the extension of marriage to same-sex couples.  In this313
situation, the leveling down decision was not a defensive construc-
tion of social meaning designed to reinforce a status hierarchy
disparaging gay and lesbian couples. Instead, it was a tactic
designed to challenge that status hierarchy and hasten the exten-
sion of marriage to gay and lesbian couples by equalizing the status
of their relationships. Importantly, the measure was understood by
members of the gay and lesbian community as breaking down,
rather than reinforcing, status differentials between gay and
straight couples.  Finally, it is significant that the leveling down314
of marriage was designed as a temporary measure, as part of a
larger strategy to ultimately extend the privilege of marriage to
same-sex couples.315
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However, that answer, relying on the particular fact pattern in
Benton, Oregon, begs the larger question of whether a successful
equality challenge to marriage’s exclusion of gay and lesbian couples
could, or should, be remedied by the elimination of marriage
altogether. This is a more difficult question. Some gay and lesbian
rights activists have argued that marriage is a fundamentally
heterosexist and patriarchal institution that should be undermined
and destabilized, rather than extended to same-sex couples.  If316
accepted, their argument would lead to the conclusion that marriage
is an unjust privilege that defies restructuring on an inclusive basis,
such that equality is best served by eliminating rather than
extending it. However, other feminist scholars and gay and lesbian
rights advocates have argued that marriage could and should be
restructured on an inclusive and equal basis, and that the inclusion
of same-sex couples would help shape marriage as a more just and
valuable social institution.  I tend to agree with these scholars and317
believe that the elimination of marriage, as a response to a success-
ful equality challenge by same-sex couples, would violate equal
concern, and that equal concern would be better served by the
restructuring of marriage so that its benefits are available to all
couples regardless of gender.
As these last examples suggest, difficult interpretive questions
may arise in distinguishing between leveling down as a legitimate
reassessment of privilege and leveling down as an expression of
unequal concern. Yet, engaging in such an analysis has the
advantage of taking into consideration the kinds of questions that
should be important to equality law rather than assuming that all
leveling down responses are the same and fully satisfy equality
norms.  It also has the advantage of causing us to think more318
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AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 498-99 (1992) (“the best way to take into account
the full range of symbols, good and bad, noble and vain, is for the legal system to ignore them
all—mine and yours alike.”). The alternative of narrowing the equality principle to recognize
only facially differential treatment and actions premised on a provable, subjective
discriminatory intent is highly unsatisfying, and leaves out much of what is at stake in an
equality claim : contest over social hierarchies and expressive meaning. See supra notes 219-63
and accompanying text.
319. For literature on white privilege and arguments that discrimination law should be
understood as addressing questions of privilege, see Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind But Now
I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 M ICH. L.
REV. 953 (1993); Tina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The
Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or other isms), in STEPHANIE
W ILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 87
(1996); Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1659 (1995); Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making
Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881 (1995).
deeply about inequality and discrimination by recognizing the
existence of unjustified privilege, and the failure to extend justified
privilege, as lapses of equal concern, wholly apart from the existence
of differential treatment.319
IV. ADVANCING THE DEBATE OVER EQUALITY’S NORMATIVE VALUE
The approach taken here contrasts sharply with scholarly
accounts of leveling down in the legal literature debating equality’s
normative appeal. In contrast to the inattention to leveling down in
other areas of legal scholarship, leveling down has figured promi-
nently in the ongoing debate about whether the ideal of equality has
any independent meaning or normative appeal. The critics of
equality cite the permissibility of leveling down in support of their
overall critique of equality rights. Equality’s defenders respond to
the leveling down objection either by arguing that leveling down is
not as problematic as the critics assume, or by contending that it is
not quite so unlimited a response as equality’s critics contend.
Neither the critics nor the defenders of equality, however, grapple
sufficiently with the expressive meaning of leveling down in
concrete cases or the impatience  of social context in determining
the compatibility of leveling down with equality rights. As a result,
both sides of the debate are too sanguine about the flexibility of
equality rights in accepting leveling down and stop short of fully
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Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136 (1982); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A
Reply to Professor Westen, 81 M ICH. L. REV. 575 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the
Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters,
17 GA. L. REV. 245 (1983).
324. See Christopher Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1997) [hereinafter
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acknowledging the possibilities for equality-based limits on leveling
down.
A. Equality’s Critics and the Leveling Down Objection
Peter Westen first launched the debate in legal circles over
equality’s moral value with the publication of his article, “The
Empty Idea of Equality.”  As the title suggests, Professor Westen320
took the position that equality as a normative principle has no
independent content—that it does not prescribe any way of acting
that is not also compelled by other, noncomparative norms.321
Westen’s later writing qualified his initial thesis to some extent,322
but many of the questions raised in his initial critique continue to
percolate in legal scholarship. Numerous scholars responded by
arguing that the ideal of equality does have normative force and
that it should continue to hold a prominent place in law and
morality.323
In recent years, a revised critique of equality drawing on and
extending Westen’s initial thesis has generated new interest in the
question of whether equality is an empty or objectionable ideal.
Christopher Peters has presented a complex argument that goes
beyond Westen’s more limited critique of equality to advocate the
abandonment of prescriptive equality in legal and political
rhetoric.  Peters, more so than Westen, objects specifically to what324
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directive to treat likes alike merely because they are alike—has no moral validity.”).
325. See, e.g., Peters, Equality Revisited, supra note 324, at 1237-39 (describing the absurd
result prescriptive equality can mandate in conditions of scarcity).
326. Id. at 1215.
327. Id. at 1222-24.
328. Id. at 1257. By defining prescriptive equality in a way that does have meaning beyond
a mere tautology, Peters observes that he parts ways with Westen, whose first article on the
topic claim ed that equality, defined as “treat likes alike,” is always tautological. Id.
329. See id. at 1237-39 & n.46.
330. See id.
he views as the inherent acceptability of leveling down in response
to assertions of equality rights. In his indictment of equality, Peters
contends that to the extent that equality has any independent
normative force, it lacks normative appeal because it requires
absurd results.  Peters agrees with Westen that, if equality is325
defined as “treat likes alike,” it is reduced to a tautology and empty
of any normative content.  Peters, however, argues that equality326
has a nontautological meaning in that when one person or group has
received better treatment than what is deserved under the relevant
substantive criteria, a similarly situated person or group may assert
an equality right to that same treatment, which is also incorrect
under the relevant substantive criteria. Peters labels this kind of
equality “nontautological prescriptive equality.”  He concedes that327
this version of equality has normative content and is not empty. Yet,
he contends that it is “worse than empty; it is both incongruous and
inherently unjust, and thus it is morally invalid.”328
It is in this context that Peters addresses leveling down as a
response to inequality. Peters views the acceptability of leveling
down as symptomatic of what is wrong with prescriptive equality:
when one group has been wrongly denied a benefit under the
relevant criteria, a similarly situated group that has properly
enjoyed that benefit under the relevant criteria nonetheless may be
brought down to the incorrect level of the first group.  In discuss-329
ing this problem, Peters starts from the premise that an actor who
is constrained by an equality principle may always comply with that
principle by lowering the level of treatment for those who are better
off to the level of those who are worse off.  For Peters, the right to330
equality is satisfied by equal treatment in either direction.
Using this reasoning, Peters launches a two-fold attack on
equality rights. On the one hand, he argues, prescriptive equality is
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meaningless in that it says nothing about how to determine the
proper level of treatment for anyone. The substantive criteria for
determining who deserves what level of treatment must be derived
from external substantive rules, independent of equality.  For331
example, the substantive rule of treatment for Jackson city services
might be that all city residents deserve access to any public
swimming pool. If Jackson then provides public pool access to some
but not to other residents, it has violated this substantive rule.
Equality rights, under this argument, are devoid of content in that
they merely piggy-back on the guiding substantive rule, without
having any input into the content of the underlying substantive
rule. Under this reasoning, if some city residents are denied access
to pools, in violation of the substantive rule, they should be able to
secure the proper treatment under that substantive rule without
resort to equality rights.
On the other hand, Peters argues, to the extent that prescriptive
equality does have meaning, that meaning is unjust. Although
prescriptive equality says nothing about the content of the substan-
tive rule, it may serve as the reason for extending incorrect
treatment to additional persons. For example, if some city residents
have been incorrectly denied access to public pools under the
relevant substantive criteria, prescriptive equality might serve as
the basis for extending that incorrect treatment to those city
residents who had been properly permitted access to city pools.
Accordingly, Peters argues, prescriptive equality is worse than
meaningless; it is unjust.  To Peters, the permissibility of leveling332
down supports the rejection of equality rights altogether.
As an example of how equality rights produce harmful and unjust
consequences, Peters invokes Palmer v. Thompson.  As Peters333
reads Palmer, the Court endorsed the egalitarian premise that the
unjust denial of a benefit to one group warrants the further unjust
denial of that benefit to a similarly situated group. Peters views this
premise as the remedial conclusion to be drawn from prescriptive
equality, which he defines as treating one person or group in a
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338. See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, EQUALITY OR PRIORITY? (1995).
certain way as a sufficient reason for according the same treatment
to a similarly situated group.334
Another example Peters uses to illustrate the leveling down
objection to equality rights comes from litigation challenging
inequality in school funding.  In response to a New Jersey335
Supreme Court ruling that the state constitution requires equal
funding for public schools,  then-Governor Christine Whitman336
proposed a remedial plan to lower spending in richer districts to the
level of funding for poorer districts. Although Governor Whitman
ultimately retreated from this proposal in response to pressure from
irate parents, Peters cites the incident as an example of the harmful
and unjust consequences of prescriptive equality.337
To Peters, Palmer and the New Jersey school funding cases
demonstrate the harm of applying prescriptive equality for its own
sake. Peters contends that the very real possibility that one group
may become worse off simply because the same fate has befallen a
similarly situated group warrants the rejection of prescriptive
equality as a principle of justice. Peters draws on scholars in other
fields, such as philosophy and political science, who have likewise
invoked the problem of leveling down as a reason for rejecting
equality as an independent norm. Like Peters, these scholars claim
that equality is not defensible if it results in a leveling down of
benefits that makes the favored group worse off and the disfavored
group no better off.  338
The expressive meaning approach to leveling down advocated
here contrasts sharply with the treatment of leveling down by
Peters and the critics of equality. Both approaches share an
assessment that leveling down in response to inequality raises
issues that are more problematic than generally acknowledged.
Peters’s objection to leveling down, however, stems from utilitarian
calculations rather than a concern for remedying injuries of the
persons asserting equality rights. Under the expressive meaning
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approach, the problem with leveling down is not the utilitarian one
of diverting social resources from their presumptively most benefi-
cial use.  Rather, it is that leveling down may express unequal339
concern and solidify social inequality. More significantly, Peters’s
approach concedes too readily that leveling down always satisfies
equality rights, based on a cramped definition of equality as limited
to protection from differential treatment. Peters focuses on the
injustice of compounding one wrongful material deprivation with
another, as in Palmer, without fully considering whether the
leveling down exacerbated the injuries of the African American
residents of Jackson and violated the principle of equal concern.
Peters’s equating of Palmer and the New Jersey school funding
cases is symptomatic of a narrow view of equality as equal treat-
ment. Peters assumes that the two cases are alike in that both
leveling down responses fully satisfy equality rights. If the animat-
ing principle in an equality right is equal concern, however, then the
two cases differ significantly. As elaborated above, the leveling down
in Palmer expressed unequal concern and functioned as a last-ditch
effort to preserve the existing social meanings of race and the
attendant racial hierarchy. The message and the resulting stigma
from the pool closures cut to the heart of an equality right. In the
New Jersey funding case, on the other hand, it is not so clear that
the leveling down in funding conflicts with equal concern. Peters
laments the unfortunate state of affairs that would occur if one
school received less funding than it otherwise would have simply
because another school received less funding than it should.
Although such a result may indeed be regrettable from the perspec-
tive of the children attending the wealthier school, it may or may
not be problematic as measured against a principle of equal concern.
If the level of funding for richer districts could not be sustained if
the state had to ensure equal funding to all other districts, equal
concern may require resetting the baseline in order to share the
resources at a sustainable level. The implementation of funding
reductions that are necessary to set a sustainable baseline for all
school districts would diminish, rather than entrench, social
stratification and status differentials among persons in relatively
wealthier and poorer districts. 
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Of course, social context matters. If Governor Whitman’s proposal
lowered the richer district’s funding more than necessary and set a
baseline lower than the average level of wealth, her proposal would
be more problematic. In that case, setting the baseline below an
average sharing of the wealth would punish the plaintiffs by
minimizing the gains from their equality challenge, and express
unequal concern by signaling that children in wealthier districts
deserve all the money available for their education, while children
in poorer districts are less worthy of maximized educational
resources.
Peters’s failure to engage a norm of equal concern that is sensitive
to expressive meaning and its role in reproducing inequality leads
him to the conclusion that the inherent acceptability of leveling
down in response to equality rights weighs in favor of abandoning
equality rights altogether. Leveling down is more often in tension
with equality law and the principle of equal concern, however, than
Peters recognizes. An expressive meaning approach that is sensitive
to the social setting in which inequality occurs would limit leveling
down responses more than equality’s critics acknowledge.
B. The Treatment of Leveling Down by Equality’s Defenders
Unlike equality’s critics, legal scholars who have weighed in to
defend equality rights do not view leveling down as a reason for
rejecting equality as a principle of justice. Their responses, however,
also concede too much remedial flexibility to equality, albeit not
quite as much as equality’s critics. The defense of equality could be
strengthened by a greater attention to the expressive meaning of
leveling down, and how that expressive meaning may conflict with
a requirement of equal concern.
Numerous legal scholars have responded to the critique of
equality described above.  Responses to the leveling down340
objective, in particular, tend to take one of two forms. One approach
concedes that leveling down is a permissible response to the
assertion of equality rights, but argues that it is not as problematic
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as equality’s critics contend. The other approach argues that the
permissibility of leveling down is overstated, and seeks to elaborate
the conditions under which leveling down is an acceptable response
to the assertion of equality rights. This second approach has the
most in common with the expressive meaning approach advocated
in this Article. Even here, however, the defenders of equality stop
short of recognizing the full extent of the potential incompatibility
between leveling down and equality rights. The following discussion
focuses on the work of Professor Kenneth Simons, the legal scholar
who has most extensively addressed the leveling down objection in
his defense of equality. Professor Simons’s defense illustrates both
approaches to the leveling down objection.341
In his defense of equality, Professor Simons makes the first type
of argument when he contends that equality’s critics have over-
stated the undesirability of leveling down responses.  He argues342
that leveling down may avoid the stigmatic harm that comes from
unequal treatment, thereby creating a better state of affairs than
the initial inequality. He explains, “[L]eveling down is not always
troubling. If the benefit in question is not of great importance, and
the seriousness of the equality violation depends significantly on the
invidiousness of the trait (as in cases of racial discrimination), then
the leveling down is not problematic.”  Simons offers the example343
of a hypothetical university president who greets every attendee at
an alumni reception with a voice greeting but only shakes the hands
of white alumni.  Leveling down all interaction to simple vocal344
greetings and not shaking any hands would be an appropriate
remedy, Simons claims, because it would discontinue the stigma to
blacks from the prior practice.
Unlike equality’s critics, Professor Simons recognizes the
importance of stigma as a significant harm from inequality. He
assumes too readily, however, that leveling down remedies that
stigma, and views the stigma as tied to the differential treatment.
As discussed previously, even facially neutral treatment can inflict
expressive harm and stigma, and leveling down may actually
exacerbate the expressive harms of the prior unequal treatment. To
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345. Id. at 766. Simons approvingly cites Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Ry. Express
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opposed to the law. Id. For my response to Justice Jackson’s perspective as it relates to
leveling down, see supra Part II.B.
346. See supra Part II.B.
use the handshake example, Professor Simons’s analysis does not
allow for the possibility that the refusal to shake anyone’s hand as
a remedy to the inequality may magnify rather than reduce the
stigma. The legitimacy of the refusal to shake hands depends on its
expressive meaning. In my view, the refusal to shake hands with
anyone in response to an equality claim challenging racially
selective handshakes sounds alarmingly similar to the refusal by
whites to share pools with blacks in Palmer. Simons’s qualification
of limiting leveling down’s acceptability to cases in which the benefit
at issue is not of great importance does not allay this concern. The
expressive harm of leveling down may exist regardless of the
significance of the benefit, if the across-the-board withdrawal of the
benefit is premised on a message of disregard and unequal concern.
Perhaps one reason why Professor Simons is not as troubled by
leveling down as equality’s critics is that he has greater faith in the
political process to provide sufficient protection against the harms
of leveling down. As he explains:
[A]n important political constraint often, as a practical matter,
limits the scope and severity of both the multiplication of wrong
and the leveling down objections. Equality rights are often
invoked by minorities. If government responds [sic] to a violation
by multiplying the wrong or by leveling down (in the sense of
depriving a larger group of an entitlement), this will burden, or
deny a benefit to, a larger class of persons—possibly a much
larger class. This larger class might well employ the political
process to ensure that the problem is remedied by government
eliminating [sic] rather than multiplying the wrong, by leveling
up instead of down.345
As explained above, however, when leveling down occurs as a
defensive construction of social meaning, this faith in the political
process is misplaced.  It rests on a mistaken assumption that the346
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art8
2004] WHEN EQUALITY LEAVES EVERYONE WORSE OFF 611
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348. Sim ons, supra note 340, at 713. Simons’ elaboration of the equality principle also
draws on Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between superficial equal treatm ent and a deeper
“equal concern” or “treatm ent as an equal.” Id. at 720-21 & n.97. Like Dworkin, Simons’s
principle of equality encompasses the broader conception of treatment as an equal. Id.
349. Id. at 715-20.
350. This is true even if the reason for leveling down is nothing other than “a simple desire
to level down to rectify the inequality.” Id. at 716-17 n.84.
351. Id. at 715-16. Simons explains that impure equality rights are still genuine equality
rights, and still flexible in the sense that the decision maker could have avoided the problem
by not offering unequal benefits in the first place. For example, in dealing with an impure
equality right under the Equal Pay Act, although the initial decision to raise wages is
discretionary, once the employer raises wages for men it must also increase wages for women
to comply with the statute.
majority concerns itself with only material goods, and ignores how
the relational aspects of leveling down can function to preserve
unequal social arrangements. While equality’s critics are too quick
to invoke the harmfulness of leveling down as a reason for abandon-
ing equality altogether, equality’s defenders are not as troubled by
it as they should be. Neither the remedying of stigma linked to
differential treatment nor the opportunity for politically based
limits are sufficient answers to leveling down’s propensity to leave
persons worse off for asserting equality rights.
Notwithstanding his argument that the political process can
check leveling down, Professor Simons is troubled enough by the
prospect of leveling down that he devotes a great deal of space to
elaborating equality-based limits on it.  This work falls under the347
second type of argument in response to the leveling down objection:
that equality’s critics overstate the permissibility of leveling down.
Professor Simons grounds this discussion in his broad definition of
equality rights as including “not just the tangible benefits and
burdens distributed by a decision maker, but the deeper and more
subtle question of how a distributional decision affects the status of
different social groups.”  Professor Simons then locates the limit348
on leveling down at the line between what he terms “pure” and
“impure” equality rights.  A “pure” equality right is satisfied either349
by leveling up or leveling down,  while an “impure” equality right350
is asymmetrical and permits remedying the inequality in only one
direction.  This definitional framework serves as the primary351
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352. Simons states that whether an equality right is “pure” or “impure” depends in part on
whether its underlying justification is teleological (the belief that inequality is an intrinsically
bad consequence, regardless of who bears the brunt of it), in which case it must be a pure
equality right, or deontological (recognizing moral concerns other than the intrinsic badness
of inequality itself), in which case it may be either pure or impure. Id. at 717. For those
equality rights grounded in deontological (as opposed to teleological) justifications, this
distinction does not indicate whether leveling down is permissible or not. Because the
majority of equality rights can be justified in both teleological and deontological terms, this
classificatory scheme provides little guidance for deciding when leveling down violates
equality norms.
353. Id. at 716, 718-19. As an example of the former, Simons mentions the Equal Pay Act
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, both of which forbid leveling down remedies
to wage discrim ination. See supra Part I.C.3. As an example of the latter, Simons discusses
several contexts where the level of treatment is fixed, such that a benefit that has been
distributed unequally is vested, and cannot be taken away from persons who have received
it.
354. Sim ons, supra note 340, at 719.
355. Id. at 720.
vehicle for explaining whether a particular equality claim permits
leveling down as a remedy to inequality.352
Simons offers several examples to add content to his distinction
between pure and impure equality rights. As examples of impure
equality rights, Simons points to discrimination statutes that
explicitly reject leveling down remedies and the presence of
principles external to equality that set a fixed level of treatment.353
In contrast, Simons mentions the Equal Protection Clause as an
example of a pure equality right which may be satisfied either by
leveling up or by leveling down. In addition to these examples,
Simons offers one more suggestion for how to distinguish a pure
equality right from an impure equality right. He contends that
impure equality rights are more plausible where the inequality is
premised on an impermissible trait.  He explains this distinction354
by looking at the nature of the injury from the equality violation.
Where inequality is based on a suspect trait, according to Simons,
the injury often involves the harm of stigma. In such cases, he
acknowledges, a leveling down remedy may not cure the stigma.
Instead, it may add injury to insult by taking away material
benefits, whereas leveling up would at least offer “the salve of
tangible benefits.”  In contrast, Simons continues, when a pure355
equality right is violated, the injury consists solely of the inequality
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art8
2004] WHEN EQUALITY LEAVES EVERYONE WORSE OFF 613
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of tangible benefits. In such cases, leveling down by redistributing
resources may adequately address this harm.356
This is the part of Simons’s analysis that comes the closest to
pinning down why and under what circumstances leveling down
conflicts with equality. Still, the analysis does not fully explore the
relationship between leveling down and equality from the perspec-
tive of an expressive meaning approach. Depending on the social
context, leveling down may not only fail to remedy the stigma from
discrimination based on impermissible traits, it may actually
exacerbate and intensify that stigma. Where Simons views leveling
down in such cases as adding injury (in the form of withholding
benefits) to insult (in the form of stigma from the differential
treatment), it would be more accurate to say that it adds insult
(additional stigma) to injury (the preexisting deprivation of
benefits). Leveling down in a case like Palmer inflicts additional
injury in that the preexisting denial of benefits is now accompanied
by further stigma. This is more than a matter of semantics. The
expressive harm of leveling down inflicts a status-based stigma that
compounds the stigma from the previous differential treatment. In
Palmer, the closure of the pools may have been even more stigmatiz-
ing than the initial segregation. The message that blacks are unfit
to swim with whites was compounded by the demonstration of the
depth of feeling with which this view was held.
More fundamentally, the presence or absence of a suspect trait
should not in itself determine whether leveling down is compatible
with equality rights. Leveling down has very different implications
for the equality right in a case like Mathews than Cazares, even
though both cases involve responses to sex-based discrimination.
The critical difference in the two cases is how the social meaning of
leveling down works to solidify status hierarchies and structure
social relations.357
In the end, Simons’s framework for setting equality-based limits
on leveling down turns on a somewhat elusive distinction between
pure and impure equality rights. This emphasis on the classification
of the equality right as determinative of the permissibility of
leveling down does not fully engage the reasons why leveling down
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358. It is not at all clear that Simons would disagree with this, even though he classifies
equal protection as a pure equality right, because he acknowledges that some facially neutral
actions not premised on a conscious discriminatory intent may still violate equality’s
requirement of equal respect and concern. For example, Simons views Palmer as a case where
the formally similar treatment rested on selective sympathy, in violation of equal concern.
Sim ons, supra note 340, at 721. From this, it is clear that Simons believes that the pool
closure in Palmer conflicted with the equality guarantee, but it is not clear why, since he
otherwise identifies equal protection as a pure equality right. Presumably, Simons would not
view the pool closure as a true leveling down response, but rather as an example of a case
where the greater concern afforded white residents in Jackson was not leveled all the way
down to the very low level of concern shown for blacks. Id. at 722. But this meaning of leveling
down, as referring to the level of concern rather than the level of treatment, differs from how
Sim ons defines leveling down elsewhere as the leveling of treatment. Id. at 707 (stating that
a genuine equality right may be remedied either by extending benefits to all relevant persons
or by uniformly denying benefits to all relevant persons). Using a treatment-focused definition
of leveling down, Simons states that a genuine equality right m ay always be cured by a
uniform denial of benefits unless it is an impure equality right. Id. The leveling down
objection as fram ed by equality’s critics also generally presupposes a leveling of treatment,
not necessarily of concern.
359. Id. at 710 n.60 (citing and quoting from David Miller, Arguments for Equality, 7
M IDWEST STUD. PHIL. 73 (1982)) (noting that “egalitarian argum ents for equality are all
sensitive to relational factors and ‘concerned not merely with how well off individuals are,
measured along some dimension, but with the relative standing of different people on that
may or may not satisfy equality law. For example, although Simons
is clearly correct in his examples of statutory rights that fit his
definition of impure equality rights, it is not so clear that equal
protection is a pure equality right such that it may always be
remedied by leveling down. If the underlying norm of equal
protection is not equal treatment, but equal concern, the determina-
tion of whether leveling down remedies an equal protection violation
must be context-dependent.358
Simons’s analysis of impure equality rights as a constraint on
leveling down remains an important recognition in the literature
that leveling down is not always a permissible response to inequal-
ity. Rather than requiring the classification system for pure and
impure equality rights to perform the analytical work of determin-
ing leveling down’s compatibility with equality law, however, the
analysis would be furthered by a context-driven analysis of the
expressive meaning of leveling down and its consistency with the
principle of equal concern. If, as Simons recognizes is sometimes the
case, the injury from inequality is not limited to the material
deprivation itself, but extends to social relations and the relative
standing of social groups,  then the acceptability of leveling down359
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classes, but they can also require the reduction or minimization of inequality.”); id. at 739-40
(discussing stigma and status-based harms of discrimination).
360. Although Sim ons offers a nuanced and contextual analysis of the relational aspects
of equality norms, he does not follow these insights to their full conclusion at the remedial
stage of the analysis, and so overstates the remedial flexibility of equality norms. Id. at 711
(stating that comparative equality rights “may be flexibly satisfied,” and offering as an
example: “If a court finds that someone has committed an equal protection violation, it may,
consistent with the egalitarian norms embodied in the equal protection clause, permit him to
respond either by extending or by denying the benefits to both classes.”).
361. Cf. Gewirtz, supra note 32, at 587-89 (criticizing highly abstracted, counter-realistic
scholarship on remedies).
362. See KARST, supra note 171, at 245-50.
as a response to inequality should depend on whether it remedies
or exacerbates the relational injuries with which equality is
concerned.360
C. How Attention to Social Context and Expressive Meaning
Would Enrich the Debate
Both sides of the debate over equality’s normative appeal fall
short of fully accounting for the ways in which leveling down may
conflict with equality rights. The understanding of leveling down is
ultimately distorted by the artificiality of the types of examples
typically used, and suffers from a highly abstracted logical and
moral reasoning that is common to this genre of scholarship.  The361
equality under discussion is largely a bloodless and rarefied equality
about children deprived of dessert and Rhodes scholars denied
fellowships. Kenneth Karst’s contribution to this debate is atypical
in this respect, relying heavily on social context and history to
explain why equality is meaningful, although he does not address
the leveling down objection specifically.  Other than an occasional362
reference to Palmer, it is difficult to get a sense of how leveling
down actually works in the legal system to solidify and perpetuate
social relationships of inequality. The ahistorical and abstract
nature of the debate detracts from a complete understanding of
what is at stake in leveling down and its relationship to equality
law.
As an illustration of how hypothetical examples ungrounded in
the case law may influence the analysis, consider an example used
by Professor Simons of inequality in a parent’s allocation of dessert
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363. Sim ons, supra note 340, at 706.
364. Id.
365. A discussion with my colleague, Tom Ross, caused me to question whether even this
seemingly trivial example of leveling down really remedied the injury from the inequality.
Unless there was not enough ice cream to go around, the parent’s response in withholding ice
cream  from both children who are, as the hypothetical assumes, equally deserving of it, seems
harsh and uncaring. The expressive meaning of this response may be to punish the second
child for asserting an equal claim to ice cream, or reaffirm the favored status of the first child
by denying the second child the chance to share in the gift of ice cream  and the affection it
represents. The expressive message to the second child seems capricious at best and hostile
at worst. If equal concern requires a commitment to caring and respect on equal terms, this
response m ay well violate equality’s mandate.
to his children. In his discussion of the criteria that define pure
equality rights, Simons invokes a parent’s promise that if one child
is permitted to have dessert, both children will be permitted to have
it.  Simons observes that if one child is given dessert but the other363
is not, the harm from the inequality is not limited to the incorrect
denial of the dessert to the deprived child. At the same time, he
notes, the harm may be remedied by depriving both children of
dessert.  The outcome of this example may be correct.  If it is364 365
correct, however, its correctness lies in its social context, not in any
inherent feature of equality rights generally. In this example, the
denial of dessert to both children only remedies the harm of the
inequality if the injury amounts to a formal equality injury, limited
to the differential treatment. As long as the stigma to the dessert-
less child inheres in the differential treatment itself, it is cured by
the end of the differential treatment. In that case, the parent’s
remedial decision to deny both children dessert would not represent
a move to preserve the social dominance of the dessert-eating child
or to devalue the dessert-deprived child as unworthy in a way that
reinforces the higher status of the first child. Nor, presumably,
would the resulting denial of dessert to both children express a
desire to punish the second child for asserting a right to be treated
on the same terms as the first child. If we change the social context
to one where status differentials and social stratification matter,
however, it is not at all clear that a uniform denial of a benefit
satisfies the equality right. The disparate dessert example may be
analogous to the male plaintiff’s challenge to the differential
treatment in Social Security benefit calculations in Mathews—a
formal equality injury—but it is a far different case from the injury
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(discussing the importance of “commitment” to law, and how that commitment itself creates
legal meaning).
to status and the exclusionary meaning of the school’s cancellation
of the honor society in Cazares.
CONCLUSION
A more nuanced understanding of leveling down and its relation-
ship to equality, an understanding grounded in the reality of
leveling down as it plays out in actual cases, would further the
debate over equality’s value in important respects. A more critical
approach to leveling down that focuses on whether its expressive
meaning comports with equal concern would support an under-
standing of equality that is less formalistic, more situational, and
more sensitive to status and social relations. It would shape
equality as a worthy and valuable legal construct, not one that
permits absurd results—like the pool closure in Palmer—which we
know, at a gut level, to be wrong. Equality should not leave
everyone worse off, particularly the very persons whom the law
aspires to make whole. To a modest degree, such a rehabilitation of
equality law would help make equality rights worth fighting for.
Although equality law is frequently unsuccessful in performing its
aspirational work, and woefully inadequate as a litigation tool in
challenging entrenched discrimination, these shortcomings stem
from the diluted version of equality embodied in much of current
antidiscrimination doctrine, and not in any inherent limitation in an
equality principle per se. 
A legal system’s commitment to remedying inequality says a
great deal about the kind of equality to which that system sub-
scribes.  The uncritical acceptance of leveling down as a remedy to366
inequality reinforces a particular version of equality that does less
than it should for those in need, and makes the assertion of equality
rights unpopular and unappealing. Nothing in American law, or in
the nature of equality rights generally, requires such an approach.
This Article has sought to shed greater light on leveling down’s
potential to thwart discrimination claims and preserve entrenched
inequalities, in the hope that a greater understanding of the
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problem will spur new efforts to secure a more meaningful equality
that does not punish those who seek it. The problem of leveling
down calls for greater reflection on the meaning of equality as it is
guaranteed in law, and a greater appreciation of the nonmaterial
injuries of inequality. An understanding of equality that tran-
scends a limited right to equal treatment, and protects against the
expressive and relational injuries of inequality, would grant much
less room for leveling down than the conventional understanding
has allowed.
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